Unpresentable landscapes and the art of the index by Smith, Matthew
UNPRESENTABLE LANDSCAPES  
AND THE ART OF THE INDEX 
Matthew Smith 
Doctor of Philosophy 
School of Arts and Cultures  
Newcastle University 
September 2011 
Unpresentable Landscapes and the Art of the Index © 2011 Matthew Smith 
This document is for reference purposes only and may not be copied, reproduced, 
redistributed or disseminated, in whole or in part, without written consent from the 
copyright holder. 
PLEASE NOTE THAT MANY OF THE IMAGES IN THIS ELECTRONIC 
THESIS HAVE BEEN REMOVED DUE TO COPYRIGHT RESTRICTIONS. 
SEE A HARD COPY TO VIEW THE ORIGINAL IMAGES. 
THE VIDEO PIECE RE: FLAMINGO DISCUSSED THROUGHOUT 
THIS THESIS MAY BE VIEWED ONLINE HERE: 
http://vimeo.com/mattjamessmith/reflamingo 
 
ABSTRACT 
This practice-led PhD determines an aesthetic approach through which a sense of 
the ‘unpresentable’ may be exposed within camera-based representations of the 
industrial landscape. Through an interrogation of contemporary lens-based media, it 
proposes ways in which experiences problematic to representation – such as the 
sublime, the uncanny and the traumatic – might be revealed within 
photographic/filmic images of such landscapes. 
The culmination of the practical element of the project is a 25-minute 
narrative-based, single channel video piece entitled Re: Flamingo, which combines 
HDV and Super-8 footage with digital and traditional still photography. The narrative 
structure of the work is based on E.T.A. Hoffmann’s short story The Sandman 
(1816), which Freud cited in his essay The Uncanny (1919). Re: Flamingo is a semi-
autobiographical variation on that tale, consisting of an email conversation between 
the artist, his father and the fictional ‘Clara’. Through this correspondence, the piece 
reveals correlations between themes in The Sandman and Ridley Scott’s science 
fiction film Blade Runner (1982) (e.g. traumatic memory, a fascination with eyes/sight 
and each protagonist’s obsession with mechanized life). It reflects upon how the 
industrial landscape of Teesside – which inspired many of the visuals in Scott’s film – 
has been remembered in different photographic media by three generations of the 
artist's family.  
The practical submission is supported by a contextual written element, which 
consists of two parts. Part One is a theoretical review. Firstly it traces philosophical 
and aesthetic approaches to the sublime, its representation, its status as a subjective 
experience and its presence within the industrial landscape (Lyotard, Kant, Derrida, 
Nye). This is continued through an analysis of the related theories of the uncanny 
and the traumatic (Freud, Vidler, Luckhurst), their association with industrialization 
and relationship with lens-based media. The uncanny qualities of the photographic 
and cinematic image are examined alongside correlations of the indexical properties 
of such images with trauma (Mulvey, Barthes). Finally, an analysis of the camera 
image’s indexical status in the wake of digitization, and its consequent alignment with 
artforms such as painting (Gunning, Rodowick, Manovich), assesses its potential for 
expressing subjective experience. Part Two of the contextual element explores 
creative approaches to the themes outlined in Part One. Firstly, it examines 
Canadian artist Stan Douglas’s film piece Der Sandmann (1995), which exposes a 
sense of the uncanny in the landscape of pre- and post-reunification Germany. 
Secondly, it reflects upon Blade Runner’s significance to the practical element and its 
correlations with the Sandman narrative. The final section of Part Two details the 
development and formation of the studio research, documenting its distinctive 
approach to figuring a sense of the unpresentable within camera-based 
representations of the industrial landscape. 
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The video piece Re: Flamingo is dedicated to  
the memory of my grandad, Bill Smith.
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Substitution of the image 
for relentless earth. What 
do I know of this place … 
We look at the world once, in childhood. 
The rest is memory.  
 
from Nostos by Louise Gluck 
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INTRODUCTION 
This practice-led research project aims to determine an aesthetic approach by 
means of which a sense of the ‘unpresentable’ may be exposed within 
camera-based representations of the industrial landscape. The PhD 
submission consists of two parts: a practical element and a written element. 
The practical submission takes the form of a 25-minute narrative-based film 
piece, which considers how the industrial landscape of Teesside in northeast 
England has been represented in different photographic media by three 
generations of the artist's family. The narrative structure of the piece draws on 
E.T.A. Hoffmann’s short story The Sandman (1816), which Sigmund Freud 
cited in his 1919 essay The Uncanny. It also makes reference to Ridley 
Scott’s science-fiction film Blade Runner (1982), the visuals of which drew 
inspiration from Scott’s childhood memories of the Teesside landscape. The 
written component of the submission gives context to the practical element 
through both an analysis of relevant theoretical concerns and an examination 
of pertinent artworks (‘case studies’). It begins by establishing a theoretical 
framework for the project, examining ideas of the ‘unpresentable’ and their 
relationship to the industrial landscape – in particular through the related 
concepts of the sublime and the uncanny. These ideas are considered in 
relation to theories associated with lens-based media, with a specific focus on 
issues of indexicality and subjectivity in the contemporary photographic/filmic 
image. This is followed by a survey of practical approaches to the themes 
established in the theory section, looking initially at established film works that 
have contributed to the development of my own film piece, and then, finally, 
documenting the evolution of my studio research process. 
 
The Unpresentable 
The notion of the unpresentable is approached within the context of this thesis 
as an aesthetic category embracing a number of concepts that share a 
problematic relationship with artistic representation. The idea that some 
objects, situations or events cannot be represented artistically comes about, 
the philosopher Jacques Ranciere suggests, when “it is impossible to make 
the essential character of the thing in question present … [and] nor can a 
representative commensurate with it be found” (2007: 109-110). He suggests 
that a thing is deemed un-representable because the feeling of “unreality” 
brought about by reducing such an event to material representation “removes 
from the thing represented its weight of existence”, therefore delivering it over 
“to effects of pleasure, play or distance which are incompatible with the gravity 
of the experience it contains” (Ranciere: 110). Such ideas come together to 
suggest that certain phenomena are irreducible to representation – that they 
are, in effect, unpresentable.1 

1
 It should be noted that, although presentation and representation are distinct terms – 
presentation generally denoting the staging of an original event or object, representation 
referring to the interpretation or substitution of the original in a secondary form – the two 
concepts are to some extent conflated in much of the literature discussed here. This 
conflation also extends to the terms ‘unpresentable’ and ‘unrepresentable’: for example, 
Ranciere aligns – rather than differentiates between – the concept of the unpresentable and 
what he calls the unrepresentable (2007: 109).  
It is also interesting to note that Ranciere confesses to “a certain intolerance for an 
inflated use of the notion of the unrepresentable”, suggesting that the term “subsumes under 
a single concept all sorts of phenomena…and it surrounds them all with the same aura of 
holy terror” (2007: 109). In particular he challenges Jean-François Lyotard’s assertion that 
there is a “coincidence between something unthinkable at the heart of the event and 
something unpresentable at the heart of art” (Ranciere: 130). In order to align the two, he 
suggests, the former “must itself have been rendered entirely thinkable, entirely necessary 
according to thought. The logic of the unpresentable can [therefore] only be sustained by a 
hyperbole that ends up destroying it” (Ranciere: 138). Further criticism of Lyotard’s 
conception of the unpresentable is explored later, in Chapter One (see for example p37) 
 
 
 
The term ‘unpresentable’ is perhaps most commonly associated with 
the idea of the sublime, in particular through the writings of the French 
philosopher Jean-François Lyotard. In his most well known work, The 
Postmodern Condition (first published 1979), Lyotard argues that the sublime 
occurs “when the imagination fails to present an object which might, if only in 
principle, come to match a concept” (1984: 78). He explains:  
We can conceive the infinitely great, the infinitely powerful, but every 
presentation of an object destined to "make visible" this absolute greatness or 
power appears to us painfully inadequate. Those are Ideas of which no 
presentation is possible…They can be said to be unpresentable. (1984: 78) 
He reiterates this idea several years later in his essay The Sublime and the 
Avant-Garde (first published 1984) when he writes, “[i]n the event of an 
absolutely large object…or one that is absolutely powerful…the faculty of 
presentation, the imagination, fails to provide a representation corresponding 
to this Idea” (Lyotard 1991: 98). Though traditionally associated with the great, 
the powerful or the awe-inspiring, the sublime’s defining characteristic is, 
ultimately, this irreducibility to any form of cultural framing. From its roots as a 
theory of rhetoric in ancient Greece (Longinus 1964), through its development 
in eighteenth-century descriptions of the vast and terrible in the natural 
landscape (Addison 1718), to its categorization as a form of subjective 
experience (Burke 1990, Kant 1952), to postmodern theory (Lyotard 1991, 
2010) and contemporary visions of a technological sublime (Jameson 1991, 
Nye 1994), the concept seems to cohere as an aesthetic category only 
through its resistance to limitations.  
 
Since the concept gained popularity in the eighteenth century, the 
problem of representing the elusive experience of the sublime has 
preoccupied visual artists as much as it has philosophers and theorists. The 
epic landscapes of the painter Caspar David Friedrich (1774-1840), for 
example, provide what have perhaps become the archetypal Romantic-era 
visualizations of the sublime. However, even before Friedrich’s death artists 
were beginning to experiment with ‘new media’ – in the form of the panorama 
and diorama – in an attempt to bypass the limitations that the picture frame 
imposed upon expressing the sensory overload associated with sublime 
experience. In the mid twentieth century, abstract expressionists such as 
Barnett Newman and Mark Rothko dealt with themes that have been 
discussed in terms of the sublime (Lyotard 1991, Rosenblum 2010), while 
more recently the work of filmmaker David Lynch has moved at least one 
theorist to describe a distinctly postmodern version of the sublime in cinema 
(Zizek 2002). 
As has been suggested above, the notion of that which is impossible to 
present need not be considered only in terms of the great and powerful. In his 
essay Presenting the Unpresentable: The Sublime (first published 1982), 
Lyotard offers what is perhaps a more encompassing account of the concept. 
That which cannot be demonstrated, he suggests, is that “for which one 
cannot cite (represent) any example, case in point, or even symbol…because 
to represent is to make relative, to place in context within conditions of 
representation” (2010: 134). This account of the non-demonstrable or 
‘unpresentable’ as that which is irreducible to representation suggests that, as 
an aesthetic category, the notion need not be specific to the sublime alone. 
 
While a consideration of the sublime is an important aspect of this project – 
primarily through its associations with landscape in art – my investigation 
embraces established fields of aesthetic and theoretical enquiry which, though 
closely related, are distinct from that discourse. In particular, it considers the 
relevance of the interrelated concepts of the uncanny and the traumatic, both 
of which possess an important relationship to the idea of the unpresentable. 
Like the sublime, the uncanny resists precise definition. The German 
psychiatrist Ernst Jentsch (b.1867), who was among the first to develop the 
concept, defined it as a “sensation of psychical uncertainty” (1906: 6). 
Furthermore Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), expanding upon Jentsch’s theory in 
his essay The Uncanny (first published 1919), echoes much thinking about 
the sublime when he describes the former concept as belonging “to the realm 
of the frightening, of what evokes fear and dread” (2003a: 123). Jentsch and 
Freud each centre much of their analysis of the uncanny on a reading of 
Romantic author E.T.A. Hoffman’s short story The Sandman (1816), which 
tells of a student who falls in love with an automaton he mistakes for a real 
girl. Jentsch focuses on the confusion of representation and reality brought 
about by the robot-girl, while Freud attributes the uncanny qualities of 
Hoffmann’s story to its account of a reawakened traumatic childhood memory 
(Freud 2003a). The relationship traced by Freud between trauma and the 
uncanny is centred around his theory of the ‘repetition compulsion’, which he 
suggests occurs when an event is so traumatic or overwhelming that it cannot 
be assimilated into normal mental processes (that it is, as it were, 
unpresentable) and so the mind attempts to master the experience 
retroactively, by repeatedly returning to it (2003a, 2003b).  
 
This thesis reflects upon the interrelated concepts of the uncanny and 
the traumatic through their relevance to an examination of the industrial 
landscape, and its representation through photographic media. As established 
above, the concept of the uncanny has been associated with the strangely 
automated ‘life’ of the mechanical object (Jentsch 1906, Freud 2003a). 
Furthermore, the history of psychological trauma and its theorization is 
intimately bound up with the rise of modernity and the machines of 
industrialization (Benjamin 1999, Luckhurst 2006). Each concept’s place 
within aesthetic discourse, therefore, ties it to some extent to issues important 
to both the industrial landscape and to the ‘industrial’ media of photography 
and film.  
This project’s examination of the relationship between the mechanical 
representational technologies of photography and film and the 
uncanny/traumatic, however, extends beyond such simplistic associations 
with the industrial. Ideas of the traumatic and the uncanny have been 
important to a number of theoretical analyses of camera-based imagery (for 
example Barthes 2000, Mulvey 2006, Gunning 1995). In his book Camera 
Lucida (first published 1980), for example, Roland Barthes speaks of the 
photographic image in terms of its “intractable reality” (2000: 119): this 
concept “leads back to Freud’s theory of trauma as an event or experience 
that…leaves a mark on the unconscious, a kind of index of the psyche that 
parallels the photograph’s trace of an original event” (Mulvey 2006: 65). In her 
book Death 24x a Second (2006), from which the above quotation is taken, 
the film theorist Laura Mulvey also draws upon Freud – in particular his essay 
The Uncanny – to help shape her analysis of the strange, mechanical 
 
temporality of cinema. As part of this analysis, she interrogates the 
photographic base of the filmic image, examining both its ‘intractable reality’ – 
its indexical connection to a real object – and its more subjective, uncanny 
qualities (the latter in particular through Barthes’ alignment of the photograph 
with death). This dualistic approach to a theory of the camera image – 
encompassing an interest in both its ability to reiterate objective reality (its 
indexicality) and its potential for the expression of subjective experience – is 
central to my project’s concerns with the representation of the unpresentable. 
 
Indexicality 
The association of the term ‘indexicality’ with photography derives from 
American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce’s concept of the index (1894). 
Peirce classified signs into different typologies, within which he identified the 
categories of the ‘icon’, the ‘symbol’ and the ‘index’. A sign, he proposes, can 
be associated with one of these three categories depending upon the way in 
which it refers to its referent or ‘object’. An icon shares some resemblance 
with its object (for example a figurative portrait). A symbol denotes its object 
through an arbitrary convention or rule (e.g. the word ‘cat’). An index, 
however, has an actual connection to its object through causation (for 
example, Peirce categorized footprints and weathervanes as indexical).  
In traditional photography, light reflects off an object, passes through 
the camera lens and then hits the light-sensitive emulsion of the negative 
causing a chemical reaction. The chemical-based photograph’s status as 
indexical relies upon this physical connection between the object 
 
photographed and the resultant image. Indeed, Peirce himself directly 
associates the photograph with the category of the index. As he explains, 
photographs “are very instructive, because we know that they are in certain 
respects exactly like the objects they represent ... this resemblance is due to 
the photographs having been produced under such circumstances that they 
were physically forced to correspond point by point to nature” (1894: n. pag.).  
The notion of an indissoluble connection between a photograph and its 
originating object forms the basis of much of Barthes’ examination of 
photography in Camera Lucida: “[i]t is as if the Photograph always carries its 
referent with itself” he insists, “…they are glued together” (2000: 5-6). It is 
because of this intractable relationship between image and referent, Barthes 
argues, that photography stands apart from other forms of representation: 
Painting can feign reality without having seen it. Discourse combines signs 
which have referents, of course, but these referents can be and most often 
are “chimeras”. Contrary to these imitations, in Photography I can never deny 
that the thing has been there…What I intentionalize in a photograph…is 
neither Art nor Communication, it is Reference. (2000: 76-77) 
What Barthes feels is absent in the still photograph (‘Art’ and 
‘Communication’) can, he suggests, be rediscovered in the moving image 
(2000: 117). The communication of subjective experience, a capacity 
traditionally associated with painting in the visual arts, manifests itself in the 
indexical photograph, according to Barthes, through animation and 
narrativization. As the media theorist Lev Manovich puts it, “[c]inema is the art 
of the index; it is an attempt to make art out of a footprint” (2000: 174).  
 
What is more, Manovich suggests that as a result of the advancement 
of digital capture and editing processes in the late 20th century, and the 
concurrent potential for seamless integration of manually constructed digital 
images, cinema is “no longer an indexical media technology but, rather, a 
sub-genre of painting” (2000: 175). The lack of a direct physical connection to 
a referent inherent in the encoding and storage processes of digital imaging, 
coupled with an increased potential for image construction and manipulation, 
means that the indexical status or ‘truth claim’ (Gunning 2008) of the 
contemporary photographic/filmic image has been radically called into 
question (Manovich 2000, Doane 2007a, Rodowick 2007). Thus camera-
based imagery in the 21st century has acquired a renegotiated alignment with 
‘Art’ and ‘Communication’ – that is, with the expression of subjective 
experience.  
Concurrently, however, digitization has also opened up new 
possibilities for restoring to the moving image that sense of ‘intractable reality’ 
that Barthes felt cinema lacked in comparison to the still photograph (Mulvey 
2006). What is more, while the digitally captured photographic image may 
possess a weakened sense of indexical veracity in comparison to its 
chemical-based predecessor, the medium’s history of a uniquely unmediated 
connection to the real world, its reiterative “perceptual richness”, remains to a 
large extent intact (Gunning 2008). 
My project’s interest in the representation of unpresentable experience 
through lens-based media is informed by the potential of the contemporary 
camera image to simultaneously figure both the objective (through a sense of 
indexical veracity) and the subjective (through its potential for artistic 
 
expression). Those registers of the unpresentable examined in this thesis –
the sublime, the uncanny and the traumatic – boast a complex relationship to 
the contrasting concepts of objective and subjective, occupying an often 
paradoxical space between the real and the imagined (Kant 1952, Derrida 
1987, Freud 2003a, Lacan 1991, Vidler 1994). The capacity of 21st century 
lens-based media to merge these opposing ontological categories suggests a 
unique aptitude for figuring a sense of the indeterminate, for developing 
photo-based forms that might represent an experience of the unpresentable, 
or at least point toward its presence. 
 
Research Proposition  
Through interrogating the inherent properties of contemporary lens-based 
media, this research project aims to determine a form or set of forms through 
which a sense of the unpresentable may be exposed within camera-based 
representations of the industrial landscape. This proposition suggests a 
number of key approaches, which I shall outline below.  
Firstly, it suggests a review of ways in which the unpresentable has 
been conceptualized both theoretically and creatively. This will involve both an 
examination of how theories of the sublime, the uncanny or the traumatic 
might contribute to an understanding of the unpresentable, and an analysis of 
how such ideas have been approached by artists in their work. This should 
lead to a consideration of ways in which the findings of the above might be 
incorporated into my own studio-based research. 
 
Secondly, my research proposition suggests an investigation into lens-
based media’s capacity for figuring a sense of the unpresentable. This will 
require a consideration of what links might be drawn between 
photographic/film theory (referring to issues such as indexicality) and theories 
of the unpresentable. Consequently an analysis of how digitization has 
affected such correlations will be necessary, as will a survey of how artists 
working in lens-based media have explored the relationships between such 
ideas. 
Finally, the proposition suggests an examination of ways in which ideas 
of the unpresentable might relate to camera-based representations of the 
industrial landscape. This will require an assessment of those aspects of the 
unpresentable that can be attributed to the industrial landscape, an analysis of 
how artists have elicited a sense of the unpresentable in their representations 
of such landscapes, and a consideration of how such approaches might be 
incorporated into my own experimentations with lens-based media. 
 
Methodology 
 [A]esthetic intuition is only intellectual intuition become objective.  
(Schelling [1800] 1988: 227) 
The above quote from German philosopher Friedrich Schelling (1775-1854) 
pertains to a drive in art of the Romantic era to overcome the split between 
mind and nature that thinkers of the time believed was brought about by an 
experience of the sublime (see Chapter One). The sublime pleasure of 
transcending nature through reason was diminished, the Romantics felt, by 
 
the failure of imagination to provide sensible forms with which to comprehend 
the ineffable. Schelling believed that the task of reuniting mind and nature in 
order to adequately represent the unpresentable could not be accomplished 
on the basis of philosophy alone (Shaw 2006: 91). As Philip Shaw explains, to 
do so Schelling felt that “we must draw on the resources made available to us 
by art” (2006: 91). Schelling, it would seem:  
… regards the artwork not as a thing but as the medium through which the 
sensible is reunited with the transcendental…It is art that gives sensuous 
expression to the concept of the sublime and which unites the hitherto divided 
faculties of reason and imagination. (Shaw 2006: 92) 
Drawing upon this notion of reuniting mind and nature through art in 
order to give descriptive form to the unpresentable, my practice-led project 
explores lens-based media’s potential for blurring such boundaries (between 
the sensible and the transcendental, art and index, objective and subjective, 
the real and the imagined). Although the theoretical approaches outlined at 
the beginning of this introductory chapter inform and give context to my 
practical explorations, this project is driven by studio-based research – for, as 
Schelling suggests, the task of describing the ineffable cannot be achieved 
through ‘intellectual intuition’ alone. That undertaking is given over to art, for 
art is not about concepts, “art is the power to think in terms that are not so 
much cognitive and intellectual as affective (to do with feeling and sensible 
experience)” (Colebrook 2002: 12). 
An important aspect of my approach to creative practice is that what I 
explore in the studio remains open to what Schelling terms “aesthetic intuition” 
(1988: 227) – that it does not become theory driven. This formal impulse 
 
transfers to the work, allowing its sensible presentations of the unpresentable 
to touch the viewer directly, rather than simply present ‘illustrations’ of 
intellectual concepts. As Gilles Deleuze proposes: 
It is a question of producing within the work a movement capable of affecting 
the mind outside of all representations; it is a substituting of direct signs for 
mediate representation; of inventing vibrations, rotations, whirlings, 
gravitations, dances, or leaps which directly touch the mind. (Deleuze 2001: 
8) 
My artistic impulse is based largely upon a tacit understanding of the 
concepts of ineffability and ‘unpresentable-ness’ examined throughout this 
project. Allowing my inquiry to remain open to aesthetic intuition means that a 
valuable aspect of that practice remains intact – informed, but not 
encumbered by theory. As the documentation of a creative, practice-led 
research project, the written element of my submission reflects upon what is 
explored in the studio and gives it theoretical context, but it does not seek to 
define it. As David Lynch, that preeminent purveyor of the unpresentable in 
cinema so eloquently suggests, “[i]t’s a dangerous thing to say what a picture 
is…[i]f things get too specific, the dream stops” (quoted in Woods 2000: 176). 
 
Research Methods 
The starting point for this project was a research proposition, from which a set 
of aims were developed. The specifics of this initial framework were refined 
throughout the course of the project in response to the findings of my 
theoretical research and the development of my practice. Practical research – 
in the form of site visits (to places such as Teesside and Hownsgill in County 
 
Durham), photography, videography and studio based experimentation 
(generally using digital editing programs such as Final Cut Pro and 
Photoshop) – drove the project from beginning to end. My first practical 
experiments with photography and video (for example the Hownsgill Rip photo 
series, the photographic/sculptural piece Shadowgram and the video piece 
Mottled Screen)2 fed into and were also informed by theoretical reading based 
around the key themes identified in the research proposition (e.g. the 
unpresentable; the sublime, uncanny and traumatic; indexicality and the 
impact of digitization on lens-based media). The findings of such experiments 
were augmented by feedback from supervisors, peers and visiting artists. 
Early theoretical research contributed to a refinement of the project’s 
intellectual framework, which in turn led to a survey of established artists 
whose work engaged with the themes identified. From this survey a number of 
possible in-depth case studies were identified, some of which became 
particularly important to the development of the main body of studio research 
(for example Stan Douglas’s film piece Der Sandmann [1995] and Chris 
Marker’s short film La Jetée [1962]). These studies gave context to my own 
practical research, in addition to feeding directly into my studio-based 
experiments by providing inspiration in terms of form and content. At this 
stage creative material was also identified that would be integrated into the 
substance of the final practical submission (e.g. the feature film Blade Runner 
and E.T.A. Hoffmann’s short story The Sandman). My research into 
established practical/creative approaches to ‘unpresentable’ subject matter 
informed extensive experimentation periods in the studio (and indeed in the 

2
 These early practical experiments are discussed in detail in the first part of Chapter Seven. 
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field), leading to the ongoing development of one extended video work. 
Numerous test screenings of this ‘work in progress’ generated valuable 
feedback from supervisors, visiting artists, peers and, in the later stages of the 
project, public audiences. Such feedback was generally informal, documented 
through taking notes or asking viewers to contribute to comment books. The 
evolution of the project was documented informally throughout, in the form of 
research journals, process notes and electronic portfolios containing draft 
‘evolutions’ of studio research. My theoretical research and case study 
analysis has been refined and collated here in the written thesis, in order to 
give context to my practical submission and document its ‘findings’. The 
reflexive process of research, experimentation, presentation and feedback 
described above led, finally, to my ‘research outcome’: the single-channel 
video piece Re: Flamingo (2011). This piece presents my ‘thesis’ or 
‘argument’ in the form of an artwork. It stands as an aesthetic rather than 
theoretical/textual (what Schelling categorized as ‘intellectual’) proposition, 
suggesting ways in which the unpresentable may be exposed within lens-
based representations of the industrial landscape.3 
 

3 It is perhaps important to address here an issue brought about by Re: Flamingo’s voiceover 
narration, which presents at certain moments what could be construed as a theoretical/textual 
proposition. It should be made clear that it is in no way the intention of the piece to make its 
argument in the manner of a textual/theoretical thesis. Indeed if it was, I would certainly deem 
it to fall short of the requirements of such an argument. As Victor Burgin suggests, discussing 
a hypothetical case in which a film perhaps not dissimilar to my own is submitted in lieu of a 
philosophical essay, “to expose [a] fact is not to argue it; although the film provocatively and 
successfully suggests the basis for an argument, it does not make the argument” (2009: 77). 
My video piece Re: Flamingo does in fact make an argument – indeed, its ‘textual’ elements 
contribute to and support that argument – but its argument is made, ultimately, aesthetically. 
For a more extended discussion of this issue, see the section ‘Audiovisual Art Practice: an 
Exceptional Case?’ in Burgin 2009: 76-78.  
 
Description of Practical Submission 
 
Figure 1 Matthew Smith, Re: Flamingo, 2011. 25 minutes, High Definition Video 
(16:9), stereo soundtrack. 
 
The practical submission Re: Flamingo takes the form of a 25-minute, single 
channel video piece that combines HDV and Super-8 footage with both digital 
and traditional still photography. The narrative structure of the work has its 
foundation in German Romantic author E.T.A. Hoffmann’s short story The 
Sandman (1816), which is told initially through a series of letters between the 
protagonist, his fiancée and her brother. A semi-autobiographical variation on 
Hoffmann’s tale, Re: Flamingo consists of an email conversation between 
semi-fictionalized versions of myself, my father and the fictional character 
Clara from the original story. Through this correspondence, the piece 
considers correlations between themes in The Sandman and the film Blade 
Runner – for example, their shared preoccupation with eyes, a distinct focus 
on themes of memory and the protagonist of each story’s obsession with a 
robot-woman. In so doing, Re: Flamingo reflects upon how the industrial 
 
landscape of Teesside, which formed the inspiration for many of the visuals in 
Scott’s film, has been remembered in different photographic media by three 
generations of my family. Ultimately, this leads to a consideration of the 
impact of digitization on how the past is represented through lens-based 
media. 
 
Figure 2 Matthew Smith, Re: Flamingo, 2011. Video still. 
 
For exhibition, the piece requires a ‘cinematic’ environment: a large HD 
video projection (ideally no smaller than 2m x 1.1m) from an HD source (e.g. 
a QuickTime file, BluRay disc or HDV tape) in a darkened room with stereo 
speakers (ideally placed either side of the video image towards the front of the 
theatre/exhibition space).  
For reference/documentation purposes only, Re: Flamingo has been 
included in this thesis as a watermarked QuickTime file (see DVD insert ‘Disk 
One’, inside back cover).  
 
 
 
Thesis Structure 
The main body of this written thesis is divided into two parts. Part One is a 
theoretical review consisting of four chapters. Chapter One traces 
philosophical and aesthetic approaches to the sublime, its representation, its 
status as a subjective experience and its presence within the industrial 
landscape (with a particular focus on the ideas of Burke, Kant, Lyotard, 
Derrida and Nye). Chapter Two analyzes theories of the uncanny and the 
related subject of trauma, both of which first took hold with the rise of 
industrialization (Freud 2003a, 2003b; Vidler 1992; Luckhurst 2006). Chapter 
Three examines photographic and film theory and its relationship to theories 
of the unpresentable discussed in the first two chapters (Benjamin 1999, 
Barthes 2000, Mulvey 2006). Chapter Four considers lens-based media’s 
indexical status in the wake of digitization and its concurrent alignment with 
‘subjective’ artforms such as painting (Gunning 2008, Doane 2007a, 
Rodowick 2007, Manovich 2000, Mulvey 2006).  
Part Two of the thesis looks at creative/practical approaches to the 
themes outlined in the theoretical section. This begins with Chapter Five, 
examining Canadian artist Stan Douglas’ film piece Der Sandmann (1995), a 
work that exposes a sense of the uncanny in the landscape of pre- and post-
reunification Germany (specifically the Schrebergärten of Potsdam). Chapter 
Six assesses Ridley Scott’s science fiction film Blade Runner (1982), its 
significance to the ideas discussed in Part One and its correlations with E.T.A. 
Hoffmann’s Sandman narrative. Chapter Seven, the final section of Part Two, 
details the development and formation of my studio research, describing the 
 
distinctive approach of my practical submission – the film piece Re: Flamingo 
– toward representing an experience of the unpresentable within the industrial 
landscape through lens based media.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART ONE: 
THEORETICAL APPROACHES 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE: THE SUBLIME 
The Sublime and Representation 
How does one represent that which, almost by definition, is unrepresentable, 
is ‘beyond expression’?…The Sublime eludes the impulse to consume … it is 
pictorially unframeable, and it cannot be framed in words. The vocabulary 
associated with the experience is one of surrender to a superior power…In 
the act of surrender we acknowledge the feebleness of our powers of 
articulate expression and representation. (Andrews 1999: 142) 
The problem of how to represent the sublime has preoccupied artists and 
thinkers since at least the eighteenth century, when the concept was 
predominantly considered in terms of the overwhelming within the natural 
world. However, its formulation began much earlier, in a different field of 
aesthetics. The notion of the sublime was first clearly articulated by a Greek 
scholar known as Longinus in a text written in the first century AD, in relation 
to what he termed “elevated language” (1965: 100). This work, entitled On the 
Sublime, is primarily a treatise on rhetoric. It suggests that while there are 
formal techniques a speaker may learn in order to convince an audience, an 
instinctively realized “combination of wonder and astonishment always proves 
superior to the merely persuasive and pleasant. This is because persuasion is 
on the whole something we can control, whereas amazement and wonder 
exert invincible power and force and get the better of every hearer” (Longinus 
1964: 2). 
On the Sublime conceives of sublimity as an experience of 
irrepressible power brought about through language. Yet although a lesson in 
rhetoric, the treatise deems it to be indescribable and unteachable. As Philip 
Shaw points out, “[central] to Longinus’ text is the suggestion that the sublime 
 
occurs within representation whilst nevertheless annulling the possibility of 
representation” (2006: 26). Even in the earliest incarnation of a theory of the 
sublime, a complex and paradoxical relationship with representation is already 
apparent. 
By the eighteenth century the concept had reached a wider audience 
and gained importance as a distinct philosophical category. Though 
influenced by Longinus’ treatise on language, it began to develop in relation to 
the astonishing and ineffable within the natural landscape. This came about 
initially through the work of a number of British writers, several of whom drew 
inspiration from their travels across the mountainous wildernesses of Europe. 
The English writer Joseph Addison (1672-1719) for example, remarked that 
“the Alps, which are broken into so many Steeps and Precipices…fill the mind 
with an agreeable kind of Horror, and form one of the most irregular and mis-
shapen Scenes in the World” (1718: 300). 
Such an interest in the emotional impact of such landscapes raises 
important questions about the location and classification of sublime 
experience – such as whether it is an internal mental state or whether it exists 
externally in nature (or, indeed, at the interface of the two). The resistance of 
the concept to such categorization is of course the very characteristic that 
identifies it as unpresentable. As Shaw suggests, “the quest for definition is 
self-defeating since the sublime is precisely that which frustrates the 
distinction between cause and effect” (2006: 47). 
If other thinkers of the time appear to regard the sublime as residing 
within the natural object, the writing of the political philosopher Edmund Burke 
 
(1729-1797) lends itself to a reading of the experience as subjective in origin. 
In his influential work A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origins of Our Ideas of 
the Sublime and Beautiful (first published 1757), Burke emphasizes the 
psychological effects of sublimity upon the individual’s soul and mind: 
The passion caused by the great and the sublime in nature, when those 
causes operate most powerfully is Astonishment, and astonishment is that 
state of the soul in which all its motions are suspended, with some degree of 
horror. In this case the mind is so entirely filled with its object that it cannot 
entertain any other … (1990: 53) 
Such a focus on emotion and subjective experience with regard to the sublime 
is also evident in Shaw’s reading of Burke. Quoting Burke, he explains that 
“the expression of what ‘really is’ is not the concern of a theory of the sublime; 
where the ‘former [‘reality’] regards the understanding; the latter [sublimity] 
belongs to the passions. The one describes a thing as it is; the other 
describes it as it is felt” (2006: 50). 
Burke’s ideas about the emotional aspects of the sublime initiated a 
lasting shift in attention away from the material world of natural phenomena to 
a greater interest in the psychological experience of the viewer. In 1790 
Immanuel Kant published his Analytic of the Sublime, adapting Burke’s 
theories to his own. Kant argues that the sensation of the sublime is brought 
about not through the horrifying realization that we cannot comprehend an 
object fully, but in the pleasure we derive from our ability to apply abstract 
reason to what our senses are unable to fully affirm: 
All that we can say is that the object lends itself to the presentation of a 
sublimity discoverable in the mind. For the sublime, in the strict sense of the 
word, cannot be contained in any sensuous form, but rather concerns ideas 
 
of reason, which, although no adequate presentation of them is possible, may 
be excited and called into the mind by that very inadequacy itself which does 
admit of sensuous presentation. (Kant 1952: 92) 
Kant, therefore, explicitly regards the sublime as an effect of the mind, a 
subjective experience brought about through reason, rather than an objective 
attribute of “sensuous” nature. The viewer becomes aware of a capacity within 
him or herself to transcend nature, to stand apart from it and give abstract 
form to a thing it cannot conceive of in material terms. For Kant, the sublime is 
“at once a feeling of displeasure, arising from the inadequacy of imagination 
…and a simultaneously awakened pleasure, arising from this very judgement 
of the inadequacy of the greatest faculty of sense being in accord with ideas 
of reason” (1952:106). 
In Kant’s formulation, the awareness through reason that a sublime 
object exists, but that it cannot be imagined in sensuous form, means that its 
existence can only be presented negatively – it can be expressed only as that 
which is unpresentable. As Jacques Derrida later summarizes this idea: “[t]he 
sublime cannot inhabit any sensible form…[it] relates only to the ideas of 
reason. It therefore refuses all adequate presentation” (1987: 131). Derrida 
follows this declaration (from his book The Truth in Painting) with the question 
“how can this unpresentable thing present itself?” (1987: 131).  
Drawing much from both Burke and Kant’s ideas, the difficult question 
of how to present sublime experience became an important pursuit of the 
Romantic Era. Roughly dating from the mid-eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth 
century, Romanticism is characterized by a privileging of the emotional over 
the rational, subjectivity and individualism over objective consensus, and 
 
imagination over the real or literal. The Romantics therefore lamented the 
failure, described by Kant, of imagination to provide sensible forms with which 
to adequately represent the sublime. The inassimilable vastness of the natural 
world was, for the Romantics, forever divided from the human subject 
(structured as it is by culture, language and representation). As the poet and 
philosopher Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805) observed, “nature is for us nothing 
but the uncoerced existence, the subsistence of things on their own, being 
there according to their own immutable laws” (1993: 180). 
As the intellect alone was deemed unable to bridge the gap between 
the sublime pleasure derived from transcending nature (Kant) and the 
simultaneous melancholy brought about by the knowledge of that very 
separation, thinkers of the time turned instead to art – for, as we have already 
heard Friedrich Schelling (1775-1854) remark, “aesthetic intuition is only 
intellectual intuition become objective” (1988: 227). As Shaw suggests, 
“Schelling…regards the artwork not as a thing but as the medium through 
which the sensible is reunited with the transcendental” (2006: 91). 
The sense of an immutable void between the human subject and the 
vastness of nature was a favourite motif of the painter Caspar David Friedrich 
(1774-1840), whose work repeatedly depicted figures upstaged by a luminous 
and humbling landscape. In its sombre tones, his 1809 painting The Monk by 
the Sea embodies the Romantic model of a solitary individual contemplating 
in melancholic reverie the ineffability and vast sublimity of nature (see Figure 
3, overleaf). The picture’s scarcity of fixed representational forms, which 
“bewildered spectators when it was first exhibited” (Rosenblum 1975: 10), 
 
echoes Kant’s theory of “negative presentation” in its method of denoting the 
sublimity of nature (1952: 127). As Malcolm Andrews suggests:  
… we cannot exercise any control over what the painting offers to us … we 
react to it in terms of what is missing from it, the terrible emptiness. Within 
this luridly tinted vacuum, there isn’t even a narrative offered. It is a portrait of 
near nothingness, its power residing in its accumulation of negatives, 
absences. (1999: 146)  
The painting presents only the barest requirements of a figurative 
land/seascape. The exception being the monk himself, offering the viewer an 
inert figure with whom to identify – thus placing one alone and dwarfed in the 
face of ineffable space.  
 
Figure 3 Caspar David Friedrich, The Monk by the Sea,1809. Oil on canvas. 110 x 
171cm. Alte Nationalgalerie, Berlin. 
 
It is known that Friedrich’s picture originally depicted a number of 
sailing boats and the suggestion of a moon (Rosenblum 1975: 13; Andrews 
1999: 146). In removing what at the time of its painting would have been the 
IMAGE REMOVED DUE TO COPYRIGHT RESTRICTIONS. PLEASE SEE HARD COPY 
FOR ORIGINAL IMAGE.
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standard (even expected) recognizable visual coordinates of a seascape, the 
painter presents what was perhaps then the ultimate allegory of the sublime 
as subjective experience. The sublime, as Andrews puts it, “with its emphasis 
on obscurity, vacuity and indeterminancy, destabilizes and disorientates: in 
terms of landscape art it seeks to represent less the objects that strike the 
viewer than the sensations experienced by the viewer” (1999: 147). He 
continues, underlining the idea that “the ‘negative pleasure’ that constitutes 
the Sublime emphasizes the subjective status of sublimity”, explaining that 
therefore “forms of nature, objectively portrayed, are not only inadequate but 
inappropriate as a means of representing the Sublime” (Andrews 1999: 147). 
The ‘negative pleasure’ of the sublime, it seems, can manifest itself in art as 
negative space. The negation of objective form leads, Andrews suggests, to 
the assertion of subjective encounter.  
The near-absence of illusory space in The Monk by the Sea has led to 
a consideration of its ineffable qualities in relation to 20th century abstraction. 
In 1961 the art historian Robert Rosenblum wrote an article for Art News in 
which he compares Friedrich’s picture to the painting Light, Earth and Blue 
(1954) by Mark Rothko (see Figure 4, overleaf). Rosenblum argues that both 
paintings place us “on the threshold of those shapeless infinities discussed by 
the aestheticians of the Sublime” (2010:110). He continues: 
Like the mystic trinity of sky, water and earth that, in the Friedrich…appears 
to emanate from one unseen source, the floating horizontal tiers of veiled light 
in the Rothko seem to conceal a total, remote presence that we can only intuit 
and never fully grasp. These infinite glowing voids carry us beyond reason to 
the Sublime… (2010: 110) 
 
 
Figure 4 Mark Rothko, Light, Earth and Blue, 
1954. Oil on canvas. 193 x 170 cm. 
 
The void-like ground of Rothko’s mature work seems to present a primal 
landscape from the genesis of a consciousness prior to any representational 
system. With reference to what representational elements remain in the 
Friedrich, Rosenblum suggests that in “the abstract language of Rothko, such 
literal detail – a bridge of empathy between the real spectator and the 
presentation of a transcendental landscape – is no longer necessary; we 
ourselves are the monk before the sea” (2010: 110). 
Due to the concept’s resistance to representational form, it is perhaps 
unsurprising to find ideas of the sublime associated with abstraction in art. As 
Jean-François Lyotard suggests: 
…infinity, or the absoluteness of the Idea can be revealed in what Kant calls a 
negative presentation, or even a non-presentation … optical pleasure when 
reduced to near nothingness promotes an infinite contemplation of infinity … 
abstract and Minimal art…is thus present in germ in the Kantian aesthetic of 
the sublime. (1991: 98) 
IMAGE REMOVED DUE TO COPYRIGHT 
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Some abstract painters, such as Barnett Newman, have engaged with 
the concept of the sublime directly. Newman, another American for whom the 
colour-field approach offered a commitment to what he referred to as ‘the 
absolute emotions’, believed that the abstract expressionist movement 
signaled a departure from pictorial traditions that was necessary to an 
expression of the sublime.  
 
Figure 5  Barnett Newman, Vir Heroicus Sublimis, 1950-51. Oil on canvas, 
242cm x 541 cm. 
 
As Friedrich seems to have intuited before him, Newman believed that any 
concession to the conventions of representation was inherently at odds with a 
presentation of the sublime. In his 1948 essay The Sublime is Now, he 
outlines his belief that if the sublime is to be present within a work, then it 
must be entirely free of representational baggage: 
The failure of European art to achieve the sublime is due to this blind desire 
to exist inside the reality of sensation (the objective world, whether distorted 
or pure) and to build an art within a framework of pure plasticity…In other 
words, modern art, caught without a sublime content, was incapable of 
creating a new sublime image…I believe that here in America, some of us, 
free from the weight of European culture, are finding the answer…The image 
we produce is the self-evident one of revelation, real and concrete, that can 
be understood by anyone who will look at it without the nostalgic glasses of 
history. (2010: 26-27) 
IMAGE REMOVED DUE TO COPYRIGHT RESTRICTIONS. PLEASE 
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Much of what Newman says here is, however, echoed in Lyotard’s thoughts 
on that preeminent precursor of 20th century abstraction, Paul Cezanne. As 
the philosopher says of Cezanne’s working methods, “[t]he task of having to 
bear witness to the indeterminate carries away, one after another, the barriers 
set up by the writings of theorists and by the manifestos of the painters 
themselves” (Lyotard 1991: 103). In much the same spirit, Cezanne himself 
exclaimed (in 1902), “If only we could see with the eyes of a newborn child!… 
Today our sight is a little weary, burdened by the memory of a thousand 
images” (quoted in Andrews 1999: 149).  
In Newman’s terms however, Cezanne is perhaps somewhat guilty of 
the “blind desire to exist inside the reality of sensation” (2010: 26)1 and this is 
where Lyotard sees the distinction between modern and postmodern 
approaches to the indeterminate: 
[M]odern aesthetics is an aesthetic of the sublime, though a nostalgic one. It 
allows the unpresentable to be put forward only as the missing contents; but 
the form, because of its recognizable consistency, continues to offer to the 
reader or viewer matter for solace and pleasure. (1984: 81)  
Cezanne’s endeavor, as Lyotard puts it, “to make seen what makes one see, 
not what is visible” (1991: 102), seems to be taken to its ultimate conclusion in 
the high-modernism/proto-minimalism of Newman’s work, which presents only 
itself, rather than attempting the representation of an unknowable beyond. 
Lyotard, who looks closely at Newman’s engagement with the sublime in his 
writings on postmodernism, suggests that the postmodern (in contrast to the 

1
 Lyotard however does suggest that Cezanne’s “sublime was fundamentally not nostalgic 
and tended toward the infinity of plastic experiment rather than toward the representation of 
any lost absolute” (Lyotard 2010: 135).  
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modern) “puts forward the unpresentable in presentation itself” (1984: 81). He 
continues: 
…[it] denies itself the solace of good forms, the consensus of a taste which 
would make it possible to share collectively the nostalgia for the unattainable; 
that which searches for new presentations, not in order to enjoy them but in 
order to impart a stronger sense of the unpresentable. (1984: 81) 
Without prior conceptions formed through the understanding of a historically 
derived representational system, the viewer experiences the artwork as 
sublime, as a “self-evident” event of the “Now” (Newman 2010: 27). Lyotard 
describes this effect: 
Newman’s now…is what dismantles consciousness, what deposes 
consciousness, it is what consciousness cannot formulate … when he seeks 
sublimity in the here and now he breaks with the eloquence of Romantic art 
but he does not reject its fundamental task, that of bearing pictorial or 
otherwise expressive witness to the inexpressible. The inexpressible does not 
reside in an over there, in another word, or another time, but in this: in that 
(something) happens…Here and now there is this painting, rather than 
nothing, and that’s what is sublime. (Lyotard 1991: 90-93) 
While Friedrich’s Monk offered “a bridge of empathy between the real 
spectator and the presentation of a transcendental landscape” (Rosenblum 
2010: 110), Lyotard is suspicious of this Kantian attempt to unite the 
transcendental with the material. He suggests that for the indeterminate to 
remain sublime, its resistance to such rationalist appropriation must remain 
intact (Shaw 2006: 129-130). In the work of artists like Rothko and, perhaps 
more overtly, Newman, there is no representation of a transcendental beyond, 
no reference to some ineffable thing other than the work itself. As Lyotard 
asserts, “[m]atter does not question the mind, it has no need of it…It is 
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presence as unpresentable to the mind, always withdrawn from its grasp 
(1991: 142).  
Lyotard’s belief in the primacy of matter and presence in the discourse 
of the sublime – his assertion that “the inexpressible does not reside in an 
over there” – appears to be shared by Derrida in The Truth in Painting (1987). 
Derrida suggests that Kant’s notion of a beyond, what he calls his 
“subjectivism”, is a fallacy. He argues that the experience of the sublime 
cannot be explained “in terms of a finite subjectivity. We must on the contrary 
comprehend the sublime inasmuch as it is founded in the unique absolute 
substance, in the content to be presented” (1987: 133). 
Derrida arrives at this argument through the notion of the parergon, the 
significance of which he elaborates from a brief and relatively immaterial 
mention in Kant’s Critique of Aesthetic Judgement (first published 1790). The 
word parergon is Latin, referring to the border or frame around a work of art – 
though it can also suggest wider interpretations such as ‘remainder’ or 
‘addition’ (Shaw 2006: 117). The significance of the concept to a theory of the 
sublime is perhaps already implicit within the etymology of the word ‘sublime’ 
itself, which derives from the Latin sublimis: sub meaning ‘up to’ and limen 
‘threshold, surround or lintel of a doorway’ (Morley 2010a: 14). The point here 
being that it is impossible to think of the boundless nature of the sublime 
without the concept of a boundary: that which transcends the threshold of our 
understanding can only be represented as such (as we have already seen, 
this is Kant’s ‘negative presentation’; it is also the root of his ‘negative 
pleasure’). As Derrida puts it, “[t]he experience and pleasure of the sublime do 
not stem from the promise of something noumenal, outside a given frame, but 
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rather from the perpetual, yet always provisional, activity of framing itself, from 
the parergon” (quoted in Cheetham 2001: 107). Derrida’s elaboration and 
critique of what he calls Kant’s “finite subjectivity” however, is founded on the 
assertion that the reliance of one concept upon the other works both ways – 
that the boundary also relies upon the unbounded, the parergon upon the 
ergon (the ‘work’). This rationale conceives of subjectivity as an effect of the 
sublime as much as the sublime is an effect of subjectivity. The privileging of 
reason, consciousness and subjectivity (that is, representational framing) over 
absolute matter is for Derrida a bias that misrepresents the sublime, which he 
suggests is “neither culture nor nature, both culture and nature. It is perhaps, 
between the presentable and the unpresentable, the passage from the one to 
the other as much as the irreducibility of the one to the other” (1987: 143). As 
Shaw explains it, the parergon “is that which cannot be thought within the 
terms of the system since it discloses the fundamental point of contradiction 
on which the system is founded” (2006: 120). 
The roots of both Lyotard’s interest in an art that “denies itself the 
solace of good forms” (1984: 81) and Derrida’s examination of the parergon 
can be traced back to the distinction Burke and Kant drew between the 
sublime and the beautiful. For Burke, these two concepts “stand on 
foundations so different, that it is hard…to think of reconciling them in the 
same subject” (1990: 103). The idea of the sublime, he felt, was founded on 
pain, filling the mind with terror, while the idea of beauty was founded on 
pleasure (Burke 1990: 113).  He characterized what he saw as their opposing 
qualities through considering the emotional effect each concept engendered 
in the viewer: 
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There is a wide difference between admiration and love. The sublime, which 
is the cause of the former, always dwells on great objects, and terrible; the 
latter [of which beauty is the cause] on small ones, and pleasing; we submit 
to what we admire, but we love what submits to us … (Burke 1990: 103)   
For Kant the two categories are not so diametrically opposed, as each 
induces some form of pleasure. Nevertheless, he does remark upon 
significant differences between the two. He regards the pleasure derived from 
the sublime, for example, as a “negative pleasure” provoking “admiration or 
respect”, as opposed to the more straightforward pleasure of beauty (Kant 
1952: 91). Beauty, says Kant “is a question of the form of [an] object, and this 
consists in limitation” (1952: 90). In other words, what is beautiful has finite 
shape, is bounded, and therefore submits happily to framing. The sublime 
however, “is to be found in an object [that is] devoid of form,” one involving, or 
provoking, “a representation of limitlessness” (1952: 90). What is sublime 
resists the unification of its elements, has no discernable boundaries, and so 
therefore attempts at framing such an object become problematic.  
Derrida considers these differences between the sublime and the 
beautiful in terms of the parergon: 
The presence of a limit is what gives form to the beautiful. The sublime is to be 
found, for its part, in an “object without form”…you already understand that the 
sublime is encountered in art less easily than the beautiful, and more easily in 
“raw nature.”…If art gives form by limiting, or even by framing, there can be a 
parergon of the beautiful…But there cannot, it seems, be a parergon of the 
sublime…First of all because it is not a work, an ergon, and then because the 
infinite is presented in it and the infinite cannot be bordered. The beautiful on 
the contrary, in the finitude of its formal contours, requires the parergonal 
edging… (1987: 127-128) 
The same qualities which discern the beautiful from the sublime can also be 
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recognized in the shift we have seen from that art which (as Lyotard put it) 
“bends itself to models”, to the work of those artists who strove to transcend 
such conventions of pictorial form (Lyotard 1991: 101). Barnett Newman’s 
desire to dispense with “the nostalgic glasses of history” (2010: 26-27) has its 
roots in the tradition of artists such as Friedrich and Cezanne, who looked for 
new ways of seeing the world (whether by standing on top of a mountain or by 
visually deconstructing one). Their work, in one way or another, is an attempt 
to subvert the ‘rules’ of representation, to resist the ‘frame’ of taste and 
tradition in order to impart something of the boundlessness of the sublime. As 
Lyotard has said, such work “denies itself the solace of good forms, the 
consensus of a taste” (1984: 81). This approach stands in stark contrast to the 
late eighteenth-century aesthetic ideal of the picturesque, which “appreciates 
landscape in so far as it resembles known works of art” (Andrews 1999: 129). 
Burke defined the beautiful as that which submits to us. Similarly, the 
picturesque makes a natural landscape ‘beautiful’ by submitting it to formal 
principles. As Malcolm Andrews suggests, it changes “what was strange and 
wild” into something “increasingly familiarized and commodified” (1999: 129). 
He elaborates upon this idea, arguing that “natural scenery is, as it were, 
domesticated…it is aesthetically colonized” (Andrews 1999: 129). To colonize, 
in this sense, is to render submissive, to dominate.  
Derrida defined the beautiful as that which is constrained and limited. The 
picturesque limits, it reduces the landscape from “novelty and variety to 
secure uniformity”, with the result that this cultural framing “makes different 
places seem like each other” (Andrews 1999: 129). Where the picturesque 
processes the natural world “into aesthetic commodities – ‘landscapes’”, the 
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sublime, on the other hand, “eludes the impulse to consume…it is pictorially 
unframeable…[it] is that which we cannot appropriate, if only because we 
cannot discern any boundaries” (Andrews 1999: 142).  
As we have seen, for Lyotard et al, the sublime is a matter of 
aesthetics. It is defined by representation because of its resistance to 
representation. But this attitude seemingly neglects what was for Burke (and 
to some extent Kant) a defining characteristic of the sublime – namely, terror. 
As Burke puts it: 
Whatever is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain, and danger, that is to 
say, whatever is in any sort terrible, or is conversant about terrible objects, or 
operates in a manner analogous to terror, is a source of the sublime. (1990: 
36) 
The historian David Nye criticizes Lyotard’s “postmodern” sublime, 
suggesting that he is “writing not about the sublime but about another form of 
the unspeakable” (1994: xix-xx). He points out that Lyotard makes “little 
distinction between the sublime in the arts and the direct experience of the 
sublime” (1994: xix-xx), going on to argue that: 
… [a] volcano, unlike a painting, can kill the observer. An eruption can cause 
the terror that lies at the core of Burke’s philosophy of the sublime and which 
later was an essential part of Kant’s theory of the dynamic sublime. Take out 
terror and the mind is not transfixed; rather, it is free to engage in games of 
reference and to lose itself in an interior hall of mirrors. Lyotard’s early writing 
on the sublime…has nothing to do with fear. (Nye 1994: xx) 
Nye’s suggestion appears to echo Derrida’s assertion that “the sublime is 
encountered in art less easily than the beautiful, and more easily in ‘raw 
nature’” (1987: 127). Derrida does however qualify this statement, claiming 
that there “can be sublime in art if it is submitted to the conditions of an 
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‘accord with nature’” (1987: 127). Drawing on Kant, he goes on to make the 
important point that “although the sublime is better presented by (raw) nature 
than by art, it is not in nature but in ourselves, projected by us because of the 
inadequation in us of several powers, of several faculties” (Derrida 1987: 
132). As Kant himself put it: 
[T]rue sublimity must be sought only in the mind of the judging subject, and 
not in the object of nature...Who would apply the term "sublime" even to 
shapeless mountain masses towering one above the other in wild disorder, 
with their pyramids of ice, or to the dark tempestuous ocean, or such like 
things? But in the contemplation of them, without any regard to their form, the 
mind abandons itself to the imagination and to a reason…and it feels itself 
elevated in its own estimate of itself on finding all the might of imagination still 
unequal to its ideas. (Kant 1952: 104-105)  
Kant distinguished between two varieties of sublime experience: what he 
termed the “mathematical” sublime and the “dynamic” sublime. The 
mathematical sublime, which is perhaps most easily aligned with Lyotard’s 
ideas, occurs when an object is so vast that the imagination is unable to fully 
comprehend it – for example Kant’s “shapeless mountain masses” and “dark 
tempestuous ocean” (Kant 1952: 104). Though the dynamic sublime shares 
the quality of ineffability associated with the mathematical sublime, its defining 
characteristic is that it provokes fear or terror. In describing the dynamic 
sublime, Kant listed phenomena similar to those mentioned by Nye, such as 
“volcanos in all their violence of destruction” and “hurricanes leaving 
desolation in their track” (Kant 1952: 110). However, the dynamic sublime is 
brought about not through direct contact with an object as such, but rather at 
a remove. For the terrible or frightening object to provoke sublime experience, 
it must be encountered at a safe distance, in order that “we may look upon an 
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object as fearful, and yet not be afraid of it” (Kant 1952: 110). Therefore Kant 
categorizes it, like the mathematical sublime, as a psychological effect rather 
than a physical one. For Kant, both the mathematical and the dynamic 
sublime are subjective experiences. 
 
The Technological Sublime 
In his book American Technological Sublime (1994), Nye insists that the 
psychological effects of the sublime are not exclusive to natural phenomena. 
He argues that sublime experience “when it occurs, has a basic structure. An 
object, natural or man-made, disrupts ordinary perception and astonishes the 
senses, forcing the observer to grapple mentally with its immensity and 
power” (Nye 1994: 15, my emphasis). Nye also notes that “Burke took it for 
granted that two basic categories of the sublime, namely difficulty and 
magnificence, particularly applied to architecture”, suggesting that following 
the industrial revolution “cities were filled with structures that were not meant 
to be beautiful or picturesque, but rather awesome, astonishing, vast, 
powerful, and obscure, striking terror into the observer” (1994: 126). Nye 
reflects upon the experience of the industrial landscape through drawing on 
the idea of the “technological sublime” - a phrase first used by the historian 
Perry Miller and later elaborated by Nye’s mentor Leo Marx, in his book The 
Machine in the Garden (1964). Marx’s interest is focused upon the 
psychological effects of witnessing the arrival of the industrial machine in 
“pastoral” America. He approaches his subject through considering literature 
of the time. Though Marx’s book contemplates the problematic aspects of this 
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change in the landscape, it also points out that the experience of the 
technological sublime was often allied with a positive vision of progress: 
Consider how the spectacle of the machine in a virgin land must have struck 
the mind. Like nothing ever seen under the sun…Is it any wonder that the 
prospect arouses awe and reverence?…The stock response to the panorama 
of progress…by-passes ideas; it is essentially a buoyant feeling generated 
without words or thought. (1964: 206-207) 
Similarly, Nye notes that in the work of some writers of the early 20th century, 
“cavernous factories draped in smoke became sublime” (1994: 124-125): 
Their size, obscurity, and danger were converted into assets…these new 
industries seemed exciting because they were vast, dim worlds of iron, brick 
and smoke. The new landscape was read as an objective correlative of man’s 
new powers of transformation. It was understood in terms drawn from the 
tradition of the sublime… (Nye 1994: 124-125) 
Increasingly, in the work of many writers and artists of the early 1900s, “the 
industrial world was presented as a separate realm, fascinating because it 
was utterly unnatural” (Nye 1994: 126). The industrial panorama was sublime 
for them because it “combined the abstraction of a man-made landscape with 
the dynamism of moving machinery and powerful forces” (Nye 1994: 126). 
Nye goes on to relate these different feelings of “unnatural” abstraction and 
“dynamism” to Kant’s categories of the mathematical and dynamic sublime, 
doing so through considering the position of the viewer in relation to the 
industrial spectacle:  
The factory district, typically viewed from a high place or a moving train … 
combined the dynamic and geometrical sublimes. The synthesis evoked fear 
tinged with wonder. It threatened the individual with its sheer scale, its noise, 
its complexity, and the superhuman power of the forces at work. (1994: 126) 
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The position of the artist in relation to the expansive factory scene is 
perceived by Nye to dictate which of Kant’s categories of sublime experience 
the artwork presents. “Seen close up, [the factory’s] productive processes 
reveal frightening yet exhilarating forces under human control. Seen from a 
height, it [is] a vast man-made nature reduced to geometric piles of materials” 
(Nye 1994: 132). Whether provoking terror from up-close, or astonishment 
from afar, the industrial landscape is experienced as sublime. Nye goes on to 
consider how the circumstances of viewing the industrial landscape affect how 
it is experienced, again through a consideration of art of the early 20th century. 
He notes that manufacturing districts were generally represented as 
“aesthetically pleasing once one found the proper vantage point…from the top 
of a skyscraper, or from a train window” (1994: 126). He notes that Elsie 
Driggs’s “darkly precise painting” Pittsburgh (1927; see Figure 6) depicts a 
lucid memory from her childhood of seeing the city – which at the time 
produced almost half of the USA’s steel – from a train window at night (Nye 
1994: 126). 
 
Figure 6 Elsie Driggs, Pittsburgh, 1927. Oil on canvas. 87 x 101 cm. 
Whitney Museum of American Art, New York 
IMAGE REMOVED DUE TO COPYRIGHT 
RESTRICTIONS. PLEASE SEE HARD COPY FOR 
ORIGINAL IMAGE.
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Nye goes on to associate Driggs’s painting with a passage from the 
1912 novel The Olympian by James Oppenheim, in which, similarly, the 
author describes the sight of Pittsburgh from a train at night: 
 A vision shown and passed, swallowed in the night; the sublime spectacle of 
window-lit mills at the riverside girdling with darkness the fierce flaming of the 
Bessemer converter, whose several swelling tongues of fire licked at the 
flaring clouds… (quoted in Nye 1994: 126) 
Nye suggests that the “clean air and the comfort of the smoothly rolling train 
reduce this threatening landscape to a pleasing vignette”, thus, at a remove 
(and as the novelist himself describes it), the scene becomes “sublime” (1994: 
126-127). The fact that these experiences, which obviously left a deep 
impression on each artist, occurred at night, is identified as important by Nye, 
who notes that Burke had observed “darkness is more productive of sublime 
ideas than light” (Burke 1990: 73). Nye follows this with another passage from 
Oppenheim’s novel, which describes the awesome sight of a steel works, 
again at night, though this time seen from above. The “powerful” imagery of 
the passage, Nye feels, is “drawn from the tradition of the sublime in painting” 
(1994: 127): 
[O]ver the vast acreage they saw the shadowy outlines of a dozen immense 
buildings…craters with waving manes of flame and rolling clouds of luminous 
vapor. Everywhere they saw sheets of fire, leaping white tongues, glare and 
smoke and steam, while lightnings flashed at the cloudy skies. And over it all 
a hundred black chimney-pipes looked through the changing lights. (James 
Oppenheim (1912), quoted in Nye 1994: 127) 
Nye, like Leo Marx, also considers negative experiences of 
industrialization, noting that in late nineteenth century America “[t]wo quite 
different literary traditions developed to deal with the new industrial 
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landscape” (1994: 123). He observes that in most novels, sensitive and 
educated writers:  
…saw little or no sublimity in the industrial scene, and instead took the side of 
workers in their struggle for higher wages, better working conditions [and] 
shorter hours…This tradition…often “read” the new landscape as a blighted 
contrast to the pastoral world that had preceded it. (Nye 1994:123) 
He goes on to suggest that such a vision “resembles the older English critique 
of industrialization, in which the railroad and the mill have usurped the natural 
world, polluting it with smoke and noise” (1994: 124). 
In the first chapter of his book Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of 
Late Captalism (1991), the Marxist theorist and critic Frederic Jameson 
devotes a section to the idea of a technological sublime. Like Nye, Jameson 
identifies a trend amongst artists in the first half of the 20th century of exalting 
the sublime powers of technology. Citing Fernand Leger and Diego Rivera as 
examples, he describes the “excitement of machinery…the exhilaration of 
futurism” and how “revolutionary or communist artists of the 1930s…sought to 
reappropriate this excitement of machine energy for a Promethean 
reconstruction of human society as a whole” (Jameson 1991: 36). 
However, (writing in the late twentieth century) Jameson confines this 
particular trend of representing the sublime forms of industry to the “moment 
of capital preceding our own”, going on to suggest that “the technology of our 
own moment no longer possesses this same capacity for representation” 
(1991: 36). He suggests that the forms absent from the post-industrial 
landscape – smokestacks, “baroque” elaborations of pipes, even “the 
streamlined profile of the railroad train” – have been replaced, as Jameson 
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puts it, in “our own moment”, by a technology that does not lend itself to such 
awe-inspiring representations (1991: 36-37). The technology of which he 
speaks is, of course, “the computer, whose outer shell has no emblematic or 
visual power” – a form he compares to the “television which articulates 
nothing but rather implodes, carrying its flattened image surface within itself” 
(1991: 37). Jameson conceives of such ‘new’ technology as “machines of 
reproduction rather than of production,” insisting that they “make very different 
demands on our capacity for aesthetic representation than did the relatively 
mimetic idolatry of the older machinery” (1991: 37). He suggests that, where 
the older technology provoked an experience of the sublime through “kinetic 
energy”, the newer technology’s sublime dimension lies within its 
“reproductive processes” (Jameson 1991: 37). To represent this new 
configuration of sublime experience therefore requires a new approach to 
models of representation. As Jameson puts it: 
[I]n the most energetic postmodernist texts…the work seems somehow to tap 
the networks of the reproductive process and thereby to afford us some 
glimpse into a postmodern or technological sublime, whose power or 
authenticity is documented by the success of such works in evoking a whole 
new postmodern space in emergence around us. (1991: 37) 
Jameson suggests that such representations act not as self-referential models 
of some vast digital matrix, but rather present “a distorted figuration of 
something even deeper, namely the whole world system of a present day 
multinational capitalism” (1991: 37). He argues that digital technology is 
mesmerizing because it offers a “privileged representational shorthand for 
grasping a network of power and control even more difficult for our minds and 
imaginations to grasp” – something he defines as “the whole new decentered 
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global network of the third stage of capital itself” (1991: 37-38). Jameson 
suggests that the most successful attempts to “think the impossible totality of 
the contemporary world system” are to be found in science fiction narratives, 
for example the cyberpunk novels of William Gibson, which he (reluctantly) 
characterizes as “high-tech paranoia” entertainment literature (Jameson 1991: 
38). Such fiction is, Jameson asserts, “as much an expression of transnational 
corporate realities as it is of global paranoia” (1991: 38). In these works he 
sees an attempt to represent the ungraspable complexity of “that enormous 
and threatening, yet only dimly perceivable, other reality of social and 
economic institutions” (1991: 38). It is in engaging with this “other reality”, 
Jameson believes, that “the postmodern sublime can alone be adequately 
theorized” (1991: 38). 
What Jameson identifies is a mode of representation, based upon the 
model of the computer, that is adequate to a landscape of incomprehensibly 
vast and complex global power networks – and furthermore, one capable of 
expressing an experience of such a strange, abstract landscape as sublime. 
As Malcolm Andrews asserts, “[t]he inexpressible, ‘unpresentable’ properties 
of landscape, its power to dislocate and renew vision, are not confined to the 
great scenic spectacles of the world. The Sublime happens anywhere, once 
the film of familiarity is pierced” (1999: 149). 
The postmodern sublime, then, for both Lyotard and Jameson, is not 
provoked through terror but through abstraction and ineffability. We have 
heard Nye argue that Lyotard’s version of a postmodern sublime “is not about 
the sublime but about another form of the unspeakable”, which he suggests 
might be better described as an “aesthetic of the strange” (Nye 1994: xix-xx). 
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However if, as Andrews suggests, the sublime can be found wherever the 
“film of familiarity is pierced” (surely to do so is to make ‘strange’), then what 
of Burke’s insistence that “whatever is in any sort terrible, or is conversant 
about terrible objects, or operates in a manner analogous to terror, is a source 
of the sublime” (1990: 36)? That these questions remain unanswered is 
perhaps testament to the unknowable, often paradoxical nature of the 
unpresentable.  
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CHAPTER TWO: THE UNCANNY 
The Strange Sublime 
One manifestation of the unpresentable that invokes ideas of both terror and 
strangeness is the notion of the ‘uncanny’. As Antony Vidler defines it, the 
uncanny is “[a]esthetically an outgrowth of the Burkean sublime, a 
domesticated version of absolute terror” (1992: 3). He argues that the 
uncanny is closely associated with, but simultaneously strangely different from 
the concept of the sublime, which he describes as “the master category of 
aspiration, nostalgia, and the unattainable” (1992: 20). It should be noted, 
however, that Vidler follows this with the appropriately paradoxical suggestion 
that, while subgenres of the sublime have been traditionally considered "to be 
subversive of its overarching premises and its transcendent ambitions”, the 
uncanny “was perhaps the most subversive of all…because it seemed at 
times indistinguishable from the sublime” (1992: 21).1 Indeed, when 
describing the sublime Burke himself includes phenomena that we have come 
to closely associate with the idea of the uncanny: “[h]ow greatly the night adds 
to our dread in all cases of danger” he writes, listing those threatening 
sensations that provoke a feeling of terror (and thus an experience of the 
sublime), “and how much the notions of ghosts and goblins, of which none 
can form clear ideas, affect minds.” (1990: 54). Such a correlation – between 
Burke’s ghoulish description of the sublime and the notion of the uncanny – 
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1
 This notion that the uncanny is interchangeable with the sublime also appears to be held by 
the American artist Mike Kelley, who speaks of the two concepts as though they were 
synonymous. Kelley describes the sublime as “coming from the natural limitations of our 
knowledge”, suggesting that “when we are confronted with something that’s beyond our limits 
of acceptability…then we have this feeling of the uncanny” (quoted in Morley 2010b). 
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may also be traced in Sigmund Freud’s influential essay on the latter subject. 
Indeed, it has been suggested that Freud’s text The Uncanny (first published 
1919) – which Nicholas Royle describes as a work “[f]ull of ghostly omissions 
and emissions…an essay in the night, an investigation in the dark, into 
darkness” (2003: 108) – is “the only major contribution that the twentieth 
century has made to the aesthetics of the Sublime” (Bloom 1994: 182). To 
continue with this reading of the uncanny as a correlative of Burke’s sublime, 
it is also interesting to note that Freud, in the very first sentence of his essay, 
introduces his subject as “not restricted to the theory of beauty, but described 
as relating to the qualities of our feeling”, and goes on to define the concept 
as belonging “to the realm of the frightening, of what evokes fear and dread” 
(Freud 2003a: 123). Furthermore, Freud asks, “where does the uncanny 
effect of silence, solitude and darkness come from? Do not these factors point 
to the part played by danger in the genesis of the uncanny…?” (2003a: 153). 
Again, these qualities seem to echo Burke’s definition of the sublime as 
something that excites “ideas of pain, and danger…whatever is in any sort 
terrible, or is conversant about terrible objects, or operates in a manner 
analogous to terror” (1990: 36). Echoing Burke’s passage on dark and ghostly 
phenomena (“of which none can form clear ideas”), Freud suggests that the 
uncanny may locate itself in “an area in which a person was unsure of his way 
around” (2003a: 125), or, perhaps, that it is something “[c]oncealed, kept from 
sight” (quoted in Royle 2003: 108). Furthermore, as Freud points out, the 
word ‘uncanny’ “is not always used in clearly definable sense” (Freud 2003a: 
123). The notion that Freud’s uncanny shares the sense of ineffability or 
‘unpresentable-ness’ that is often attributed to the sublime seems to be 
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supported by Royle’s deconstructive reading of the psychoanalyst’s text (also 
entitled The Uncanny): Royle suggests that Freud’s essay demonstrates “that 
the uncanny is destined to elude mastery, [that] it is what cannot be pinned 
down or controlled” (2003: 15-16). As a register of the unpresentable, the 
uncanny is, like the sublime, closely connected with the way in which we 
“conceive and represent what is happening within ourselves, to ourselves, to 
the world” (Royle 2003: 2). As a concept problematic to representation, the 
uncanny is nevertheless (or perhaps consequently) bound up with theories of 
representation – what has earlier been defined as a kind of ‘subjective 
framing’. Echoing Derrida’s application of the parergon to the notion of 
sublime, Royle insists that the uncanny resists a straightforward distinction 
between inside and outside, instead being characterized by “a strangeness of 
framing and borders, an experience of liminality” (2003: 2).  
The concept of the uncanny was first extensively developed by the 
German psychiatrist Ernst Jentsch, in his essay On the Psychology of the 
Uncanny written in 1906. Jentsch characterizes the notion as a “sensation of 
psychical uncertainty” (Jentsch 1906: 6). However Freud, who drew on 
Jentsch’s text when writing his own essay thirteen years later, is ambivalent 
about this definition, suggesting that it is “clearly not exhaustive” (2003a: 125). 
In searching for substantiation of his doubts, he studies the meaning of the 
word in different languages and consults various dictionaries. The title of 
Freud’s essay in its original German is Das Unheimliche, for which, one 
translator notes, “the nearest semantic equivalents in English are [the] 
‘uncanny’ and ‘eerie’, but which etymologically corresponds to [the] 
‘unhomely’” (Freud 2003a: 124). Freud’s search leads him to a consideration 
 
of the German word heimlich, for which he finds two very different, but “not 
mutually contradictory”, definitions (2003a: 132). He notes that the word has 
its roots in the meaning “belonging to the house…familiar…homely” (2003a: 
126) but that it can refer to “what is concealed and kept hidden” (2003a: 132) 
(the latter description corresponding with the German word’s standard 
contemporary usage). Focusing initially on the former definition, Freud points 
out that “Unheimlich is clearly the opposite of Heimlich”, suggesting that “it 
seems obvious that something should be frightening precisely because it is 
unknown and unfamiliar” (2003a: 124-5). He recognizes, however, that “not 
everything new and unfamiliar is frightening” (2003a: 125), which leads him to 
a consideration of unheimlich as the opposite of something that is concealed 
or kept hidden. Here he finds a definition from Friedrich Schelling, who 
describes the uncanny as “what one calls everything that was meant to 
remain secret and hidden and has come into the open’” (quoted in Freud 
2003a: 132). Schelling’s account of the term intrigues Freud, and it becomes 
central to his own formulation. As though merging the two definitions he has 
found, he suggests that something safe and familiar (heimlich) may become 
uncanny (unheimlich) through the “notion of the hidden and the dangerous” 
(Freud 2003a: 134). Defining the uncanny as “that species of frightening that 
goes back to what was once well known and had long been familiar”, it is the 
notion of the return of the familiar that has been hidden, buried or repressed 
that becomes fundamental to Freud’s understanding of the concept (2003a: 
124). As he describes this idea: “every effect arising from an emotional 
impulse … is converted into fear by being repressed” (2003a: 148). It is this 
 
variety of fear that we call uncanny, and it is this link with repression that 
explains Schelling’s definition of the concept.2 
Freud establishes the importance of the idea of the ‘return of the 
repressed’ to his theory of the uncanny through a review of those phenomena 
(people, things, impressions, processes, situations) he believes to be capable 
of provoking  “an especially strong and distinct sense of the uncanny in us” 
(2003a: 135). He begins by considering Jentsch’s suggestion that the 
uncanny can be brought about through “‘doubt as to whether an apparently 
animate object really is alive” or, alternatively “whether a lifeless object might 
not perhaps be animate’” (quoted in Freud 2003a: 135). He notes that Jentsch 
refers specifically here to those odd sensations aroused in us by waxwork 
figures, “ingeniously constructed dolls” and automata (quoted in Freud 2003a: 
135). Addressing the question of the uncanny in literature, Jentsch suggests 
that one effective method of inducing such a feeling is to provoke in the 
reader an uncertainty as to “whether a particular figure is a real person or an 
automaton” (quoted in Freud 2003a: 135). Here he identifies the German 
Romantic author E.T.A. Hoffmann (1776-1822) as someone who regularly 
made effective use of this psychological device in his stories. Jentsch focuses 
specifically on Hoffmann’s short story The Sandman (1816), attributing its 
uncanny effects to the character of Olimpia, an automaton. In The Uncanny, 
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It is perhaps interesting to note here that when speaking of repression, Freud uses the term 
‘sublimation’ (although as Simon Morley points out, he does not directly address the 
philosophical context of the sublime). As Morley describes it: “In his concept of ‘sublimation’ 
Freud argued that in order to find psychic stability the ‘normal’ ego necessarily bases itself 
upon the suppression of undesirable urges and traumatic memories, and these are 
transformed into ‘purer’ and more morally and socially acceptable forms.” (2010a: 17). For 
Freud, the uncanny is generated through the ego’s contact with such “destabilizing, only 
partially repressed, psychological forces” (Morley 2010a: 17). 
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Freud too draws on Hoffmann’s writing, describing him as an author “who was 
more successful than any other at creating uncanny effects” (2003a: 135). As 
Jentsch had before him, he focuses specifically on The Sandman. In contrast 
to Jentsch’s reading however, Freud attributes the uncanny effects of the 
story to those elements that tell of repressed memory and the resurgence of 
traumatic experience. 
It is, I believe, worthwhile quoting Freud’s summary of The Sandman at 
length here. Not only will this fulfill the necessary function of relaying the 
story’s basic narrative, but, through a consideration of the elements he 
focuses upon, it should also reveal much about Freud’s own interpretation of 
the tale. It begins:  
A student named Nathaniel, with whose childhood memories this fantastic 
tale opens, is unable, for all his present happiness, to banish certain 
memories connected with the mysterious and terrifying death of his much-
loved father.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TEXT REMOVED DUE TO COPYRIGHT RESTRICTIONS
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 In his delerium the memory of his father’s death is 
compounded with this new impression: ‘Hurry – hurry – hurry! – ring of fire – 
ring of fire! Spin round, ring of fire – quick – quick! Wooden doll, hurry, lovely 
wooden doll, spin round –.’ Whereupon he hurls himself at the professor, 
Olimpia’s supposed father, and tries to strangle him. (Freud 2003a: 136-138) 
Freud concludes his summary by relaying the final scene of the story, in which 
Nathaniel and Clara, reunited, climb to the top of a tall tower to admire the 
view. As Freud interprets it, Nathaniel, looking through his telescope, catches 
sight of Coppelius below, whereupon he is, once again, seized by madness, 
shouting “Ring of fire, spin round”. In his fit he attempts to throw Clara from 
the tower, but the story ends instead with him falling to his own death. 
However, as Laura Mulvey points out, Freud’s convictions about the root of 
TEXT REMOVED DUE TO COPYRIGHT RESTRICTIONS.
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the story’s uncanny effect (i.e. Nathanael’s traumatic childhood memories 
relating to the Sandman) bias his interpretation of the ending. As she puts it, 
his “disavowal of the doll’s mediating place in Nathaniel’s crisis is so acute 
that he misreads the tragic ending of the story” (Mulvey 2006: 49). In 
Hoffmann’s original text it is not, as Freud claims, Coppola/Coppelius that 
Nathaniel looks at through the telescope, but Clara, who he mistakes for the 
wooden automaton Olimpia. Given Mulvey’s exposé of his ‘misreading’, it is 
evident that Freud foregrounds – perhaps even embellishes – those elements 
of the story that best corroborate his hypothesis. Unlike Jentsch, who 
attributes the uncanny qualities of the story to the intellectual uncertainty 
generated by Olimpia, Freud insists that “the sense of the uncanny attaches 
directly to the figure of the Sand-Man, and therefore to the idea of being 
robbed of one’s eyes” (2003a: 138). As Royle suggests, Freud’s selective 
reading of The Sandman in The Uncanny “is a violent attempt to reduce or 
eliminate the significance of Jentsch’s work…in particular the importance of 
the figures of the doll and automaton for an understanding of the uncanny” 
(2003: 41).  
Despite the above, there is no denying that The Sandman is saturated 
with images of eyes and allusions to sight – the significance of which, as 
Freud implies, is figured most prominently by the Sandman himself. Vidler 
estimates that more than sixty pairs of eyes are described in Hoffmann’s tale, 
in addition to “the sack of eyes carried by the legendary Sandman…the 
‘myriad’ eyes figured by the flashing eyeglasses of the barometer dealer 
Coppola…[and] the incessant repetition of veiled references to eyes in gazes, 
glances, and visions” (1992: 33). Even Royle, though having taken exception 
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to Freud’s obfuscation of the significance of the automaton, describes the 
story as “a magnificent, relentless exploration of the uncanniness of seeing 
and not seeing, of the optical imagination” (2003: 45).  
The significance of Nathaniel’s fear of losing his eyes to the Sandman is 
explicitly ascribed by Freud to a fear of castration. He argues that “ [t]he study 
of dreams, fantasies and myths has taught us…that anxiety about [losing] 
one’s eyes, the fear of going blind, is quite often a substitute for the fear of 
castration” (Freud 2003a: 139). This equation may be “a good deal less 
obvious…to a female reader than a male” (Royle 2003: 41), but whatever the 
veracity of Freud’s claim, it allows him to make an important and consequently 
fertile association between Nathaniel’s fear for his eyes – that is, fear of the 
Sandman - and the traumatic memory of his father’s death (Freud 2003a: 
140). Indeed, as (feminist film theorist) Mulvey suggests, in Hoffmann’s tale 
there is: 
…ample evidence that its hero, Nathaniel, has had traumatic childhood 
experiences that could have led to intense castration anxiety. Freud sees his 
symptoms very much in terms of displaced anxiety about his eyes provoked 
by the two vengeful father figures, the vendor of eye-glasses Coppola 
(otherwise known as Coppelius), and Spalanzini, the ‘father’ of the automaton 
Olympia. (2006: 47-48) 
Whether through Nathaniel’s fear of the Sandman as ‘eye-thief’, or his 
association of the character with his father’s death years earlier, the 
reappearance of the ‘father figure’ Coppelius as the barometer dealer 
Coppola personifies Freud’s formulation of the uncanny as “that species of 
frightening that goes back to what was once well known and had long been 
familiar” (Freud 2003a: 124). When, as a student, Nathaniel sees that 
 
Coppola has stolen the eyes of his beloved Olimpia, he is seized by a 
resurgence of the traumatic memory of his father’s death. He cries “ring of fire 
– ring of fire!” in an “access of madness”, as he relives his father’s alchemical 
experiments with Coppelius beside the “brazier that emits glowing flames”. 
This notion of the return or recurrence of something familiar that has been 
hidden, buried or repressed is, as has been established, fundamental to 
Freud’s understanding of the uncanny. For him, the recurring figure of the 
Sandman is, in many ways, the ‘uncanny element’ of Hoffmann’s story. The 
uncanny re-emergence of the Sandman, in the form of Coppola, comes to 
embody Nathanael’s traumatic memory of his father’s death. As Freud 
explains: “the uncanny element we know from experience arises…when 
repressed childhood complexes are revived by some impression” (2003a: 
155). This understanding of such reoccurrences leads him to suggest that: 
In the unconscious mind we can recognize the dominance of a compulsion to 
repeat…It is strong enough to override the pleasure principle and lend a 
demonic character to certain aspects of mental life…[A]nything that reminds 
us of this inner compulsion to repeat is perceived as uncanny. (2003a: 145)  
The sense of a compulsion to repeat imparting a “demonic character to 
certain aspects of mental life” (2003a: 145) surfaces – repeatedly – 
throughout The Sandman. The notion is in fact explicitly articulated in Clara’s 
letter to her fiancé, when she asks,  “Ah, my beloved Nathaniel, do you not 
then believe that in cheerful unaffected, careless hearts too there may not 
dwell the presentiment of a dark power which strives to ruin us within our own 
selves?” (Hoffmann 1908: 96). Giving this particular passage as an example, 
Royle argues that The Sandman is “explicitly concerned with what Freud will 
call the ‘death drive’” (2003: 46). The ‘death drive’ is the name Freud gives to 
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his speculative theory that the compulsion to repeat traumatic experience can 
be strong enough to override what he called the ‘pleasure principle’. Although 
Freud does not refer explicitly to the death drive in The Uncanny, the concept 
“lurks, as if forbidden to speak its name, everywhere in the 1919 essay” 
(Royle 2003: 86) – its “ghostly presence…evident above all perhaps in 
[Freud’s] focus on the notion of a ‘compulsion to repeat’” (Royle 2003: 89). 
The concept of the death drive was developed by Freud in his 1920 
essay Beyond the Pleasure Principle, marking a significant departure from his 
earlier concept of the pleasure principle outlined in The Interpretation of 
Dreams (first published 1899). In the earlier work, Freud “insists upon the 
principle that the dream is a fulfillment of a wish” (Ellmann 1994: 7) – hence 
the term ‘pleasure principle’. However, he was forced to re-examine this idea 
in the aftermath of the First World War, as he attempted to grapple with the 
traumatic dreams of shellshock victims. This experience led him to conclude 
that the “dreams of patients with accident-induced neurosis can no longer be 
viewed in terms of wish-fulfillment, and nor can those dreams…that bring 
back memories of the psychic traumas of childhood. Instead they obey the 
compulsion to repeat” (Freud 2003b: 71-72). These compulsive returns to 
traumatic experience made it clear to him that “no pleasure, in any ordinary 
sense of the word, could be derived from these horrendous nightmares” 
(Ellmann 1994: 7). It was through his examinations of the nature of war 
neuroses and childhood disturbance, that Freud was able to develop a greater 
understanding of traumatic experience in general.  
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Trauma, Modernity and the Uncanny 
Etymologically, the term trauma derives from a Greek word meaning wound – 
that is, a physical injury in which the skin is punctured. By the nineteenth 
century however, the word came to more commonly denote psychological 
trauma. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud describes the significance of 
this shift for psychoanalysis, noting that while for physical trauma “the 
essential thing…is that it directly damages the molecular or even the 
histological structure of the nerve elements” psychoanalysts seek to 
understand the effects of shock “in terms of the breaching of the protective 
barrier around the psyche” (2003b: 70). 
In both cases, trauma indicates a shock from the outside that is 
powerful enough to puncture a protective shield. In terms of psychological 
[‘psychical’] trauma, that shock originates, Freud suggests, “in the element of 
fright and in the threat to life” (2003b: 70). The resulting experience of such a 
shock becomes, quite literally, unpresentable. As Roger Luckhurst puts it: 
[P]sychical trauma is something that enters the psyche that is so 
unprecedented or overwhelming that it cannot be processed or assimilated by 
normal mental processes. We have, as it were, nowhere to put it, and so it 
falls out of our conscious memory, yet it is still present in the mind like an 
intruder or ghost. (2006: 499) 
Such ghosts take the form of scars – the index of a traumatic event 
manifested as a kind of negativity. These psychological scars are formed, it 
would appear, through the healing process of the repetition compulsion. As 
Freud understands it, the repetition compulsion is an attempt to gain 
retroactive mastery over a traumatic event by continually returning to it. The 
 
psychological wound is healed through “mastering the amounts of stimulus 
which have broken in and…binding them, in a psychical sense, so that they 
can be disposed of” (Freud quoted in Luckhurst 2008: 9). As Anne Whitehead 
puts it, this allows the individual to “construct a protective shield against 
trauma after the event” (2004: 119). 
Interestingly, the first diagnoses of psychological trauma by medics 
were concurrent with the rise of Victorian modernity. For example, Luckhurst 
points out that:  
…[t]he shocks produced by railway accidents were first thought to be the 
result of direct physical jars to the nervous constitution...[but] [m]edics soon 
recognized that accident victims could escape physical injury completely, yet 
suffer persistent forms of mental distress long after the event. (2006: 498) 
The rise of modernity and industrialization brought with it numerous forms of 
traumatic experience similar to those associated with railway accidents – 
Freud’s analysis of the dreams of shell-shock victims suggesting just one 
example. For the Marxist critic Walter Benjamin however, modern society in 
general caused “a disorienting psychic condition of traumatic ‘shock’, with 
hugely destabilizing consequences not only for the individual but also for 
society” (Morley 2010a: 17). As Luckhurst points out, in his analysis of 
modern urban environments Benjamin draws explicitly on Freud’s ideas of 
“the shock that overwhelms psychic defences” describing the city in terms of a 
series of “traumatic encounters” (Luckhurst 2008: 20-21). Such an experience 
of the urban/industrial environment suggests an understanding of modernity 
as inherently traumatic – rather than being an encounter with one particular, 
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devastating event, it presents a continuous series of minor shocks to the 
nervous system.  
Given the inassimilable, even ghostly nature of traumatic experience 
(Luckhurst 2006: 499) and Freud’s suggestion of an inextricable association 
between the two concepts, it is perhaps unsurprising to find modernity also 
described in terms of the uncanny. Indeed, “to many thinkers of the early and 
mid twentieth century the conditions of daily life within modern technological 
society could seem one continuous and disturbingly uncanny or sublime 
experience” (Morley 2010a: 17). The uncanny was, traditionally, associated 
with the domestic space of the home – as Vidler suggests, in his book The 
Architectural Uncanny, the concept was, “in its first incarnation, a sensation 
best experienced in the privacy of the interior” (1994: 4). However, 
intellectuals such as Benjamin felt that modernity changed this – that the 
uncanny “was also born out of the rise of the great cities, their disturbingly 
heterogeneous crowds and newly scaled spaces” (Vidler: 4).  
This relocation of the uncanny from the domestic sphere to the 
‘traumatic’ space of the modern urban environment came about, as Luckhurst 
puts it, through “transformations of the relations of so-called traditional 
society” (2008: 20-21). With the growth of modernity, Vidler argues, came the 
“the alienation of the individual” as “community bonds were brutally severed” 
(1994: 4). Karl Marx adapted the idea of individual estrangement to his theory 
of class alienation when writing his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts 
of 1844, but the rise of this peculiarly urban experience had been eloquently 
described by Benjamin Constant some years earlier. In the early 1800s, he 
wrote that:  
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Individuals, lost in isolation from nature, strangers to the place of their birth, 
without contact with the past, living only in a rapid present, and thrown down 
like atoms on an immense and leveled plain, are detached from a fatherland 
that they see nowhere. (quoted in Vidler 1994: 4) 
In his book The Trauma Question, Luckhurst describes how by the end 
of the nineteenth century, Britain had turned from “an agrarian nation into an 
urban one” (2008: 20). He points out that in “these sprawling, artificial terrains, 
divorced from nature, commentators began to worry about the overstimulation 
and exhaustion caused by prolonged immersion” in urban environments, 
further noting that with the growth of industrialization, new machinery only 
added to such complications (Luckhurst 2008: 20). Recalling Nye’s 
examination of the technological sublime, he suggests that although 
technology “can be seen as the instrumental vehicle for the liberations of 
modern space-time”, it can also be thought of as a “‘demonic’ force” 
(Luckhurst 2008: 20) – a force that, as Karl Marx puts it, “reduces humans to 
the conscious limbs of the automaton” (1980: 141). 
This reading of the traumatic space of the industrial environment as 
“demonic” – together with Marx’s evocative description of its effect on the 
human figure – suggests why such surroundings might be thought of in terms 
of the uncanny. As Vidler argues, the uncanny, with its “individual and poetic 
origins in romanticism,” became generalized by the end of the nineteenth 
century as an alienating “condition of modern anxiety” (1994: 6). When it 
“finally became public in metropolis…[a]s a sensation it was no longer easily 
confined to the bourgeois interior” (Vidler: 6). Manifesting itself within the 
context through which Freud would later define the concept: 
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…the uncanny emerged in the late nineteenth century as a special case of 
the many modern diseases, from phobias to neuroses, variously described by 
psychoanalysts, psychologists, and philosophers as a distancing from reality 
forced by reality. Its space was still an interior, but now the interior of the mind 
(Vidler: 6). 
As Freud began studying the disturbing dreams of shell-shock victims – those 
nightmares caused by the machine-induced, industrial traumas of the First 
World War – a feeling of ‘unhomeliness’ also began to take its grip over 
Europe. As Vidler describes the change, “the entire ‘homeland’ of Europe, 
cradle and apparently secure house of western civilization, was in the process 
of barbaric regression”, thus the uncanny’s “traditional links with nostalgia” 
were reinforced through a sense of “[h]omesickness…for the true, natal 
home” (1994: 7). This sense of homesickness in the face of industrial war 
speaks not only of a desire for a return to the familiar culture and security of 
peacetime, but also, perhaps, of a “profound nostalgia for the premodern” 
(Vidler: 8) – before individuals came to be, as Constant put it, “lost in isolation 
from nature” (quoted in Vidler: 4). It is this sense of longing for a time or place 
devoid of feelings of alienation and estrangement, brought about as they are 
by the industrial ills of modernity, that can mark such experience as uncanny. 
As Royle suggests, “the feeling of the uncanny may be bound up with the 
most extreme nostalgia or ‘homesickness’, in other words a compulsion to 
return” (2003: 2). 
The project of restoring harmony to an industrial society beset by the 
malady of alienation was taken up by the modernist avant-gardes of the 
twentieth century, for whom “a world estranged and distanced from its own 
nature could only be recalled to itself by shock, by the effects of things 
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deliberately ‘made strange’” (Vidler 1994: 8). From the subjective distortions 
of the Expressionists to the revolutionary aspirations of the Surrealists, the 
uncanny “readily offered itself as an instrument of ‘defamiliarization’” (Vidler: 
8).  
The uncanny has manifested itself, then, as both an aesthetic and a 
psychoanalytical response to the shock of modernity – “a trauma that”, Vidler 
proposes, “has not been exorcised from the contemporary imaginary” (1994: 
9). Those traumas of modernity that continue into the twenty-first century are 
marked by a sense of alienation common to all urban landscapes (whether 
industrial or post-industrial), for the uncanny: 
… is not a property of the space itself nor can it be provoked by any particular 
spatial conformation; it is, in its aesthetic dimension, a representation of a 
mental state of projection that precisely elides the boundaries of the real and 
the unreal in order to provoke a disturbing ambiguity, a slippage between 
waking and dreaming. (Vidler 1994: 11)  
Like the sublime, the uncanny may occur wherever one’s experience of reality 
becomes estranged from the familiar (see Chapter One, p45). Resisting any 
kind of framing, like the sublime the uncanny is also a somewhat subjective 
encounter problematic to representation: it is, as it were, ‘unpresentable’. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE INDEXICAL UNCANNY 
As the uncanny and traumatic effects of modernity took shape in the 
landscapes of industrial life, they also began to reveal themselves within its 
representational technologies. Since their invention, the nineteenth-century 
‘new media’ of photography and cinema have elicited feelings of both 
uncertainty and shock. The story of audiences fleeing screaming from the 
Lumiere brothers’ 1896 film of an approaching train1 perhaps offers one 
famous example – leading, as it has, the film theorist Tom Gunning to 
describe early cinema as “a series of visual shocks” (1999: 820). It would 
seem appropriate to suggest, therefore, that such media present an 
interesting and apposite form through which to explore the problem of 
representing traumatic, uncanny or otherwise ‘unpresentable’ experiences of 
the industrial landscape. What follows is a consideration of the ways in which 
the indexical media of cinema and photography have been associated with 
ideas of the traumatic and the uncanny. In the next chapter (Chapter Four), 
this also leads to an examination of how an experience of the sublime might 
be elicited through such media. The present chapter draws initially on Walter 
Benjamin’s conception of cinema as traumatic, before moving on to examine 
Roland Barthes’ reading of photography in terms of trauma. In particular, 
Barthes’ reflections on photography are considered through Laura Mulvey’s 
book Death 24x a Second, which applies the French theorist’s ideas to an 
extended reading of both photography and cinema in terms of the uncanny. 
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1
 L'arrivée d'un train à La Ciotat (1896) d. Auguste Lumière and Louis Lumière. 
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Trauma, Modernity and Photographic Machines 
Proposing that camera-based technologies were “crucial to modernity’s 
reconceptualization of time and its representability”, the film theorist Mary 
Anne Doane notes that Walter Benjamin understood this shift in perception in 
terms of the traumatic (2002: 4). Elucidating, for example, his argument that in 
cinema “perception in the form of shocks was established as a formal 
principle” (Benjamin 1999: 171), she suggests that the “very rapidity of the 
changing images in film is potentially traumatic for the spectator” (Doane 
2002: 15). Benjamin tends to align shock in film with montage – a formal 
principle that embodies “something of the restructuration of modern 
perception” (Doane 2002: 15). Montage is an editing technique generally 
employed to convey the passage of time in cinema, structuring, as it were, a 
film’s ‘temporal logic’. In its rapid accumulation and juxtaposition of dislocated 
time and space, Doane suggests, montage echoes “the excesses of a 
technologically saturated modern life” (2002: 15). She explains that for 
Benjamin, the “shock experience of film makes it adequate to its age” (2002: 
15). As Allen Meek puts it, Benjamin “emphasized the ways media 
technologies served to attune experience to new rhythms and speeds of 
modernity” (Meek 2010: 6).  
Benjamin developed his ideas about shock and its relationship to 
industrial culture’s representational technologies through Freud’s theories of 
trauma. His essay On Some Motifs in Baudelaire (first published 1939), for 
example, draws on Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) to suggest 
that with modernity came, as Meek puts it, “the destruction of earlier forms of 
communal memory and individual interiority” (2010: 7). Benjamin conceived of 
 
photographic media as replacing the “long memory characteristic of more 
stable societies, localized communities and traditional cultures” (Meek 2010: 
6-7). As the fixed, indexical trace of a past moment, the mechanically derived 
photographic image represents a departure from more organic (sometimes 
subjective) forms of memory. Thus despite his focus on the traumatic 
properties of montage, Benjamin also appears to attribute the shock value of 
photographic imagery to this, perhaps more fundamental, indexical 
characteristic. What is more, as Doane notes, “it is clear from 
[Benjamin’s]…delineation of shock as a surface phenomenon unassimilable to 
meaning, that the cinema’s shock effect is ineluctably associated with its 
indexicality” (2002: 15). As has been outlined in the introduction to this thesis, 
the indexical character of the photographic image invokes complex issues of 
representation. Photography’s distinctively unbiased imprinting of reality 
marks it apart from what may be considered more ‘subjective’ 
representational systems (such as painting or literature). The photographic 
image may, as such, be more readily understood as ‘unassimilable to 
meaning’: Laura Mulvey, for example, speaks of the intellectual impossibility 
“of reducing the photograph to language and a grammatical system of 
meaning”, because of the “presence of an intractable reality in the index” 
(2006: 63) (this idea is discussed further later in this chapter). It is this 
conception of the indexical image as irreducible to meaning through which 
Doane draws her parallel between the indexical characteristics of cinema and 
the ‘unpresentable’ nature of traumatic shock. 
The ‘intractable reality’ of the photograph is a result of the mechanical 
process of the camera, which produces “unmediated and spontaneous” 
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images of the real world (Campany 2003: 39). As Barthes suggests “[a] 
specific photograph, in effect, is never distinguished from its referent (from 
what it represents)…the Photograph always carries its referent within itself” 
(2000: 5).2 Barthes speaks of the nature of a photograph’s immutable 
connection to its referent and its lack of ‘meaningful’ or mediated 
representational baggage with reference to Jacques Lacan’s concept of ‘the 
Real’: “In the Photograph, the event is never transcended for the sake of 
something else…[it is], in short, what Lacan calls the Tuche, the Occasion, 
the Encounter, the Real, in its indefatigable expression” (Barthes 2000: 4). 
Lacan’s notion of the Real describes “that which resists symbolization…the 
traumatic kernel at the core of subjectivity and the symbolic order…the 
ultimate, unspeakable, limit of human existence” (Homer 2005: 94). Like the 
‘unpresentable’ concepts of the sublime, the uncanny or the traumatic, the 
Real exists beyond representation. Lacan defines it as an “object which isn’t 
an object any longer”, something against which “all words cease and all 
categories fail” (1991: 164). The Real may, therefore, be described as that 
state of unmediated nature from which we are permanently severed because 
of our entry into language (the root of our subjectivity and consciousness). It is 
inexpressible precisely because our adherence to any system of 
representation (or ‘language’) prompts a separation from the actuality of the 
event. As Mulvey describes this impossibility: 
Lacan’s category of ‘the Real’ refers to the actuality of a traumatic event, 
personal or historical. The mind searches for words or images that might 
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 Barthes does however qualify this statement somewhat: “…or at least [the photograph] is 
not immediately or generally distinguished from its referent (as is the case for every other 
image, encumbered – from the start, and because of its status – by the way in which the 
object is simulated)” (2000: 5). 
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translate and convey that reality. But its translation into ‘Symbolic’ form and 
into consciousness separates the two, just as an account of a dream is 
separated from the time of dreaming and loses its original feeling. (2006: 128)  
The camera-machine’s inhuman nature differs from that of other, more 
subjective modes of representation through its ability to figure the Real. As 
Mulvey argues “[t]he human imagination engages with the mechanical 
integrity of photographic registration”, and therefore a photograph, “however 
influenced it might be by its surrounding culture or its maker’s vision, is 
affected by the Real both in its materiality and in the human subject’s 
response to it.” (2006: 58). The photographic image, it would seem, is 
uniquely capable of presenting something of the traumatic – the 
unpresentable – if perhaps only negatively, as a scar, a trace or index of the 
Real. 
This ‘Real’ that clings to the photograph, its intractable reality, is 
evoked by Barthes in Camera Lucida through his use of Lacan’s term tuche 
(2000: 4). As Sean Homer describes it, “[t]he tuche presents itself in the form 
of trauma, that is to say, that which is impossible for the subject to bear and 
assimilate” (2005: 93). Barthes’ concept of photography is structured around 
this notion of trauma as “the hard impenetrable kernel at the heart of 
subjectivity” (Homer: 93). As Mulvey points out, Barthes’ use of the term 
tuche: 
…leads back to Freud’s theory of trauma as an event or experience that 
arouses too much psychic excitement for the subject to be able to translate its 
significance into words. Trauma leaves a mark on the unconscious, a kind of 
index of the psyche that parallels the photograph’s trace of an original event. 
(2006: 65) 
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Parallels between trauma and the indexical nature of the photographic trace 
are self-evident in much literature on the former subject. For example, the 
trauma theorist Cathy Caruth suggests that “since the traumatic event is not 
experienced as it occurs, it is fully evident only in connection with another 
place, and in another time” (1991: 7). Similarly, Meek writes that traumatic 
memories “are experienced with a sense of great vividness and immediacy: 
they seem to retain an indelible imprint of the past and thereby an 
incontestable link with history” (2007). The descriptions of delay, trace and 
historicity in these quotes seem interchangeable with a description of the 
nature of the photographic image. Mulvey describes this correlation between 
trauma and the indexical camera-image, elaborating upon the idea that they 
share a similar sense of temporality – and points out that the relationship is 
not exclusive to the still photographic image: 
The cinema (like photography) has a privileged relation to time, preserving 
the moment at which the image is registered, inscribing an unprecedented 
reality into its representation of the past. This, as it were, storage function 
may be compared to the memory left in the unconscious by an incident lost to 
consciousness. Both have the attributes of the indexical sign, the mark of 
trauma or the mark of light, and both need to be deciphered retrospectively 
across delayed time. (2006: 9) 
While the indexical camera-image as a trace of the Real marks it, like trauma, 
as resistant to symbolic form or meaning, its sense of delayed time also 
seems to be problematic to linguistic reduction. As Mulvey suggests, 
“language may simply not be adequate to describe the photograph’s tense” 
(2006: 57). She notes that Barthes describes the essence of the photographic 
image as “this was now”, citing Ann Banfield’s observation that the phrase is 
his attempt “to find the linguistic form capable of recapturing a present in the 
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past, a form that it turns out spoken language does not offer” (Banfield 1990: 
75, quoted in Mulvey 2006: 57). Mulvey surmises that “[t]he photograph 
pushes language and its ability to articulate time to the limits of its possibility, 
leaving the spectator with a slightly giddy feeling” (2006: 58). She goes on to 
suggest that this vertiginous sensation, a confusion of temporality caused by 
the complex relationship between the photographic image and the Real, 
“gives rise to that sense of uncertainty associated with the uncanny” (2006: 
58). As Freud suggests, the delayed resurfacing of a repressed traumatic 
memory may bring about a feeling of the uncanny. It is, similarly, an 
ambiguous interaction between the delayed time of the photographic imprint 
and the traumatic Real of its referent that may confer upon the camera-image 
a sense of the uncanny. 
 
Death, the Double and Déjà vu  
If, as Mulvey suggests, the uncanny manifests itself in the photograph as an 
intellectual uncertainty about time, such ambiguity may also be traced in 
Barthes’ association of the photograph with death. Contemplating the portrait 
of a prisoner who is condemned to die, Barthes considers the relationship 
between the photograph’s complex ‘this was now’ temporality and, as he puts 
it, “that rather terrible thing that is there in every photograph: the return of the 
dead” (Barthes 2000: 9). He observes, “[t]his will be and this has been; I 
observe with horror an anterior future of which death is the stake” (Barthes 
2000: 96). Throughout Camera Lucida, Barthes insists upon the presence of 
death in photography, articulating this assertion through an extended 
 
meditation on a photograph of his recently deceased mother. He writes, “[i]n 
front of the photograph of my mother as a child, I tell myself: she is going to 
die: I shudder…over a catastrophe that has already occurred. Whether or not 
the subject is already dead, every photograph is this catastrophe.” (2000: 96).  
Considering further the uncanny nature of photography, it is interesting 
to note that Barthes’ contention – that the ‘return of the dead’ is in every 
photograph – echoes Freud’s description of the uncanny as arising in relation 
“to death and dead bodies, to the return of the dead and to spirits and ghosts” 
(quoted in Mulvey 2006: 39). Mulvey reflects that from its beginnings, 
photography has engendered associations with life after death, suggesting 
that the medium “marks a point where an indexical sign of Peircian semiotic 
theory overlaps with an uncanny of Freudian psychoanalytic theory” (2006: 
54). As though invoking Freud’s talk of spirits and ghosts, Tom Gunning, too, 
speaks of the “spectre-like” qualities of photography (1995: 47). He suggests 
that since its emergence, photography has been experienced as “an uncanny 
phenomenon, one which seemed to undermine the unique identity of objects 
and people, endlessly reproducing the appearances of objects, creating a 
parallel world of phantasmatic doubles” (Gunning 1995: 42-43). Indeed, Freud 
gave some consideration to the significance of the double in The Uncanny, 
arguing that the doubling or repetition of a person, object or event can evoke 
a sense of the uncanny (2003a: 143). He also talks explicitly in his 1919 text 
about the double as “an insurance against the extinction of the self” and cites 
Otto Rank’s conception of it as “an energetic denial of the power of death” 
(quoted in Freud 2003a: 142). It is the immortalizing powers of photography 
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and cinema, their ability to double and hold or ‘embalm’ the flow of life, which 
contributes to the uncanny characteristics of such media.  
The camera-image’s association with the double also exposes, once 
again, the medium’s strange temporality. Nicholas Royle suggests that it is 
“difficult to imagine a theory of the ghost or double without a theory of déjà 
vu”, by which he infers that an experience of the strange, uncanny temporality 
of déjà vu involves the feeling that the present reality has a double (2003: 
182-183). Mulvey, too, invokes the concept of déjà vu alongside that of the 
uncanny, in an attempt to articulate the peculiar temporal space of the 
photograph. Reflecting upon Barthes’ discussion of the photograph of the 
dead-prisoner-awaiting-death (that vertiginous temporality he describes as 
“[t]his will be and this has been”), she points out that: 
… an overwhelming and irrational sense of fate or destiny…is also a mark of 
the uncanny. Such a disordering of the sensible in the face of sudden 
disorientation is similar to déjà vu, involuntary memory, a suddenly half-
remembered dream or the strange sense of reality breaking through the 
defences of the conscious mind. (Mulvey 2006: 62) 
The uncanny temporality of the photographic index, the “trace of the past that 
persists into present”, manifests itself here, and perhaps in all photographs, 
as “an effect of confusion between living and dead” (Mulvey 2006: 31). This 
sense of uncertainty recalls Jentsch’s suggestion that a feeling of the uncanny 
may be brought about through “doubt as to whether an apparently animate 
object really is alive” or, alternatively “whether a lifeless object might not 
perhaps be animate’” (quoted in Freud 2003a: 135). Like a stalled automata – 
the mechanized figures Jentsch proposes might induce such feelings of 
uncertainty – the photograph’s “suspension of time, its conflation of life and 
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death, the animate and the inanimate, raises…a sense of disquiet that is 
aggravated…by the photograph’s mechanical, chemical and indifferent 
nature” (Mulvey 2006: 60-61). This ‘indifferent nature’ of the photograph, the 
absence, as Bazin put it, of “the creative intervention of man”, leads to its 
complex categorization as a representational form (1967: 13). What Barthes 
sees in the photograph – “neither Art nor Communication,” but “Reference” – 
is, ultimately, what leads to his association of the medium with death (2000: 
76-77). As Derrida puts it:  
Whatever the nature of the art of photography, that is to say, its intervention, 
its style, there is a point at which the photographic act is not an artistic act, a 
point at which it registers passively and this poignant, piercing passivity 
represents the opportunity of this reference to death; it seizes a reality that is 
there, that was there in an indissoluble now. In a word, one must choose 
between art and death. (2003: 220)  
Like Barthes, what Derrida describes is an understanding of photography’s 
unmediated indexical accord with reality – its lifeless passivity in the face of 
inflection or meaning – as irreconcilable with the more ‘active’ subjective 
expression normally associated with art. The mechanical process of 
photography allows little room for the resulting image to communicate 
anything of the experience of the photographer. As Andre Bazin describes the 
arrival of the photographic process: “between the originating object and its 
reproduction there intervenes only the instrumentality of a nonliving agent. For 
the first time an image of the world is formed automatically, without the 
creative intervention of man” (1967: 13). Reflecting upon photography’s lack 
of creative intervention, Stanley Carvell too suggests that upon its arrival, “[s]o 
far as photography satisfied a wish, it satisfied a wish not confined to painters, 
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but the human wish, intensifying since the reformation, to escape subjectivity 
and metaphysical isolation” (1979: 21). At the moment a photograph is taken 
“all subjectivity that requires a subject, an I, is eliminated” (Banfield 1990: 81). 
The thoughts and feelings of the photographer become redundant, 
superfluous – the resulting photograph takes on an “unthinking existence.” 
(Banfield 1990: 79). Any representational system that might generate 
meaning is negated by the indexical nature of the photographic apparatus. 
Barthes appears to delight in this refusal of the photographic image to be 
reduced to meaning, asking, for example: “[w]hat did I care about the rules of 
composition of the photographic landscape? I saw only the referent…looking 
at certain photographs, I wanted to be primitive, without culture” (2000: 7). A 
photograph is the result of a mechanical process that indiscriminately records 
everything in front of the camera lens the moment the shutter is released: it is 
“indifferent to all intermediaries: it does not invent; it is authentication 
itself…Every photograph is a certificate of presence” (Barthes 2000: 87). 
Mulvey suggests that this indiscriminate passivity leads to what she terms a 
“slippage of language” (2006: 58). Barthes implies much the same thing 
when, in the first pages of Camera Lucida, he writes, “the Photograph 
mechanically repeats what could never be repeated existentially…[it is] 
somehow stupid” (2000: 4). As he proposes, “a photograph cannot be 
transformed (spoken) philosophically, it is wholly ballasted by the contingency 
of which it is the weightless, transparent envelope.” (Barthes: 5).  
 
 
 
Cinema: Art or Index? 
Cinema is the art of the index; it is an attempt to make art out of a footprint. 
(Manovich 2000: 174) 
While for the most part Camera Lucida dwells upon the idea that the camera 
is a machine of passive registration – that, as Derrida puts it, “the 
photographic act is not an artistic act” (2003: 220)  – in his book’s final chapter 
Barthes declares that photography “can in fact be an art” (2000: 117). He 
continues by identifying cinema (or “at least the fictional cinema”) as 
participating in what he calls “this domestication of Photography” (2000: 117). 
The photographic image, he feels, loses its compelling “that-has-been” quality 
through integration into the fictional space-time of the cinema (2000: 77). As 
Mulvey points out, the space-time of a fiction film’s narrative tends to “mask 
the primary, the moment of cinematic registration, and [to] subordinate the 
fascination of movement as recorded time to narrative drama” (2006: 183). 
She continues: “for the cinema to spin the magic that makes its story-telling 
work, the cinema as index has had to take on the secondary role of ‘prop’ for 
narrative verisimilitude” (Mulvey 2006: 183). 
Despite his proviso, however, Barthes’ ideas about cinema’s 
domestication of the photographic image – its translation of document to 
artform – do appear to extend beyond fictional film. It would appear that, for 
him, there is something more fundamental about the moving image’s refusal 
to “protest its former existence” – that in the translation from still to moving 
image the photograph as index loses something of its basic essence (Barthes 
2000: 89). He argues that the cinema’s vision is “oneiric” (dreamlike), while 
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the photograph’s is “ecmnesic” (the hallucinatory evocation of fragments of 
the past)3 (2000: 117). While he acknowledges that cinema derives from the 
photographic still, he argues that it has a “different phenomenology” and 
therefore represents a different art form (Barthes: 78). The moving image’s 
photographic base, “taken in flux,” he writes, “is impelled, ceaselessly drawn 
towards other views” (Barthes: 89) – “the pose swept away and denied by the 
continuous series of images” (Barthes: 78). While he accepts that cinema 
retains a photographic referent, he argues that this referent is constantly 
shifting and therefore “does not make a claim in favour of its reality, it does 
not protest its former existence; it does not cling to me: it is not a specter” 
(Barthes 2000: 89). As Mulvey explains: 
For Barthes the cinema’s relentless movement, reinforced by the 
masquerade and movement of fiction, could not offer the psychic 
engagement and emotion he derived from the still photograph. Unlike the 
photograph, a movie watched in correct conditions (24 frames a second, 
darkness) tends to be elusive. Like running water, fire or the movement of 
trees in the wind, this elusiveness has been intrinsic to the cinema’s 
fascination and its beauty. The insubstantial and irretrievable passing of the 
celluloid film image is in direct contrast to the way the photograph’s stillness 
allows time for the presence of time to emerge within the image. (2006: 66)  
Echoing Barthes’ conception of the cinema as a ‘different pheonomenology', 
Mulvey suggests that through the translation of still images into moving 
images “[t]he uncanny nature of the indexical inscription of life, as in the 
photograph, merges with the uncanny of mechanized human movement that 
belongs to the long line of replicas and automata” (2006: 175). Through this 
process, she suggests, the uncanny nature of the photograph is transformed 
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 I have found no reliable definition for ‘ecmnesic’, but I take it as corresponding to the French 
ecmnésique, denoting a kind of Proustian delirium in which fragments of one’s past resurface. 
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from “one emotional and aesthetic paradigm into another” (Mulvey 2006: 175). 
This merging of ‘uncannies’ – the uncanniness of still photography with the 
uncanniness of its mechanically animated descendant – seems to echo the 
point at which Freud and Jentsch’s uncannies meet. Jentsch’s conception of 
the uncanny pertains to an uncertainty “as to whether an apparently living 
being really is animate and, conversely, doubt as to whether a lifeless object 
may not in fact be animate” – for which he gives the example of (mechanically 
animated) automata (1906: 8). For Freud the uncanny is associated with the 
concept of death and the return of the dead (that is, the revival or reanimation 
of the lifeless). These linked but differing interpretations of the uncanny meet 
at the point at which the animate and the inanimate become confused: as 
Mulvey puts it, “[a] mechanical replica of the human body and the human 
body from which life has departed both threaten the crucial division between 
animate and inanimate” (2006: 37-38). In cinema, the deathliness associated 
with the still photograph merges with the mechanical animation of that very 
inertness. As she explains: 
The cinema combines, perhaps more perfectly than any other medium, two 
human fascinations: one with the boundary between life and death and the 
other with the mechanical animation of the inanimate, particularly the human, 
figure. These porous boundaries introduce the concept of the uncanny… 
(Mulvey 2006: 11) 
At the level of the individual frame, cinema is comprised of the still 
photographic index that Barthes associated with death. Barthes felt, however, 
that in animating the image, this association was annulled. Despite his 
protestations though, it would seem that death does have a place in the 
moving image. This becomes particularly apparent, for example, when we 
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consider early cinema. Describing the Lumière’s films as “touched with 
mystery”, Mulvey imagines the “disturbing, uncanny sensation of seeing 
movement fossilized for the first time” and suggests that “the images’ silence 
and lack of colour added to their ghostly atmosphere” (2006: 36). Here, 
cinema appears not to negate the deathlike quality of the photographic image, 
but rather retain it, while simultaneously resurrecting the dead as moving 
ghosts: animated specters that blur the boundary between the living and 
deceased all the more acutely. As Robert Smith puts it: 
Early viewers of film were amazed and moved by this miraculous gift 
dispensed by film, that of reanimating what had gone…Like Christ calling 
Lazarus, film seemed to bring back to life what had been irrevocably lost; it 
blurred the distinction between life and death. (2000: 121)  
Over time, it seems, early cinema has taken on yet another, even more 
acutely uncanny aspect. For viewers of old films today, Mulvey suggests…  
[t]o look back into the reality of that lost world by means of the cinema is to 
have the sensation of looking into a time machine. However clichéd the 
concept, the presence of that reality, of the past preserved, becomes 
increasingly magical and uncanny. (2006: 52) 
There is, certainly, something about cinema having the still photograph as its 
base that contributes to the form’s uncanny quality. The illusion of movement 
is created by the mechanical animation of fixed images, but “like the beautiful 
automaton…a residual trace of stillness, or the hint of stillness within 
movement, survives, sometimes enhancing, sometimes threatening” (Mulvey 
2006: 66). In the final pages of Camera Lucida, Barthes describes his 
experience of watching a scene featuring an automaton in Federico Fellini’s 
film Cassanova (1976): “when Cassanova began dancing with the young 
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automaton,” he writes, “my eyes were touched with a kind of painful and 
delicious intensity…each detail…overwhelmed me” (2000: 116). He sees in 
“the figure’s slenderness, its tenuity…something desperately inert yet 
available”, revealing that, at the same moment, “I could not help thinking 
about Photography: for I could say all this about the photographs which 
touched me” (2000:116).  
Barthes perceives in the automaton a parallel with the animated yet 
inert base of cinema – the photographic still. Like the automaton, the cinema’s 
inert base is brought to life through mechanization. Reflecting upon Barthes’ 
reaction to this scene from Cassanova, Mulvey proposes that “[i]t is as though 
the movement of the mechanical figure suggested that of the other, the 
projector, which should have remained hidden” (2006: 179). Paraphrasing 
Raymond Bellour, she continues, “the automaton leads to the film’s 
mechanism…which, like the inside of the beautiful doll, needs to be disguised 
to maintain its credibility. Film…suffers from the violence caused by extracting 
a fragment from the whole” (Mulvey 2006: 179). The figure of the automaton, 
therefore, acts as a “metaphor for a fragmented…aesthetic of cinema” 
(Mulvey 2006: 180). This fragmentation exposes in the moving image what 
Barthes felt it lacked: the photograph’s attestation to a past reality (and, 
consequently, its association with death). 
 
Fragmented Cinema 
What Mulvey suggests, in her response to Barthes’ comments about 
Cassanova, is that an awareness of the mechanism of cinema – an 
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awareness of the “time of the index” – is capable of fragmenting the illusory 
narrative drive of a fiction film (2006: 183). “[T]he presence of stillness” she 
writes “brings with it a threat to the credibility of the moving image itself, the 
ghostly presence of the still strip of film on which the illusion of movement 
depends” (Mulvey 2006: 155).  
Just as the sight of the automaton in Cassanova led Barthes to reflect 
upon the still photograph as the inert base of the cinematic image, the 
presence of an actual still photograph within the narrative space of a film may 
bring about a similar response. In his essay The Pensive Spectator (first 
published 1984), Raymond Bellour argues that: 
…the presence of a photo on the screen gives rise to very particular trouble. 
Without ceasing to advance its own rhythm, the film seems to freeze, to 
suspend itself, inspiring in the spectator…a growing fascination…Creating 
another distance, another time, the photo permits me to reflect on the cinema. 
(2007: 119-120)  
The ‘narrative drive’ of Mulvey’s book Death 24x a Second (2006) is her 
interest in what new possibilities of cinematic spectatorship are offered by 
digital media. She observes the “obvious, everyday reality” that viewers are 
now able to pause and repeat favourite scenes from movies at will, thus 
fragmenting their cinematic experience and allowing a greater space for 
reflection (Mulvey 2006: 8). This basic premise, however, provokes a more 
profound inquiry into the subject that gives her book its subtitle: Stillness and 
the Moving Image. As she explains in her 2003 essay of the same name: 
…by stilling or slowing movie images, the time of the film’s original moment of 
registration suddenly bursts through its artificial, narrative surface. Another 
moment of time, behind the fictional time of the story, emerges through this 
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fragmentation and excavation of a sequence or film fragment. (Mulvey 2007: 
137-138) 
As Mulvey implies, it is not only the explicit presence of a still that may 
provoke a state of awareness and reflection upon the moving image: slow 
motion or elongated shots may also confront the audience “with a palpable 
sense of cinematic time that leads back, from the time of screening, to the 
time of registration” (2006: 129). The repetition of privileged sequences, too, 
can induce such effects: the unique ability of cinema to resurrect the past may 
become “both more real and more mysterious” through the repetition of a 
specific fragment of film (Mulvey 2006: 160). Mulvey proposes that this “return 
to certain moments or sequences” makes the materiality of a film visible 
(2006: 192): citing Barthes, she argues that the “more often a sequence is 
viewed, the more it becomes an extended ‘emanation of an intractable reality’” 
(2006: 189). What is more, such repetition may elicit a keen sense of the 
uncanny: “repeated with mechanical exactitude” the film fragment conjures up 
the “precinematic ghosts of automata” (Mulvey 2006: 170).4 Through such 
fragmentation of cinema, Mulvey proposes, “the loss of ego and self-
consciousness that has been, for so long, one of the pleasures of the movies 
gives way to an alert scrutiny and scanning of the screen” (2006: 165). The 
space for reflection created by fragmentation invites a “fetishistic scopophilia” 
in which the “beauty of the screen and mystery of situation” is privileged over 
“suspense, conflict or linear development.” (Mulvey 2006: 165).  
Through the stilling, slowing, extending or repeating of sequences, the 

4
 Continuing this reading of ‘fragmented’ cinema in terms of the uncanny, Mulvey also 
speculates that “[t]here is something of…the repetition compulsion in the pensive spectator’s 
urge to return to the same…sequences, the same privileged moments.” (2006: 192). 
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reality of the image separates from the time of the story. The space for 
reflection that such fragmentation brings about “restores to the moving image 
the heavy presence of passing time and of the mortality that…Barthes 
associate[s] with the still photograph” (Mulvey 2006: 66). Within the forward 
motion of the cinematic image, the past reality of the referent asserts itself, 
bestowing upon it an acute sense of that uncanny space between life and 
death. 
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CHAPTER FOUR:  
THE ART OF THE DIGITAL INDEX 
Reality, as it evolves, sweeps me with it. I am struck by everything and, 
though not everything strikes me in the same way, I am always struck by the 
same basic contradiction: although I can always see how beautiful anything 
could be if only I could change it, in practically every case there is nothing I 
can really do. Everything is changed into something else in my imagination, 
then the dead weight of things changes it back into what it was in the first 
place. A bridge between imagination and reality must be built.  
(Vaneigem 1994, quoted in Keiller 1997) 
 
While fictional cinema has traditionally sought to forget its indexical 
foundations for the sake of story time, the avant-garde has “consistently 
brought the mechanism and the material of film into visibility, closing the gap 
between the filmstrip and the screen” (Mulvey 2006: 67). In the 1960s and 
1970s, structural filmmakers (e.g. Michael Snow, Hollis Frampton, Peter 
Gidal) created works that explored the specificities of their medium, bringing 
to the fore its materiality. This was achieved through, for example, scratching 
the celluloid, highlighting the grain of the film, revealing the gap between film 
frames or even asserting the presence of the projector itself (Doane 2007a: 
129). Through interrogating and exposing the physical mechanism of celluloid 
imagery, its status as an indexical document is emphasized. Such an 
awareness of the materiality of film can underline its status as ‘real’, thus 
confirming the physical reality – and therefore veracity – of the indexical 
connection to the original referent.  
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It is, however, not only avant-garde intervention that can bring about 
such effects. Over time, the material base of the celluloid image becomes 
subject to degradation and decay. This too bequeaths an aura of ‘pastness’ or 
passing time upon the image – affirming what Barthes called the photographic 
image’s “this-has-been” quality (2000: 79). As Doane puts it “[t]he scratches 
and markings on old film stock, the decay of the image, are the marks of time 
and a historical trajectory” (2007b: 118). Such damage is the index of another 
time, parallel to, yet separate from, that time fossilized in the photographic 
image.  
The digitization of photographic capture, however, changes – perhaps 
even annuls – this relationship between the indexical trace and its material 
base: as David Rodowick proposes, “the nature of ‘representation,’ or, better, 
the act of presenting, changes with digital processing” (2007: 125). This 
change has led some commentators to speculate whether “the digital 
effectively annihilates the idea of a medium” (Doane 2007a: 130). Digital 
images are stored virtually, on camera memory cards and computer hard 
drives, thereby losing the sense of physical reality associated with the 
traditional photograph or filmstrip. This immateriality confers upon the image a 
previously unknown longevity, enabling it to avoid the sense of loss generated 
by degradation, decay and the marks of passing time (Doane 2007b: 118). 
This can lead to an uncertainty as to the specificity of an image (arguably 
evoking that uncanny confusion brought about by the double and déjà vu). 
The scars of time reveal an object’s history, and therefore its autonomous 
identity. Within the physical realm, when images are copied each takes on a 
separate life, accumulating the traces of their individual trajectories through 
 
time in the form of visible degradation (dirt, scratches, fading, etc.). With 
digital images however, there is no difference between an original and its 
copy, its double: “information can simply be transferred, without loss, from one 
‘medium’ to another”, and the way in which it is stored “does not make its 
mark on the representation” (Doane 2007a: 144).  
Not only is the digital image unable to profess its own history, but this 
severance from materiality has also induced a crisis of faith in the reality – or 
rather the indexical veracity – of the photographic image. The aura of 
indexical authenticity associated with traditional photography and film is a 
consequence of a materiality that professes a direct physical connection to its 
referent – as Doane puts it, “[i]ts promise is that of touching the real.” (2007a: 
148). The digital however, “as an abstract information system, made a break 
with analogue imagery, finally sweeping away the relation with reality” (Mulvey 
2006: 18).  
Rodowick describes this crisis of faith in the index in terms of the 
“fundamental separation of inputs and outputs” in digital photographic imaging 
(2007: 113). He suggests that, on initial inspection at least, the relationship 
between digital images and indexicality is not problematic, acknowledging that 
“indexes have no necessary relationship of similarity or resemblance to their 
causes…[they] are signs of existence: the present or past action of a 
determinate force” (2007: 115). He does, however, insist that “(analogical) 
transcription should be distinguished from (digital) conversion or calculation” 
(Rodowick 2007: 116). Digital capture converts a “nonquantifiable image into 
an abstract or mathematical notation” and through this process the “indexical 
link to physical reality is weakened, because light must be converted into an 
 
abstract symbolic structure independent of and discontinuous with physical 
space and time” (Rodowick 2007: 117). Rodowick suggests that, as a result of 
its conversion of indexical information into abstract data, digital photography’s 
connection with the reality of the referent has a lack of integrity – that, in other 
words, what Tom Gunning refers to as the photograph’s ‘truth claim’ is 
weakened. 
Gunning’s use of the term ‘truth claim’ alludes to photography’s widely 
held status as a medium that accurately portrays reality. He states, “I use the 
word ‘truth claim’ because I want to emphasize that this is not simply a 
property inherent in a photograph, but a claim made for it” (2008: 27). In his 
essay What is the Point of an Index, he notes that “[a] great deal of the 
discussion of the digital revolution has involved its supposed devastating 
effect on the truth claim of photography” (2008: 27). Gunning suggests that 
this is either from a paranoid position, for example people worrying that 
manipulated photographs will be used falsely, as evidence of events that did 
not occur, or from what he calls a ‘schizophrenic’ position, in which 
manipulation opens up a world of subjective play and liberation from the real 
(2008: 27). He is, however, somewhat ambivalent about such speculation. He 
argues that while digitization alters the nature of the photographic process in 
numerous ways, its ‘truth claim’ – in so far as traditional photography had one 
to begin with – remains to some extent intact. Like Rodowick, he addresses 
the fact that digital capture’s association with indexicality is not in itself 
problematic: “storage in terms of numerical data does not eliminate 
indexicality” he explains, noting that this is why digital photographs “can serve 
as passport photographs and the other sorts of legal evidence or documents” 
 
(Gunning 2008: 24). Gunning further notes that indexicality is not synonymous 
with the photographic, pointing out that long before digitization “indexical 
instruments par excellance – such as devices for reading pulse rate, 
temperature, heart rate, and the like, or speedometers, wind gauges, and 
barometers – all converted their information into numbers” (2008: 24-25). He 
concludes, therefore, with the point that an index does not need to resemble 
the thing it represents:  
The indexicality of a traditional photograph inheres in the effect of light on 
chemicals, not in the picture it produces.1 The rows of numerical data 
produced by a digital camera and the image of traditional chemical 
photography are both indexically determined by objects outside the camera. 
(Gunning 2008: 25) 
If, then, both digital and analogue cameras retain their status as 
instruments of indexical capture, it is perhaps the digital image’s potential for 
manipulation post-capture that has called its truth claim most critically into 
question. However, the truth claim of the photographic image has always 
been unreliable – its “seemingly mechanical reiteration of the facts” never 
deemed entirely unquestionable (Gunning 2008: 31). As Gunning notes, 
traditional photography “also possesses processes that can attenuate, ignore, 
or even undo the indexical” (2008: 26). He points out that a photographer’s 
aesthetic decisions in relation to lighting, exposure and composition, as well 
as processes such as superimposing multiple negatives and solarization, 

1
 Gunning notes that the qualities a photograph must possess to pass as an accurate 
depiction of reality are not necessarily bound up in its indexicality. “Our evaluation of a 
photograph as accurate (i.e. visually reflecting its subject) depends not simply on its indexical 
basis (the chemical process), but on our recognition of it as looking like its subject.” He 
suggests that iconicity (the perceived similarity of form between a representation and its 
referent) is also an important factor, and points out that “one could produce an indexical 
image of something or someone that remained unrecognizable…the image must be 
recognizable for us to see it as a picture of the referent” (2008: 26).  
 
have “always delivered photography from a simple adherence to accuracy 
and truth claims” (2008: 31). As the Magnum photographer Donovan Wylie 
observes, “[d]igital photography has cleared away a misconception that 
should have been cleared away at the very beginning of photography – the 
camera doesn’t lie. Actually, the camera doesn’t lie, photographers do” 
(quoted in Badger 2007: 233). 
Though digital processes can alter and manipulate images “more 
quickly and more seamlessly” than their analogue counterparts, the 
differences between digital and film-based photography are relative rather 
than absolute (Gunning 2008: 26). The advent of digital photography and the 
translation of the photographic index into a numerical code represents a 
significant change, but one that is no more or less revolutionary than the 
“replacement of the wet collodion process by the dry plate, or the conquering 
of exposure time with instantaneous photography” (Gunning 2008: 38). In 
other words, “the digital revolution will change how photographs are made, 
who makes them, and how they are used – but they will still be photographs” 
(Gunning 2008: 38).  
In contrast to Rodowick, then, Gunning’s analysis suggests that 
digitization has not radically destabilized the already tentative truth claim of 
the photographic image. It has simply called attention to the uncertain ground 
that lies between the photograph as document and the photograph as 
artwork. Digital photographs have, therefore, retained at least something of 
the analogue image’s characteristic of indexical veracity, while at the same 
time allowing a greater and more seamless level of creative intervention. 
 
The Uncanny Art of the Digital Index  
Gunning’s measured perspective on the impact of digitization appears to 
stand in contrast to that of a number of other commentators, all of whom have 
hailed its arrival in terms not dissimilar to those used by Barthes to describe 
cinema’s effect on the photographic image (disassociated from its indexical 
base through animation and the intrusion of fiction, we have heard Barthes 
argue, the photographic image transforms from document into artform; see 
Chapter Three, p75). The possibility of intervention and manipulation afforded 
by digital imaging processes – not to mention their speculated elision of the 
real through the loss of a physical connection between object and image – 
has led theorists such as Mulvey and Manovich to consider these new media 
in terms of a creative invention traditionally associated with ‘subjective’ 
artforms such as painting. As Mulvey proposes: 
In the 1990s digital technology brought back the human element and man-
made illusions. The story of mechanical, photographic, reproduction of reality 
came to an end…the painterly character of the illusions of the magic lantern, 
the tradition of human ingenuity returned to visual culture. (2006: 19-20)  
Gunning and Mulvey each make legitimate claims – claims that are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. Consider, for example, the one characteristic 
of digitization that Gunning acknowledges has changed the nature of 
photographic imaging significantly: its ability to modify pictures seamlessly 
(2008: 26). The “undetectability of these manipulations”, alongside their 
“ability to undermine confidence in any image” (Doane 2007a: 142) can 
provoke distinctly disquieting effects. The unsettling effect of such 
imperceptible alterations relies on the digital image retaining its ability to 
 
convince as an index of reality: if a persuasive impression of the real is 
imperceptibly aligned with the subjective, creative intervention of the digital 
outlined by Mulvey, an aspect of the uncanny absent from (or at least less 
acute in) the analogue photographic image seems to manifest itself. As Freud 
insists, an uncanny effect often occurs when the distinction “between fantasy 
and reality is blurred” (2003a: 150)  
However, though perhaps less acutely, an uncanny juxtaposition of the 
real with the fantastic has been associated with the nature of the photographic 
image since long before the advent of digitization. The analogue photograph 
as document – the ‘intractable reality’ of its indexical image – is, for example, 
theorized by Barthes alongside his associations of it with the intellectual 
uncertainty of death and the return of the dead (Mulvey 2006: 63). As Mulvey 
points out, in both Barthes’ and Bazin’s writing on photography and cinema:  
… expressions of paradox and ambivalence recur, bearing witness to the 
surprising connection between reality and the uncanny. Both writers evoke a 
narrow, or blurred, boundary between emanations of the material world and 
those of the human imagination. (2006: 63) 
Though analogue images already professed this uncanny relation between 
imagination and reality, it may be speculated that the effect is uncannily 
doubled with the arrival of the digital: “[w]hat we find to be uncanny and 
unsettling,” suggests Rodowick “is the spatial similarity of digital images to the 
now antecedent practice of photography and film” (2007: 98). Though perhaps 
ontologically dissimilar in their indexical processes, the digital photographic 
image functions without difficulty in place of its analogue counterpart (a notion 
supported by Gunning’s observation that digital photographs can be used in 
 
legal documents such as passports [Gunning 2008: 24]). This similarity of 
form means that, regardless of its disputed ‘truth claim’, the digitally captured 
image inherits at least something of the analogue image’s historical 
association with reality.  
Through digitization, photography and film may have embraced an 
almost infinite malleability akin to painting, but they will always retain 
something of the particular power of the indexical trace of the real, which no 
painting, however objective, possesses. As Rodowick notes, “despite all self-
consciousness about the possibility of altering or falsifying photographs, they 
will still be taken, and questioned, as historical documents in a way that 
historical paintings or sketches…will not be” (2007: 62).2 The aesthetic 
potential of this fact is articulated by Manovich when, speaking of the 
digitization of cinema, he declares: “while retaining visual realism unique to 
the photographic process, film obtains the plasticity which was previously only 
possible in painting or animation” (2000: 179). Such a conflation of ontologies 
– the merging of art and index, imagination and reality – brings a new paradox 
to the realm of artistic representation. 
Mulvey identifies Jeff Wall as an artist who often explores the uncertain 
ground between art and index, noting that he has “brought the ‘manual’ back 
into his photographic work, while…also incorporating the aesthetic and 
emotional resonance of the index” (2006: 20). In Wall’s piece A Sudden Gust 

2
 Bazin seems to support this last point, observing that no matter how realistic a painting 
might appear, it is “always in fee to an inescapable subjectivity. The fact that a human hand 
intervened cast[s] a shadow of doubt over the image” (1967: 12). This ‘doubt’ occupies a 
complex position in digitally captured images, for although doubt is an acknowledged issue in 
terms of their truth claim, the gestural trace of the human hand – the traditional signifier of 
subjectivity in painting – is entirely absent. 
 
 
Figure 7 Jeff Wall, A Sudden Gust of Wind (After Hokusai), 1993. Transparency in lightbox. 229 x 377 cm. 
IMAGE REMOVED DUE TO COPYRIGHT RESTRICTIONS. PLEASE SEE HARD COPY FOR ORIGINAL IMAGE.
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of Wind (After Hokusai) (1993) he combines the camera’s ability “to capture a 
precise moment in time with a technique drawn from the more ‘painterly’ 
potential of the digital” (Mulvey 2006: 20). On initial inspection, Wall’s image 
(Figure 7, preceding page) convinces as the document of a ‘real’ moment. 
But, as Mulvey points out: 
…the photograph seems to go, in a strange way, beyond the instant it 
represents. It seems to be too visually complex, and too theatrical in its 
gestures. Rather than catching a decisive moment, A Sudden Gust of Wind 
pays tribute to the aesthetic concept of the indexically caught instant through 
a detour into non-indexical technology. (2006: 21) 
Through combining digital manipulation with the indexical aesthetic of the 
camera (the subjective with the objective, imagination with ‘reality’), Wall’s 
piece “dramatizes the dialogue between the two” (Mulvey 2006: 21). Whilst 
making use of the creative invention and subjectivity conventionally 
associated with painting (a nod, perhaps, to the original Hokusai print the 
piece is based upon), the work retains the aesthetic impact of the indexical 
trace of the real.  
The issues surrounding such a combination of creative invention and 
mechanical registration in digitally manipulated photographs lead Gunning to 
contemplate whether users of digital editing software desire the ability to 
“create an image or, rather…to transform an image that can still be 
recognized as a photograph” (2008: 27). Somewhat echoing Rodowick’s 
assertion that digital photographs “will still be taken, and questioned, as 
historical documents” (2007: 62), he proposes that the power of such digitally 
manipulated images “depends on our recognizing them as manipulated 
photographs, being aware of the strata of the indexical (or perhaps better, the 
 
visually recognizable) beneath the manipulation” (2008: 41). This insight leads 
Gunning to contend that “[r]ather than denying photography’s truth claim, the 
practice of faking photographs depends upon and demonstrates it”, thereby 
highlighting an inherent contradiction in any concerns regarding the negative 
impact of the digital on photography’s truth claim (2008: 29). He concludes: 
…the particular artistic and entertaining delight of digitally manipulated 
photographs depends on a continued investment in the photograph as 
potentially an accurate representation, causing a playful inversion of 
associations rather than simply canceling them out. (Gunning 2008: 33)  
The powerful effects of a “photographic image of a familiar world skillfully or 
imaginatively distorted in an unfamiliar manner” are brought about through a 
merging of art and index that preserves a sense of the real while at the same 
time adding a sense of ambiguity (Gunning 2008: 33). It is the 
defamiliarization caused by the imaginative distortions of digital manipulation 
that brings about a feeling of the uncanny in such images: their amalgamation 
of art and index leads to an intellectual uncertainty with regard to the borders 
between fantasy and reality, real and representation. 
The uncanny combination of imagination and reality in photographic 
works such as Wall’s A Sudden Gust of Wind (After Hokusai) is brought 
about, as Doane puts it, by the “seamless combination of image fragments 
from different sources, and invisible constructions or interventions in image 
formation” (2007a: 142). Though ‘constructed’, such work relies heavily on the 
genuine indexical status of its different components: in Wall’s case  “over 100 
photographs, taken over the course of more than a year, to achieve a 
seamless montage that gives the illusion of capturing a real moment in time” 
 
(Tate Modern n.d.). Such processes may also involve a certain amount of 
creative intervention regarding the subtle appearance of each fragment, 
perhaps even the image as a whole – what Doane refers to as “the 
manipulation of intensities” (2007a: 142). There is, however, a point at which 
creative intervention becomes creative invention: as Paul Willeman observes, 
“[a]n image of a person in a room need no longer mean that the person was in 
that particular room, or that such a room ever existed, or indeed that such a 
person ever existed” (2002: 20). The possibility of constructing digital images, 
or portions of images, entirely ‘from scratch’ in the computer seems to 
augment the contention that photography and film may now be considered in 
terms traditionally associated with ‘subjective’ artforms such as painting. As 
Manovich suggests: 
The manual construction of images in digital cinema represents a return to 
nineteenth century pre-cinematic practices, when images were hand-painted 
and hand-animated…As cinema enters the digital age these techniques are 
again becoming commonplace in the film making process. (2000: 175) 
Gunning, too, makes a connection between digital imaging processes and the 
“artificial realities” of 19th century pre-cinematic representational technologies 
such as the panorama and diorama, observing that such devices may “lack 
the indexical claim of photography…[but] they absolutely claim the ability to 
fashion a counterreality through perceptual stimulation” (2008: 37). In line with 
his argument that digitization represents an evolution of (rather than a 
complete break from) analogue photographic processes, however, Gunning 
suggests that there has always been an aspect of the ‘perceptual stimulation’ 
of such modes of representation in cinema. He notes that Bazin, in his essay 
The Myth of Total Cinema (first published in 1967),  “places cinema in the 
 
tradition not so much of indexical photography but of other nineteenth-century 
devices designed to overwhelm the senses with their perceptual richness, 
such as the panorama [and] the diorama” (Gunning 2008: 37).  
 
The Return of the Impressed 
It is here that my examination of theoretical approaches to the representation 
of the ‘unpresentable’ returns to its beginnings. The idea of overwhelming the 
senses with excessive detail or, as Gunning puts it, ‘perceptual richness’, 
leads us back into the theoretical territory of the sublime and its 
representation. As Malcolm Andrews suggests, in the nineteenth century, the 
Panorama “was new technology and offered to replicate the experience of the 
Sublime much more closely than any medium had done before” (1999: 140). 
Explaining this idea, he describes the panorama in terms that might just as 
appropriately be used to describe photography or cinema: “[t]he panorama 
paintings were detailed, high-definition transcripts from nature…Ideally, they 
were substitutes for the original scene itself, far exceeding the power of words 
or painting to reproduce that original” (Andrews 1999: 140). This account calls 
to mind, once again, the camera’s ability to present an unmediated reiteration 
of the real – its mechanical, “indiscriminate recording of everything in front of 
the lens” (Mulvey 2006: 58). The photographic image presents, as Gunning 
observes, the “sense of an unprecedented visual array, possessing 
overwhelming detail.” (2008: 37).  
 
 
Figure 8 Jeff Wall, Restoration, 1993 (detail). Transparency in lightbox. 137 x 507 cm.
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Like the panorama then, the ‘overwhelming detail’ of the indexical 
image suggests an aptitude for figuring the sublime: as Andrews notes, “[o]ne 
important constituent of the Burkean, sensationist Sublime is the power of the 
spectacle wholly to occupy the mind and senses so as to exclude anything 
else” (1999: 140). Panoramas and dioramas attempted to do this by attaching 
the reality of a scene as closely as possible to its representation. Louis 
Daguerre (1789-1851), for example, went as far as to bring real elements into 
the scenes he depicted: in his diorama View of Mont Blanc taken from the 
Valley of Chamonix (1833), he included an actual chalet and live goat from 
that mountain region. As Daguerre himself put it, “[m]y only aim was to 
produce the most complete illusion; I wanted to rob nature, and therefore had 
to become a thief” (quoted in Andrews 1999: 141). Andrews describes the 
effect of Daguerre’s attempt to fully present that mountain landscape in terms 

Wall’s photograph shows the restoration of Edouard Castres’ Bourbaki Panorama (1881) 
(15m x 112m) in Lucerne, Switzerland. To the left of the photograph is the viewing platform, 
from which the audience would absorb the enveloping two-dimensional wall painting and the 
real three-dimensional foreground ‘set’ (including discarded army equipment and a broken 
fence). Wall suggests that panoramas were “an experimental response to a deeply-felt need, 
a need for a medium that could surround the spectators and plunge them into a spectacular 
illusion” (Wall and Schwander 1996: 129). Michael Newman proposes that the ‘widescreen’ 
format of Wall’s photograph “alludes to the cinema that historically displaced the panorama as 
an immersive illusion of reality” (2007: 149)
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that, once again, evoke the characteristics of the photographic image: “[t]his 
‘complete illusion’ of a landscape” he writes, “is more than simply a 
transcription of the original: it is partly also a transplanting of the original. 
Nature has been ‘robbed’ to achieve the illusion” (1999: 141).4 Just as we talk 
of ‘taking’ a photograph, Daguerre and Andrews speak of robbing and 
transplanting from nature. Indeed, it may be speculated that Daguerre’s desire 
to lift directly from nature led to his part in the development of the 
photograph’s most direct antecedent – the Daguerreotype.  
The desire to bypass representational systems and present an 
unmediated, real landscape may be traced back to the Romantic’s conception 
of the inassimilable, sublime vastness of the natural world as forever separate 
from culture and language. As the poet and philosopher Friedrich Schiller 
(1759-1805) observed, “nature is for us nothing but the uncoerced existence, 
the subsistence of things on their own, being there according to their own 
immutable laws” (1993: 180). The camera’s passive, mechanical registration 
of the world marks its images as uniquely capable of embodying such a 
conception of nature. As David Campany suggests, “[t]he camera [can be] 
understood as nature’s industrial other but also as an apparatus with a 
particular affinity with organic form. It [can] produce ‘natural signs’, images as 
apparently unmediated and spontaneous as nature itself" (2003: 39). 
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4
 Eliding any simple reduction of the photograph to the concept of transcription, Barthes 
writes: “The photograph is literally an emanation of the referent. From a real body, which was 
there, proceed emanations which ultimately touch me, who am here; the duration of the 
transmission is insignificant; the photograph of the missing being, as Sontag says, will touch 
me like the delayed rays of a star. A sort of umbilical cord links the body of the photographed 
thing to my gaze: light, though impalpable, is here a carnal medium…” (2000: 80-81). 

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To communicate the sublime effect of a landscape, then, a 
representation must, it would seem, close the gap between culture and 
nature: it must blur the boundary between representation and reality. Andrews 
concludes his discussion of Daguerre’s diorama with the observation that “[t]o 
add to a landscape painting three-dimensionality, sound and movement, blurs 
the distinction between artefact and nature...Art and landscape materially feed 
off each other to produce a complex amalgam” (1999: 141). Barthes insists 
that sound and movement added to the photograph ‘domesticates’ 
photography, blurring the distinction between art and the unmediated, 
indexical ‘emanation’ of nature that is the camera-image (Barthes 2000: 117). 
Cinema, then, is surely the modern embodiment of nineteenth century 
attempts, such as the panorama and diorama, to re-present the sublime. As a 
towering projection of light in a darkened auditorium, with surround-sound 
(perhaps even 3D), cinema demonstrates an unsurpassed ability to, as the 
panorama did before it, “wholly to occupy the mind and senses so as to 
exclude anything else” (Andrews 1999: 140).  
The fact that, in the wake of digitization, cinema has evolved into a 
hybrid form that seemingly blurs the boundaries between painting and the 
photographic image, between art and index, only enhances the medium’s 
aptitude for figuring the unpresentable: as Simon Morley suggests, the 
uncertain space between painting and the indexical camera-image may offer 
“a new sense of the sublime as something that gets squeezed out as an 
intangible and ambiguous supplement in the gap between these two different 
but related media…[i]t is the experience of an indeterminate yet fertile in-
between state” (Morley 2010b). 
 
The many qualities of the contemporary camera-image outlined in the 
preceding chapters – its ability to figure the sublime; its various associations 
with the uncanny; its correlation with traumatic memory and the Lacanian 
Real; its confusion of art and index (through animation, narritivization, 
digitization); its associations with the mechanical, the industrial and the rise of 
modernity; its unmediated spontaneity and consequent affinity with natural 
form; and, what is more, its blurring of boundaries between each of the above 
– all combine to insinuate an aptitude for representing a sense of the 
‘unpresentable’ within the industrial landscape.   
 
PART TWO:  
PRACTICAL APPROACHES 
Having reviewed a variety of theoretical approaches to the unpresentable, its 
presence in the industrial landscape and its representation through lens-based 
media in Part One of this thesis, Part Two reflects upon how these themes 
might be approached from a practical perspective. Ultimately this involves an 
account and analysis of the development of my own practical research. 
However, in order to give practical context to my studio work, Part Two begins 
by discussing two films which have acted as important reference points for and 
directly contributed to the development of the piece that forms the core 
component of my project – the video Re: Flamingo.  
The first of these ‘case studies’ discusses the Canadian artist Stan 
Douglas’s formal and intellectual approaches to figuring the unpresentable in 
the landscape, focusing specifically on his film piece Der Sandmann (1995) – a 
work that, in many ways, offers an analogue to my own film’s reimagining of 
Hoffmann’s story. My second case study looks at Ridley Scott’s feature film 
Blade Runner (1982), the discussion of which is centered around its 
significance to the narrative and imagery of Re: Flamingo. While perhaps not 
as formally relevant to my own work as Douglas’s film, Blade Runner 
nevertheless offers some interesting and pertinent creative approaches to the 
themes it lends to my video piece.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: STAN DOUGLAS’S DER SANDMANN 
Introduction 
Like his compatriot Jeff Wall and a number of other Vancouver-based artists 
who rose to international prominence in the 1980s and 1990s, the work of the 
Canadian Stan Douglas (b.1960) frequently draws upon a cinematic aesthetic 
to explore the social and environmental effects of industrialization on the 
landscape (see for example Figure 9, below). Many of Douglas’s pieces 
examine the ‘ghosts’ of failed utopian projects through focusing a camera upon 
a particular place. These works often excavate the subjective histories of the 
sites they interrogate, through referencing literary or cinematic works that have 
contributed to their cultural framing. Douglas’s attempts to figure subjective 
experience through the rather incongruous use of mechanical representational 
technologies lends an oddly lyrical aspect to all of his work, which can take a 
variety of forms, ranging from large-scale, panoramic landscape photographs, 
to complex film and video installations, to combinations of the two.  
 
Figure 9 Stan Douglas, Gold River Mill, 1996. From the series Nootka Sound. 
46 x 91 cm. 
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Figure 10 Stan Douglas, Tahsis Mill, 1996. From the series Nootka Sound. 
 
 
Figure 11 Stan Douglas, Nu•tka•, 1996. Video installation. Single channel video, 
quadraphonic soundtrack. 6min 50sec each rotation. Video still. 
 
Figures 9, 10 and 11: In the mid-nineties Douglas developed a body of work in response to 
the idyllic landscapes of the Nootka Sound on the west coast of Vancouver Island. This 
resulted in the video installation Nu•tka• (1996, see Figure 11) and the photographic series 
Nootka Sound (1996, see figures 9 and 10). As Douglas explains: “[t]he Nootka Sound pictures 
cover an area which to the untrained eye seems like a natural situation. But if you look at it 
carefully, you realize it’s been logged at least twice…I wanted to show a landscape that was 
full of people, that was full of human presence” (quoted in Enright 2007). In the video piece 
Nu•tka•, however, the area’s first European settlers’ experience of the then uncultivated 
landscape is imagined through a voiceover that draws upon the writings of Romantic-era 
authors: “the whole issue of the sublime comes up…the natural world’s absolute indifference to 
human will or presence … the whole question of unrepresentability has been dramatized” 
(Douglas quoted in Thater 1998: 9). 
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Der Sandmann (1995)  
Douglas’s film installation Der Sandmann transposes elements of E.T.A. 
Hoffmann’s short story of the same name to the garden allotments or 
Schrebergärten of Potsdam in Germany. Hoffmann’s original narrative of 1816 
is told, initially, through a series of letters between the protagonist Nathanael, 
his fiancé Clara and her brother Lothar. Douglas’s film updates this 
correspondence to the late twentieth century, in the wake of the fall of the 
Berlin Wall.  
 
Figure 12 Nathanael reading his letter to Klara (Stan Douglas, Der Sandmann, 
1995. Film still). Installation composed of two 16mm films, two 
manipulated optical sound 16mm projectors; 9:50 min (loop), black 
and white, sound. Dimensions variable. 
 
Douglas’s reimagined Nathanael writes to his friend Lothar to tell him 
that upon returning (post-Wende) to “the scene of our shared childhood” in 
Potsdam, “places that once simply looked old now seem sinister” (Douglas 
1998: 128). Walking past the Schrebergärten they played near as children, he 
recounts, he is seized by “an overwhelming sense of dread” at the sight of an 
old man working at a strange machine in one of the allotments: “it was the 
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whole scene that got to me” he writes, “as if I had seen it all before” (Douglas 
1998: 128).  
Lothar writes back to remind Nathanael that as children they had been 
fooled by his brother into believing this old man was the fabled Sandman, who 
“comes to children when they won’t go to bed and throws handfuls of sand into 
their eyes till they bleed and pop out of their heads!” (Douglas 1998: 129). 
Lothar recounts how one night, when they should have been in bed, they 
snuck into the strange man’s garden to “liberate the eyes we thought he kept 
hidden in his burlap sacks” (Douglas 1998: 129). The old man, however, 
caught them in the act and chased them off, shouting curses at their families.  
Having mistakenly addressed his letter to his sister Klara, Nathanael 
also receives a reply from her (she read it, before passing it on to Lothar). 
Nathanael was not afraid of much as a child, Klara remembers, only the 
Sandman and the blue flame in their gas-powered water heater. However, she 
is shocked that he could have forgotten the connection between the night he 
snuck into the old man’s garden and “the saddest moment of our childhood” 
(Douglas 1998: 130): having fled the old man’s curses upon his family and 
returned to his bed, she recalls, they were both later woken to be told that their 
father had been killed. She reminds him how desperately that night he had 
cried, “It’s my fault! It’s my fault! It was the Sandman! The Sandman!” (Douglas 
1998: 130).  
Like Hoffmann’s original story, the narrative of Douglas’s film piece 
explores the resurgence of a childhood trauma linked to the figure of the 
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Sandman. Through historical recontextualization, however, Der Sandmann 
unveils a sense of the uncanny in the landscape of twentieth-century Germany. 
 
Figure 13 The old man/Sandman in his Schrebergarten (Stan Douglas, Der 
Sandman, 1995. Film still). 
 
Douglas constructed the fictional Schrebergärten sets for Der 
Sandmann within the 1920s-era Ufa film studios at Babelsburg, outside 
Potsdam. Some of these once world-leading film production facilities came 
under threat of demolition in 1990s post-reunification Germany; as Scott 
Watson notes, “[t]heir uncertain fate was part of a vaster picture that included 
the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the collapse of Communism in 
Eastern Europe” (1998: 32). For the film, two versions of the same 
Schrebergärten were built. The first set imagined the garden as it may have 
looked in the 1970s within the German Democratic Republic, when workers 
would use such sites to grow supplementary food, or as weekend retreats 
(Douglas 1998: 125). Once the 1970s set had been filmed, a second 
incarnation that represented the garden in the 1990s (contemporary with the 
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making of the piece) was built on top of it. This later set shows parts of the 
garden flattened by construction work – indicative of the fact that post-Wende 
much of Potsdam became prime real estate. Over half of the thousands of 
gardens were razed to make way for hotels, luxury housing and light industry 
(Douglas 1998: 125).  
 
Figure 14 Stan Douglas, Der Sandman, 1995. Film still. The left half of the 
screen shows the 1970s garden, the right half reveals construction 
work in the same place in the 1990s. 
 
Douglas points out that between the two sets: “[the] one abiding feature 
is the old man – the Sandman – toiling away at some mysterious contraption 
that, after two decades, is still not quite working” (Douglas 2008: 196, see 
Figure 13). The old man seems to be oblivious to the passing of time and “the 
forces that will literally undermine the ground he works on” (Watson 1998: 35). 
The various references to social change that frame the figure’s activity (the 
doomed film studio, the gradual transformation of the gardens into a building 
site) leads Watson to suggest an allegorical reading of the old man’s presence 
in the film: “the Sandman is the working class. His efforts to make a better 
world are about to be foreclosed by the triumph of capitalism” (Watson: 35). 
The two Schrebergärten sets, separated as they are by several decades, figure 
the effects of historical change both upon the landscape, and through it. 
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Figure 15 Stan Douglas, Der Sandmann Set Photos, 1994. 1970s set. 
 
 
Figure 16 Stan Douglas, Der Sandmann Set Photos, 1994. 1990s set. 
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Douglas describes the filming set-up for Der Sandmann within the old Ufa 
studio: 
The Schrebergärten sets were shot on 16mm film with a motion-control system 
that allowed the camera to make one continuous 360° pan of the old garden 
and a second of the contemporary site that, in terms of camera angle and 
motion, are identical to one another ... (2008: 197) 
Through filming a complete pan of the studio, the fiction of the cinematic 
illusion is exposed: as the camera travels beyond the edges of the Potsdam 
garden set, we see what would traditionally be ‘off-camera’ – a voice-actor 
reading Nathanael’s letter and around him the old studio, strewn with random 
props and filmmaking equipment. Der Sandmann presents us with a kind of 
meta-cinema: the film we see contains the suggestion of another, unrealized 
film that would be framed entirely within the Schrebergärten set, never straying 
from its fictional conceit. 
Douglas’s method of presentation for Der Sandmann’s installation 
further extends this sense that we are seeing more of the cinematic 
mechanism than perhaps we should. Rather than employing the traditional 
montage technique of showing each take consecutively with a ‘cut’ in time 
between the two (‘past’ garden cutting to ‘present’ garden), his film “rearranges 
these recollections into simultaneously experienced periods of time” (Inboden 
2008: 126). In doing this, the jump or cut in time that fictional cinema 
traditionally asks us to ignore is figured, quite literally, in the centre of the 
screen as a split or seam between the two time periods. The installation of Der 
Sandmann focuses two 16mm film projections (the 1970s scenario and the 
1990s scenario) onto the same screen simultaneously. However, half of each 
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image is blocked out: the visible halves meet in the middle, creating a vertical 
‘seam’ or cut in the centre of the screen. This becomes most apparent when 
there is a marked difference between the two time periods (for example, when 
the 1970s garden shows a vegetable patch and the exact same space in the 
1990s shows a construction site; see Figure 17 below). 
 
Figure 17 Stan Douglas, Der Sandmann, 1995. Film still. 
 
As Douglas puts it, “[t]he effect created is that of a temporal wipe” (2008: 197): 
as the camera pans over the much-changed Schrebergärten set (and the not-
so-changed studio), the new garden erases the old (while the slight changes to 
the studio produce a subtle ‘ripple’ effect in the centre of the image). Also 
noticeable is the fact that Nathanael’s lips are out-of-synch with his voiceover 
in one half of the image, whilst they are in-synch in the other half. When one 
circuit is completed, the old garden begins to erase the new in a compulsive, 
repetitious loop as if we must endlessly relive the trauma of the changes to the 
landscape the film’s images present to us. 
Whether or not we understand how Der Sandmann’s temporal wipe is 
constructed, “once we see the vertical seam, it is hard to see anything else.” 
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(Clover 1998: 75). Through fragmenting perspective-oriented space and 
Cartesian time,1 Der Sandmann exposes the illusory mechanism of narrative 
cinema – its cuts from one scene to the next (the very montage techniques 
Benjamin associated with trauma; see Chapter Three, p65): it places its 
discontinuity centre stage. 
If Douglas’s explicit presentation of the formal edit between the two time 
periods is to be read, in Benjamin’s terms, as ‘traumatic’, then we may perhaps 
conclude that the film figures as traumatic that literal break in German history – 
the reunification that brought with it the (even more literal) breaking of the 
Berlin Wall. As the Wall had done, Der Sandmann’s seam spans the divide 
between the old, communist GDR and Western capitalism. 
On an aesthetic level, too, we can infer some socio-political significance 
from the film’s central seam – its traumatic ‘wound’ – which calls the viewer’s 
attention to the mechanism of its narrative by giving explicit form, if only 
negatively, to the absence that lies between the two time periods. This 
approach stands in stark contrast to the language of montage traditionally 
employed by that bastion of Western capitalism, Hollywood cinema. As Carol 
J. Clover suggests: 
…classical Hollywood cinema is literally defined by its devotion to hiding those 
absences as completely as possible, and delivering the fantasy as fully as it 
can be delivered. [Whereas] Der Sandmann’s seam brings the wound to the 
surface…a wound…that never lets us forget that this is a film … the minute the 
seam appears, the fiction of plenitude and coherence falls apart. (1998: 76) 
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1
 René Descartes “is thought to have believed in the discontinuity of time; and his conception 
has been characterized as cinematographic…the support from the established interpretation 
comes from those passages where he holds that parts of time are mutually independent” 
(Secada 1990: 45). 
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Through its ‘negative presentation’ of the absence between takes, Douglas’s 
seam seems to figure something of the unpresentable. Recalling one of 
Barnett Newman’s ‘zips’ (see Figure 18, below), the central line presents the 
sublime/traumatic gap between the ‘now’ and the beyond, the past. Like the 
work of the structural filmmakers (see Chapter Four, p83), it illuminates the 
materiality of the piece’s indexical, filmic base, marking its images with that 
“this has been” quality through which Barthes aligned photography with trauma 
(see Chapter Three, p68). 
 
Figure 18 Barnett Newmann, Onement VI, 1953. Oil on canvas. 260 x 305 cm. 
Private collection. 
 
What creates the piece’s seam, however, is the same thing that produces Der 
Sandmann’s formal uncanniness: the film’s doubling function – its repetition of 
the same Ufa studio, the same Schrebergärten, the same Sandman.2 Indeed, 
Douglas’s idea for the split screen derives from an early twentieth-century 
source that would contribute, albeit indirectly, to Sigmund Freud’s delineation 
of the uncanny in his 1919 essay. Freud’s discussion of the motif of the double 
in The Uncanny centers around an appraisal of his colleague Otto Rank’s 

2
 As Watson suggests, “Der Sandmann is a machine for the production of the uncanny. 
Repetition itself will generate it…[as will] the displacement of the past by the present and the 
altogether more troubling displacement of the present by the past” (1998: 35-36). 
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detailed study on the subject, which “explores the connections that link the 
double with mirror-images, shadows [and] guardian spirits” (Freud 2003a: 142). 
Rank had been inspired to write his study after having seen the German silent 
film The Student of Prague (1913, d. Stellan Rye). This film tells the story of a 
poor student who gives his mirror image to a sorcerer in return for fabulous 
wealth. When the student finds himself held responsible for his double’s 
subsequent misdeeds, he kills it, not knowing that he too will die. 
 
Figure 19 Henrik Galeen, The Student of Prague, 1926. 
Film still. 55min, black and white, silent.  
 
Rye’s 1913 film produced a double of its own thirteen years later – 
Henrick Galeen’s remake of 1926. Watson describes how this later version 
inspired Douglas’ split-screen idea: 
The film calls for the student and his image to confront each other in several 
scenes, which were made by shooting the scenes with half the lens blocked 
and then reshooting with the other half of the stock. It is this technique, 
originally designed to present an uncanny and frightening split in identity, that 
Douglas reproduces in Der Sandmann. (1998: 34) 
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Freud’s place within the confluence of references Douglas builds around 
Der Sandmann is not, however, limited to this debt to The Student of Prague. 
Beyond even the somewhat transparent allusions to The Uncanny via 
Hoffmann’s original tale (not to mention the film’s formal ‘repetition 
compulsions’), there lies yet another, more veiled nod to the German founder 
of psychoanalysis. The Schrebergärten take their name from the physician and 
teacher Moritz Schreber (1808-1861), who believed that taking exercise in 
such green surroundings could assuage the psychologically damaging effects 
of industrialization. Schreber’s other claim to fame comes via his son Daniel 
Paul, whose autobiographical account of his own psychological maladies was 
used by Freud in the development of his theory of paranoia. As a child, Daniel 
Paul had been the guinea pig for his father’s prosthetic inventions designed to 
correct children’s posture – which undoubtedly contributed to the younger 
Schreber’s later mental collapse. As Watson suggests, “[i]n a sense Daniel 
Paul was himself a product of the Schrebergärten and Freud’s account of 
paranoia one of the garden’s earliest harvests” (Watson: 32). 
 
Figure 20 Stan Douglas, Potsdam Schrebergärten, 1994. C-print photograph, 47 x 93 cm 
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What Der Sandmann achieves through the convergence of references it 
sets up between Freud, Hoffman’s tale and the Schrebergärten is a sense of 
uncanniness about the moment in history the film presents.3 In Douglas’s 
installation, as Sven Lütticken puts it: 
…the uncanny is historicized; what is uncanny is perhaps less the possibly 
eye-stealing, castrating, automaton-building bogeyman inherited from 
Hoffmann, than the transformation of society and the status of the Schreber 
gardens as anachronistic remains of a lost childhood in a defunct state. (2005: 
128)  
Through his camera-driven interrogations of the history of a particular place, 
Douglas is able to reveal something of the unpresentable in the landscape. As 
Ivone Margulies argues, “Douglas uses film and photography primarily as a 
simulacrum, a medium to release a disturbance. He suggests that…behind a 
pastoral landscape or a rational urban design, another, darker history lurks” 
(1998: 157). Beyond its various historical, literary and cinematic references, it 
is Der Sandmann’s disruptive formal approach to conventional cinematic 
representations of passing time, its looping and doubling mechanism and its 
assertion of the materiality of the filmstrip that allows a sense of the uncanny to 
be revealed within the landscape of social change it presents.  
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3
 As Ivone Margulies suggests, “Douglas’s ground excavation links repressive practices…to 
Freud and his discoveries as if responding, through a displaced psychoanalytic thinking, to 
questions opened on a socio-historical realm” (2008: 158). 

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CHAPTER SIX: BLADE RUNNER 
Loosely based upon Philip K. Dick’s 1968 science fiction novel Do Androids 
Dream of Electric Sheep?, Ridley Scott’s 1982 feature film Blade Runner 
presents a dystopian vision of a 2019 Los Angeles. 
 
Figure 21 The industrial skyline of a future Los Angeles (Blade Runner, 1982, dir. 
Ridley Scott. Film still).  
 
Within this landscape of urban alienation and environmental decay, the 
film’s protagonist Rick Deckard (Harrison Ford) reluctantly agrees to track 
down and ‘retire’ a group of fugitive ‘replicants’ – bioengineered robots that 
are virtually indistinguishable from real humans. To confirm their status as 
non-human, suspected replicants are tested with a ‘Voight-Kampff’ machine, 
which determines whether their personal memories are the result of real 
experience or artificial implantation. This test relies upon a video-amplified 
image of the subjects’ eye. The motif of the eye, and sight in general, recurs 
throughout Blade Runner – as both an index of artificiality (for example 
replicants’ retinas reflect a red glow) and as a symbol of ‘authentic’ 
experience (e.g. the replicants use photographs to prove that their memories 
are real).  
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Figure 22 Image from the opening scene of the film, in which the flaming chimneys of 
the ‘Hades’ landscape (see Figure 21) are reflected in a replicant's eye 
(Blade Runner, 1982, dir. Ridley Scott. Film still). 
 
 
Figure 23 The ‘Voight-Kampff’ machine (Blade Runner, 1982, dir. Ridley Scott. Film 
still). 
 
 
Figure 24 A replicant owl’s eyes. The red reflection on its retina betrays the bird’s 
artificiality (Blade Runner, 1982, dir. Ridley Scott. Film still [detail]). 
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The prevalence of eye images in Blade Runner, along with several other of 
the film’s themes and visual motifs, correlates closely with Hoffmann’s 
Sandman story. Parallels may be drawn, for example, between the 
‘bogeymen’ of each piece’s inclination toward removing human eyes: 
Hoffmann’s Sandman is said to throw sand into children’s eyes “so that they 
jump out of their heads,” while the replicants Roy (Rutger Hauer) and Leon 
(Brion James) in Blade Runner indulge in similar maiming activities (1980: 
87). Leon, for instance, attempts to kill Deckard by pushing his eyes out with 
his fingers, and when Roy confronts his ‘father’ Tyrell (Joe Turkel) he kills him 
by pushing his thumbs through the human’s eyes. When the two replicants 
visit the genetic engineer of artificial eyes Chew (James Hong)  (himself, in 
some way, a correlative of the Coppola character from Hoffman’s tale, who 
constructs the automaton Olympia’s eyes) they intimidate him with 
disembodied eyes. Furthermore, when Roy bullies the genetic engineer of 
replicant toys, J.F. Sebastian (William Sanderson), into helping him find Tyrell, 
there is a moment of sinister humor when Roy plays with some of the 
human’s ‘toy’ eyes. 
The theme of eyes – or rather sight – is the root of another 
commonality between Blade Runner and the Sandman story. Both narratives 
involve a misperception of the synthetic/mechanical for the real. In Hoffmann’s 
story, Nathanael takes the automaton Olympia for a real woman (see Chapter 
Two, p53), in Blade Runner, the replicants too seem indistinguishable from 
real humans. In Ramble City, her seminal essay on the film, Giuliana Bruno 
associates the replicants of Blade Runner with Jean Baudrillard’s concept of 
the simulacrum (1987: 68). Baudrillard describes the simulacrum in terms of 
 
the double (i.e. indistinguishable from the ‘original’), defining it as a “perfect 
descriptive machine which provides all the signs of the real” (Baudrillard1983: 
4). Bruno suggests that Baudrillard’s account provides a fitting definition of the 
function of the replicants within the film’s narrative (1987: 68). Though they 
are not the ‘real’ thing, replicants are effectively indistinguishable from it, and 
it is this uncanny slippage in perceptual reality that gives the film both its 
narrative drive and its underlying philosophical theme (that is: what 
distinguishes the real from the unreal, or rather, what constitutes ‘real’ 
humanity?). In the world that Blade Runner conjures, as in Baudrillard’s 
postmodern world of simulacra, "[t]he unreal is no longer that of dream or of 
fantasy or a beyond or a within, it is that of hallucinatory resemblance of the 
real with itself." (Baudrillard 1983: 142). When Deckard first meets Rachael 
(Sean Young), she does not know that she is a replicant. Her artificially 
implanted memories give her a personal history and therefore a unique, 
human identity, making her a perfect, ‘hallucinatory’ simulation of humanity. 
The replication is as ‘real’ as the thing it represents, the line between the real 
and the imaginary is uncannily blurred. 
Another clear parallel that may be drawn between Scott’s film and The 
Sandman is the fact that the protagonist of each story falls in love with a kind 
of robot: Deckard with the replicant Rachael, Nathanael with the automaton 
Olympia. Bruno notes the parallel between the replicants of Blade Runner and 
the automaton in The Sandman, suggesting that we find in Hoffmann’s tale 
“one of the most influential fictional descriptions of simulacra” (1987: 68). 
There is, however, a critical difference between the two ‘robots’. In 
Hoffmann’s story Nathanael becomes infatuated with Olympia because he 
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mistakes her for a real girl, but eventually “reality triumphs: the android is 
unmasked and destroyed” (Bruno 1987: 68). Bruno argues that when the 
Sandman story was written in the 1800s, replication was “still a question of 
imitation” because reality was still an unambiguous concept: in the simulacra-
filled futureworld of Blade Runner however, “no distinction between real and 
copy remains” (Bruno 1987: 68). This causes something of an ontological 
crisis for both the replicants and the humans they live amongst. As Slavoj 
Zizek points out, when Rachael discovers she is a replicant she cries with 
“silent grief over the loss of her ‘humanity,’ the infinite longing to be or to 
become human again, although she knows this will never happen” (1993: 41). 
Although Deckard is supposed to ‘retire’ Rachael he feels pity for her and, 
though he knows that she is a replicant, falls in love with her. This suggests 
an acceptance on his part of her status as ‘real’. 
The simulacra-like folding of reality into representation that Bruno 
suggests Blade Runner’s replicants epitomize has clear parallels with 
photography and its indexical ‘replication’ of reality. In fact, photographs and 
their function as evidence of reality play an important role in Blade Runner’s 
narrative. Having been subjected to the Voight-Kampff test and realizing that 
that she may be a replicant, Rachael presents Deckard with a photograph of 
herself as a child with her mother. As Bruno explains: “(t)hat photograph 
represents the trace of an origin and thus a personal identity, the proof of 
having existed and therefore of having the right to exist” (1987: 71). Both the 
photograph of herself  (as evidence of a personal history) and the image of 
the mother (as evidence of a genetic family history) are invoked by Rachael in 
order to claim a ‘real’ human identity. As artificial life forms that are ‘born’ as  
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Figure 25 Rachael’s photograph of her mother (Blade Runner, 1982, dir. Ridley Scott. 
Film still). 
 
 
Figure 26 Leon’s photographs (Blade Runner, 1982, dir. Ridley Scott. Film still). 
 
 
Figure 27 Deckard’s personal collection of photographs (Blade Runner, 1982, dir. 
Ridley Scott. Film still). As Mary Ann Doane suggests, “Blade Runner is at 
one level about the anxiety surrounding the loss of history. Deckard keeps 
old photos…and while they may not represent his own relatives, they 
nevertheless act as a guarantee of temporal continuity” (Doane 2000: 118). 
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fully-grown adults and live for only four years, the question of the replicants’ 
place in history, and therefore the figure of the mother, is problematic to their 
conception of themselves as ‘real’. This trouble is perhaps most apparent 
when Leon is asked a question about his mother during his Voight-Kampff 
test: he replies "My mother? I'll tell you about my mother!" and proceeds to 
shoot his interrogator.1 
As Bruno suggests, “[a] theoretical link is established in Blade Runner 
between photography, mother, and history” (1987: 71). In support of her 
assertion, Bruno proposes that there are distinct correlations to be drawn 
between Blade Runner’s plot and Barthes’ book on photography Camera 
Lucida – the narrative of which centers around a photograph of Barthes’ own 
mother and its relationship to questions of history (Bruno 1987: 71). Barthes 
writes, "in photography I can never deny that the thing has been there. There 
is a superimposition here of reality and of the past" (2000: 76). Bruno 
interprets such ideas of Barthes’ in relation to Blade Runner’s replicants and 
their reliance on photography as evidence of a past: 
Photography is perceived as the medium in which the signifier and the 
referent are collapsed onto each other. Photographs assert the referent, its 
reality, in that they assert its existence at that (past) moment when the 
person, the thing, was there in front of the camera. If a replicant is in a 
photograph, he or she is thus real. (1987: 72) 
Mary Ann Doane, too, sees parallels between Blade Runner and Camera 
Lucida, noting that “[b]oth film and essay are stories of reproduction – 
mechanical reproduction, reproduction as the application of biogenetic 

1
 Interestingly, photographs seem to be important to Leon too. In one scene Roy asks him 
about his “precious photographs”, a hoard of which Deckard finds in Leon’s flat (see Fig. 25). 
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engineering” (2000: 117). Like Bruno, she suggests that the replicants collect 
photographs “in order to reassure themselves of their own past, their own 
subjective history” (Doane 2000: 117). In the simulacra filled world of Blade 
Runner, however, the line between the real and the unreal is uncannily 
blurred. 
This uncertainty, it would seem, extends to the indexical veracity of 
photographs, their status as ‘evidence’ of a personal history. When Rachael 
challenges Deckard with the photograph of her mother, he responds by 
relaying to her intimate memories she has never told anyone about. He 
explains to her that her ‘recollections’ are implants, that they “aren’t your 
memories, they’re somebody else’s”. If her memories are not her own, then 
her photograph of her mother is a lie – its ‘truth claim’, its status as a 
document of a past reality is annulled. As Doane puts it, in Blade Runner “the 
instances of mechanical reproduction which should ensure the preservation of 
a remembered history are delegitimized” (2000: 118). Rachael’s fake 
photograph suggests some sort of digital manipulation or cloning process, as 
though she has been ‘Photoshopped’ into a past before her time. There is, 
however, a deeper parallel here with the crisis of faith in the indexical status of 
digital photography. The suggestion that memories can be transferred from 
one person to another recalls the fact that with digital images there is no 
difference between an original and its copy: that “[digital] information can 
simply be transferred, without loss, from one ‘medium’ to another” (Doane 
2007a: 144). Just as a digital image file is incapable of claiming a unique 
identity, the replicants of Blade Runner are deprived of an authentic 
subjectivity because their history is the double of another, or many others – a 
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simulation with potentially infinite, identical copies. Such doubling brings about 
an uncanny distortion in the experience of reality. Indeed, Freud’s discussion 
of the double in relation to the uncanny addresses the “transmission of mental 
processes” from one person to another, which, he contends, produces an 
“uncanny effect” (Freud 2003a: 141). He suggests that this uncanniness is 
intensified when: 
…one becomes co-owner of the other’s knowledge, emotions and 
experience…a person may identify himself with another and so become 
unsure of his true self; or he may substitute the other’s self for his own. The 
self may thus be duplicated, divided and interchanged. (2003a: 142)  
It could be said, therefore, that the replicants’ experience of the ‘real’ world is 
an uncanny one. As Nicholas Royle proposes: 
The uncanny involves feelings of uncertainty, in particular regarding the 
reality of who one is and what is being experienced…It is a crisis of the 
natural, touching upon everything that one might have thought was ‘part of 
nature’: one’s own nature, human nature, the nature of reality and the world. 
(2003: 1) 
This sense of uncertainty pervades Blade Runner’s narrative. In the Final Cut 
version of the film released in 2007 – the edit Scott considers to be definitive – 
it is explicitly suggested that Deckard himself is a replicant. Following the 
confrontation with Rachael about her photograph, and sitting before a 
collection of his own photographs, Deckard slips into a daydream in which a 
unicorn runs through a green forest (see Figure 28, overleaf): in the final 
scene of the film he finds a small origami unicorn left for him by the policeman 
Gaff (Edward James Olmos), suggesting that his colleague knows about this 
undisclosed daydream – and therefore implying that Deckard must be a 
replicant (see Figure 29, overleaf).  
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Figure 28 Deckard’s unicorn dream (Blade Runner, 1982, dir. Ridley Scott. Film still). 
 
 
Figure 29 Gaff’s origami unicorn (Blade Runner, 1982, dir. Ridley Scott. Film still). 
 
The possibility of Deckard’s artificiality is hinted at throughout the 2007 
version of the film: for example, we briefly see a red reflection on his retinas – 
elsewhere seen only in replicants’ eyes – shortly before Rachael asks him if 
he ever took the Voight-Kampff test himself (thus implying that she thinks he 
too may be a replicant). Deckard “is forced to assume that he is not what he 
thought himself to be, but somebody-something else” (Zizek 1993: 12): for 
both him and Rachael, it seems, “every positive, substantial content, inclusive 
of the most intimate fantasies, is not ‘their own’ but already implanted” (Zizek 
1993: 41). 
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Figure 30 In the ‘Final Cut’ version of the film, both Rachael and Deckard are revealed 
as replicants. The reflected red glow on their retinas suggests their 
artificiality. As Scott says: “that kickback you saw from the replicants’ retinas 
was a bit of a design flaw. I was also trying to say that the eye is the most 
important organ in the human body. It’s like a two-way mirror; the eye doesn’t 
only see a lot, the eye gives away a lot. A glowing human retina seemed one 
way of stating that” (quoted in Jenkins 1997: 174) (Blade Runner, 1982, dir. 
Ridley Scott. Film still). 
 
The rather philosophical associations generated by the presence of 
photography in Blade Runner are matched, at times, by a more aesthetic role 
for the medium. When Deckard finds Leon’s photographs, for instance, he 
takes one home and scans it into a computer for analyzing images (see 
Figure 31). This brings about a ‘break’ in the narrative flow, echoing Raymond 
Bellour’s suggestion that the presence of a photograph in a cinematic 
narrative “gives rise to a very particular trouble” (2007: 119, see also this 
thesis: Chapter Three, p80). Bruno describes this sequence in which Deckard 
analyzes the image: “[t]he photograph is decomposed and restructured 
visually through the creation of new relations, shifting the direction of the 
gaze, zooming in and out, selecting and rearranging elements, creating close-
ups” (1987: 73). The effect is that of a hiatus from the narrative drive of the 
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film, bringing the materiality of the celluloid image – in the form of its 
photographic base – to the fore. As Doane observes:  
The resultant play of colors and grain, focus and its loss, is aesthetically 
provocative beyond the demonstration of technical prowess and control over 
the image. Deckard’s motivation, the desire for knowledge…is overwhelmed 
by the special effects which are the byproducts of this technology of vision… 
(2000: 116-117) 
 
Figure 31 Deckard’s image analysis computer (Blade Runner, 1982, dir. Ridley Scott. 
Film still). 
 
 
Figure 32 A portion of one of Leon’s photographs enlarged by Deckard’s computer 
(Blade Runner, 1982, dir. Ridley Scott. Film still). 
 
Doane’s description of the scene has echoes of Barthes’ description in 
Camera Lucida of his attempt to locate amongst old photographs of his 
recently deceased mother “the truth of the face I had loved” (2000: 67). He 
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finds it, he tells us, in a photograph of her as a five year old child: “In a first 
impulse, I exclaimed: ‘There she is! She’s really there!’” (2000: 99). However, 
the photograph does not tell him enough, so his search continues: 
…I want to enlarge this face in order to see it better, to understand it better, to 
know its truth…I believe that by enlarging the detail ‘in series’ (each shot 
engendering smaller details than at the preceding stage), I will finally reach 
my mother’s very being…Alas, however hard I look, I discover nothing: if I 
enlarge I see nothing but the grain of the paper… (Barthes 2000: 99-100) 
Having searched the photograph for greater depth and found only grain, “I 
obtain this sole knowledge” Barthes writes, “that this indeed has been” (2000: 
100). In the future-world of Blade Runner however, a photograph – like a 
replicant, a simulacrum – can appear as excessive in detail, as ‘perceptually 
rich’, as its referent. As Deckard zooms in on Leon’s photograph it reveals 
seemingly infinite depths and dimensions, and therefore new meanings, new 
knowledge. It presents a world as rich in perceptual detail as are the 
replicants he searches the image for clues to hunt down. As he analyzes the 
photograph it shows little evidence that it is not as complete, as ‘present’, as 
the room itself (though it does eventually, after extreme enlargement, show 
some signs of ‘grain’). Where Barthes’ failed search of his photograph 
provokes a sense of absence and death, Deckard’s presents a simulated 
‘hallucination’ of reality. 
It may be suggested that Blade Runner’s own sense of perceptual 
‘reality’ and excessive detail has contributed to its lasting appeal amongst 
fans and critics. Though three decades have passed since it was made, it is 
still widely regarded as one of the most influential films ever made in terms of 
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its visual effects.2 Certainly this has much to do with Scott’s painstaking, 
perfectionist approach to the film’s visuals, but it is also largely to do with the 
nature of the special-effects techniques that were used. In the early eighties, 
when Blade Runner was in production, computer-generated imagery was just 
beginning to see widespread use in mainstream cinema. In fact, 1982, the 
year of the film’s release, also saw the release of cinema’s first entirely CGI-
animated sequence (in Star Trek II: The Wrath of Khan, d. Nicholas Meyer) 
and the first live-action film to make extensive use of CGI (Tron, d. Steven 
Lisberger). Blade Runner, however, used entirely analogue, “in-camera” 
special effects – that is, visual effects that are created indexically, on the film 
negative via the camera lens, rather than in post-production. The film’s 
assistant art director Stephen Dane believes that Blade Runner “is probably 
one of the last great in-camera special effects movies ever done” (Dangerous 
Days 2007). Similarly, the chief art director David L Snyder remarked in 2007: 
“we didn’t have the advantages people have now. And I’m glad we didn’t, 
because there’s nothing artificial about it. There’s no computer-generated 
images in the film” (Dangerous Days 2007). Blade Runner’s futuristic 
landscapes were all ‘real’ in the sense that they existed as actual, physical 3D 
models, animated using traditional stop-motion techniques (see, for example, 
Figures 37 & 38). It is this feeling of physical authenticity – the indexically 
captured nature of its imagery – that has given Blade Runner its lasting 
appeal to many people. As Daryl Hannah, the actress who plays the replicant 
Pris, has said of the film, “everything was really done, because you can feel 
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 In 2007 Blade Runner was named the second most visually influential film of all time by the 
Visual Effects Society (Visual Effects Society 2007). 
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that when you watch a film. I think when you see a film and it’s an in-camera 
effect, it feels real” (Dangerous Days 2007).  
Though CGI is virtually omnipresent in Hollywood today, following the 
relatively poor reception of certain films that use CGI extensively (such as the 
Star Wars prequel trilogy [1999-2005]) in comparison to the popularity of older 
films which relied on models and stop-motion animation (such as the original 
Star Wars trilogy [1977-1983]), a number of mainstream directors have begun 
to turn once again to the older techniques. Blade Runner remains a 
touchstone for this kind of moviemaking. It has been a major source of 
inspiration for recent films such as Christopher Nolan’s blockbuster Batman 
Begins (2005) and Duncan Jones’s critical success Moon (2009), both of 
which made extensive use of ‘real’ models (Godoski 2010). Douglas Trumbull, 
Blade Runner’s celebrated special effects supervisor, has also recently re-
emerged from a 30-year hiatus to contribute his expertise to Terrence Malick’s 
Palme d’Or-winning Tree of Life (2011), because CGI was “too synthetic for 
[Malick’s] more organic methodology” (O’Neill 2011). 
The point I hope to make here is that the revival of such practices, and 
the positive reception of the resulting films, seems to refute claims made by 
theorists such as Lev Manovich and David Rodowick that CGI has definitively 
disposed of cinema’s indexical powers. Manovich suggests that “it is now 
possible to generate photorealistic scenes entirely in a computer using 3-D 
computer animation” creating “something which has perfect photographic 
credibility, although it was never actually filmed” (2000: 175). Invoking the Star 
Wars prequels, Rodowick makes a similar claim when describing the 
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interaction between the films’ live action characters and their CGI 
counterparts:  
If, in the fictional world they inhabit, Obi-Wan Kenobi and company are 
perceptually equivalent to characters such as Jar Jar Binks and Yoda, this is 
so because digital capture imports the actor’s image to the world of digital 
synthesis…These images are perceptually indistinct because, whether 
captured or synthesized, they are produced from the same kinds of data… 
(2007: 122-123) 
Despite Manovich and Rodowick’s claims, model-based special effects have 
returned to mainstream filmmaking, and I believe that this reveals something 
absolutely vital about the distinctive nature of the indexically captured image. 
It is, perhaps, ironic that Rodowick’s assertions about the ‘perceptual 
indistinctiveness’ between the live-action and CGI elements of the Star Wars 
prequel rest upon a character (Jar Jar Binks; see Figure 33 below) who was 
widely reviled and became something of a symbol of the films’ failures.3  
   
Figure 33 (above left) Obi-Wan Kenobi (Ewan McGregor) and the computer-
generated character Jar Jar Binks ‘interact’ (Star Wars: 
Episode 1 – The Phantom Menace, 1999, dir. George Lucas. 
Film still). 
Figure 34 (above right) A live-action Bob Hoskins with the hand-drawn, animated 
character Roger Rabbit (Who Framed Roger Rabbit, 1988, 
dir. Robert Zemicks. Film still). 

3
 As Eric Harrison wrote in the Los Angeles Times the year of the film’s release: “How 
annoying is Jar Jar Binks? The comical, animated Gungan is so off-putting that even one of 
his creators says he found him hard to stomach at first…The floppy-eared, loose-jointed 
creature…was an immediate hit with children, but many adults walked out of theaters loathing 
the character…” (Harrison 1999: n. pag.). 
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I would argue that this is in large part due to the fact that the CGI character is 
in no way ‘perceptually indistinct’ from his real life counterparts: Binks does 
not have, as Manovich suggests he could, “perfect photographic credibility.” I 
suggest that this is, at least in part, due to the character’s lack of a direct 
indexical connection to a real object occupying real physical space.4 Blade 
Runner’s constructed elements have a feeling of weight – of authentic, 
material presence and an excess of detail or ‘perceptual richness’ that allows 
the viewer to enter the film’s ‘world’ in a way that I myself often find I cannot 
with computer generated scenes. It could be argued therefore, in opposition to 
Rodowick, that digital capture and synthesis do not lose their distinctiveness: 
that there is an ontological difference between Jar Jar and Obi-Wan, that they 
are not “produced from the same kinds of data” – at least no more so than the 
hand-drawn Roger Rabbit and live-action Bob Hoskins in the Who Framed 
Roger Rabbit? (1988) are ontologically the same because they both, 
ultimately, end up on the same piece of filmstrip (see Figure 34, previous 
page). 
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 Binks was one of the first entirely-CGI characters to have a significant role in a major live-
action film. Later films with prominent CGI characters have, however, relied heavily on 
indexical information to help make them look as ‘real’ as their live action counterparts. Andy 
Serkis’s acclaimed portrayal of the character Gollum in Peter Jackson’s Lord of the Rings 
trilogy (2001-2003) perhaps provides the preeminent example of this. For Jackson’s films, 
Motion Capture technology was used to ‘map’ Serkis’s movements, which were then 
transferred to a CGI rendering of Gollum. As Tom Gunning explains:  
The creation of Gollum shows the pragmatic transgression of the boundary between 
theoretically distinct modes in its combination of photographic and animation effects. The 
very concept of Motion Capture, in which the recording of a living actor drives the motion 
of an animated figure through complex logorhythmic programs, embodies this 
interdependence. Animation enables a departure from any reference to reality but in the 
creation of Gollum’s animation often took its cue from the recorded motion of Serkis. 
Providing animation with a reference to reality demonstrates a desire (and perhaps an 
anxiety) to found fantasy within a realm of realistic (indeed, in Pierce’s sense, indexical) 
observation and recording… (Gunning 2006: 346).  
It is not within the scope of this thesis to engage in an extensive discussion of computer 
generated imagery. It has been touched upon by Mulvey (2006: 27) in terms of the 
“technological uncanny” and the concept of the “uncanny valley” has been widely applied to 
CGI characters in cinema (see Pavlus [2011] for an interesting article on this subject). 
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Even digitally captured photographic footage is produced from the 
indexical ‘data’ of reality. Although every digital image may be subject to the 
same levels of manipulation, regardless of the method by which it was initially 
created, each image retains a distinct ‘aura’ dependent upon what that 
method of input was. The indexical trace in a photographic image sets it apart 
from the digitally constructed image – makes it ‘perceptually distinct’ – 
because, as Daryl Hannah suggests, you can sense when something was 
really there, it “feels real” (Dangerous Days 2007). 
Much of Blade Runner’s most extensive model work can be seen in the 
film’s opening scene, which portrays what was known amongst the crew as 
the ‘Hades’ landscape – a vast, dark panorama of fire-billowing chimneys 
enveloped in a thick blanket of smog. As the film’s special-effects supervisor 
Douglas Trumbull puts it, the opening “really establishes the whole look of the 
film and the whole kind of ambiance of a world gone completely out of control 
with polluted air – very low visibility, chemical cracking plants in every 
direction” (Trumbull 2010).  
 
Figure 35 The ‘Hades’ landscape, bathed in smog (Blade Runner, 1982, dir. Ridley 
Scott. Film still). 
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Ridley Scott, Blade Runner’s director, grew-up in North East England, 
spending his late childhood and formative years at art college on Teesside. 
The sprawling, smoke and flame-spewing landscape of chemical and steel-
works there was arguably a major influence on the opening scene of the film. 
He describes the impact of Teesside’s landscape on his aesthetic sensibility: 
It probably goes back to industrial England, and, a lot of people would say, 
that's why you get Blade Runner. There were steelworks adjacent to West 
Hartlepool, so every day I'd be going through them, and thinking they're kind 
of magnificent, beautiful, winter or summer, and the darker and more ominous 
it got, the more interesting it got. (Scott quoted in Monahan 2003) 5 
The actual Hades model used in the opening scene, however, drew on 
a chemical plant in San Pedro, California to help build its convincing industrial 
landscape. Trumbull and his team photographed the towers and pipes of that 
works silhouetted against the sky (see Figure 36, below), in order to use their 
outlined shapes in the model.  
   
Figure 36 Photographs of the chemical plant in San Pedro, used as reference for the 
building of the Hades model (stills from Blade Runner: Hades Landscapes, 
Trumbull, 2010). © 2010 Trumbull Ventures LLC. 
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 The following quote from Scott can also be found online (though it has not been reliably 
attributed): “There's a walk from Redcar into Hartlepool...I'd cross a bridge at night, and walk 
above the steel works. So that's probably where the opening of Blade Runner comes from. It 
always seemed to be rather gloomy and raining, and I'd just think "God, this is beautiful." You 
can find beauty in everything, and so I think I found the beauty in that darkness” (see, for 
example, Pat 2007).  
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Figure 37  Production still of the ‘Hades’ model (still from Blade Runner: Hades 
Landscapes, Trumbull, 2010). © 2010 Trumbull Ventures LLC. 
 
 
Figure 38  Production still of the ‘Hades’ model. (still from Blade Runner: Hades 
Landscapes, Trumbull, 2010). © 2010 Trumbull Ventures LLC. 
 
 
Figure 39 The Hades model with smoke (Dangerous Days: Making Blade Runner, 
2007, dir. Charles de Lauzirika. Video still). 
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As Trumbull explains, having taken the photographs of the chemical-plant in 
San Pedro: 
…we could then reduce [the shapes] to various sizes and give them to an 
actual chemical etching plant where these silhouette cut-outs were pasted 
together in long rows and then acid etched in brass using a photo-lithography 
process. This gives a tremendous amount of almost photorealistic detail. 
(Trumbull 2010) 
Once again, an actual, direct indexical connection to the ‘real’ contributed to 
the convincingly realistic aesthetic of the film’s constructed elements.  
Once the ‘Hades’ model was constructed, smoke was added to the 
scene to give a greater sense of depth between the layers of cutouts. This 
smoke also gives the landscape its impression of heavy pollution (the 
environmental problems of the fictional 2019 L.A. are implied throughout the 
film – the only animals we see are synthetic, and even at street-level 
everything seems to be bathed in a thick layer of smoke). It would appear 
from Scott’s comments about the visual pleasure he derived from the 
industrial landscapes of his childhood, however, that the use of smoke might 
have been aesthetic choice as much as it was intended to be a carrier of 
meaning. Smoke confers upon Blade Runner’s landscapes a feeling of 
uncertainty and ethereality. As Antony Vidler suggests, writing of E.T.A. 
Hoffmann’s deployment of smoke’s aesthetic properties in his stories, it can 
act as an “agent of dissolution” by which architectural forms may slip “into the 
depth of the dream” (Vidler 1992: 41). He continues by noting, furthermore, 
that “as an instrument of the sublime, smoke has always made obscure what 
otherwise would have seemed too clear” (Vidler 1992: 41). The dark forms of 
Blade Runner’s vast and terrible industrial landscape, already rendered 
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sublime through their excess of indexical detail, their ‘perceptual richness’, are 
figured as all the more ‘unpresentable’ by the occluding presence of smoke. 
This sense of uncertainty is present throughout the film, whether in relation to 
its foreboding dystopian landscapes, or with regard to its portrayal of a society 
struggling with the blurred boundaries between reality and representation. The 
fact that these themes are explored through a medium boasting a sense of 
perceptual richness and indexical veracity somewhat lacking in today’s digital 
imaging processes makes them all the more compelling.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: STUDIO WORK 
In this chapter the development of my studio based research is mapped and 
documented. The chapter is divided into two parts: the first part – ‘Early 
Development’ – begins by describing the progression of my early practical 
experiments and their significance to the project as a whole; the second part – 
‘Do Grandads Dream of Celluloid Flamingos?’ – details the development of 
my final practical submission, the video piece Re: Flamingo. 
 
Early Development 
The initial proposal for this practice-led research project involved the 
exploration of “relationships between repetition and the subjective nature of 
memory formation through a body of camera-based work that scrutinizes the 
process of transformation inherent in such re-presentation”.1 This would 
entail, I suggested, “a self-reflexive process analyzing the unstable 
boundaries between a memory/representation and its point of origin”.2  
The first important question I faced in developing the above rather 
abstract and theoretical starting point into a body of practical work regarded 
the subject matter or ‘content’ of the lens-based imagery through which I 
would approach such issues. My work prior to commencement of the PhD had 
been predominantly concerned with landscape, and more specifically the 
natural landscape (see for example Figure 40, overleaf).  
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 Extract from my AHRC funding application (2007). 
2
 Extract from my AHRC funding application (2007). 
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Figure 40 Matthew Smith, Closer One, from the series ‘Closer’, 2006. Digital print. 
58cm x 150 cm. 
 
As I considered the implications of continuing with that theme in the 
context of this project, I became interested in the idea of exploring the 
industrial landscape. In part this came about because I intuitively felt that such 
a focus would offer fertile analogies with the questions of mechanical 
representation I would encounter through working with camera-based 
imagery. However, I was also very keen to extend my interest in landscape to 
encompass more explicitly socially engaged issues than my work had 
previously explored. Furthermore – and perhaps most importantly – my initial 
proposal’s engagement with memory led me in these early stages to consider 
my own family history as potential subject matter, and through researching 
this idea there emerged some compelling possibilities relating to my father’s 
recollections of growing up on industrial Teesside.  
One factor that made pursuing the Teesside idea particularly attractive 
was the fact that one of the local landscape’s most celebrated cultural 
framings was a cinematic one: Ridley Scott’s dystopian science-fiction film 
Blade Runner (1982). This fact, in turn, led me to draw a connection to a text 
that had become very important to the evolution of my ideas during these 
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early stages of research. The second chapter of Laura Mulvey’s book Death 
24x a Second (2006) considers Sigmund Freud’s reading of E.T.A. 
Hoffmann’s short story The Sandman (first published in 1816) in relation to 
cinema. The Sandman, I realized, had distinct parallels with Blade Runner, 
and so I set about exploring the possibility of applying Mulvey’s ideas to a 
cinematic reading of industrial Teesside.  
At this early stage, the Teesside project was only one amongst several 
possible avenues of exploration in terms of my studio work. However, I had 
the blueprint for a promising film piece, and more importantly had identified a 
set of parameters within which to develop my practice: namely themes of 
memory and subjectivity explored through lens-based representations of the 
industrial landscape.  
In order to determine a practical/artistic context for these themes, I 
began researching established artists whose work dealt with similar concerns. 
In the course of this research, in late 2007 I became aware that a major 
retrospective of the Canadian artist Stan Douglas’s work was showing at the 
Württembergischer Kunstverein and Staatsgalerie in Stuttgart (Stan Douglas: 
Past Imperfect, Works 1986 – 2007). Of particular interest was the fact that 
the show included the film installation piece Der Sandmann, based on 
Hoffmann’s story, which Douglas had made in 1995 (see Chapter 5, and 
Figure 41 overleaf). 
I spent nine days in Stuttgart, from the 10th to the 18th of December 
2007, visiting the two galleries in order to make a detailed study of the many 
works in the exhibition. Though my motivation for visiting the retrospective 
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was based in large part upon an interest in the themes that pervade Douglas’s 
work as a whole, the piece that had the greatest impact on my ideas was 
indeed the film installation Der Sandmann. 
 
Figure 41  Stan Douglas, Der Sandmann, 1995. Installation shot. Installation composed 
of two 16mm films, two manipulated optical sound 16mm projectors; 9:50 min 
(loop), black and white, sound. Dimensions variable. 
 
Unsurprisingly, this was to some degree a direct consequence of my interest 
in developing my own piece of work based around Hoffmann’s story. 
Immediately following my return from Germany however, rather than focusing 
upon how Douglas had adapted the subject matter of that piece, the work that 
emerged in my studio developed as a much more general response to his 
formal concerns. I became particularly interested in a formal convention 
employed in several of his works, including Der Sandmann, which he refers to 
as ‘binary structures’. This approach relies on the juxtaposition of dual 
elements that are somehow in conflict with one another: for example, the 
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juxtaposition of two very different time periods in Der Sandmann.3 As 
discussed in my extended analysis of that piece (see Chapter Five), such 
fragmenting of representational continuity can have the effect of asserting the 
materiality of the medium, calling attention to the illusionistic nature of a work 
while also creating an uncanny interchange between its figurative registers.  
 
The Binary Model 
The Hownsgill Rip Series (2008) 
At this stage I felt that, if I wished to pursue the potential of the ‘binary’ model, 
anything I achieved with my own ‘Sandman’ idea would potentially be too 
derivative of Douglas’s piece, and therefore lack a genuine sense of originality 
– something that seemed particularly important in the context of the PhD. 
Consequently, I put my ambitions for developing a work based on Hoffmann’s 
story to one side. Instead I began to focus on exploring, in a more general 
way, those formal and thematic ideas I had become interested in after visiting 
the Douglas retrospective. 
My first attempts at experimenting with the ‘binary’ model began via a 
set of photographs I had taken on the outskirts of the post-industrial town of 
Consett in County Durham. From the mid-nineteenth century, Consett was 
one of the world’s leading steel manufacturing towns. However, after the 
British steel industry went into terminal decline in the 1970s – causing 
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3
 Douglas says that his binary approach “began because two is the smallest unit with which 
you can have conflict” (Enright 2007: n. pag.). 
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massive job losses at similar plants such as the one at Redcar in Teesside – 
the Consett steelworks were finally closed down in 1980. The town “became 
one of the worst unemployment blackspots in Britain” (BBC n.d.) and in the 
following decades developed an alarmingly high suicide rate, which rose to 
four-times the national average in 2004 (McAteer 2004: n. pag.). I grew up 10 
miles from Consett, and as a child often walked with my parents in the Howns 
Gill valley, which lies just outside the town. That walk takes in the Hownsgill 
Viaduct, an impressive 175-foot high Victorian railway bridge that is sadly also 
a notorious suicide spot.4 The disused railway line that crosses the Viaduct 
forms part of the Waskerley Way walk, and the valley below the bridge boasts 
beautiful deciduous woodland. There is also a remarkable complex of caves 
in its eastern cliff face. I remember, however, that as a child the area had an 
eerie atmosphere. This was in part, I am sure, due to the suicides, but signs 
of nearby Consett’s economic disadvantages seem to extend into the valley in 
other ways too, detracting from its natural beauty. Vandalism, for example, is 
an ongoing problem: large objects such as shopping trolleys are regularly 
thrown from the bridge; graffiti covers the cave walls, which are littered with 
cans and bottles from teenage drinking sessions; and scrambler-bike tracks 
tear-up the field around the small lake that lies just below the viaduct. It was 
an attempt to figure the childhood memory of this confusion – between the 
sense of unease I attributed to the valley’s post-industrial detritus and its 
natural beauty – that led to my first experiments with ‘binary structures’. 

4
 This unfortunate fact is made visible to walkers as The Samaritans have placed signs with 
phone numbers at intervals along the bridge. 
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Figure 42 Matthew Smith, Hownsgill Rip 1, 2008. Digital print. 19 x 28 cm. See DVD insert ‘Disc Two’ (inside back cover) for higher resolution image. 
 
 
Figure 43 Matthew Smith, Hownsgill Rip 3, 2008. Digital print. 19 x 28 cm. See DVD insert ‘Disc Two’ (inside back cover) for higher resolution image.
 
Each piece in the Hownsgill Rip series, which I began in 2008, 
combines two versions of the same photograph: one ‘true’ photograph in 
which can be seen some trace of modernity or ‘disruptive’ human activity (e.g. 
a shopping trolley or scrambler bike tracks) layered with a second ‘imaginary’ 
version of the same photograph in which that element has been digitally 
removed in order to present a more idyllic ‘natural’ scene. The area of the 
photograph in which the presence overlaps the absence is then torn, in order 
to juxtapose the difference between the two images (see Figures 42, 43 and 
44). The form created by the hole also seems to introduce a third, non-
representational element – a negativity similar to that of the central seam in 
Douglas’s Der Sandmann (see Chapter Five, pp109-110).  
The act of tearing the physical surface of the photographic paper 
foregrounds each piece’s materiality, disrupting its illusory qualities and 
asserting its status as representational. Each hole also seems to function as a 
‘frame-within-a-frame’, confusing the boundaries of the representation by 
adding another level to what Derrida refers to as the parergon of each piece 
(see Chapter One, p33). Yet another register of confusion is added here too, 
in that the collages are themselves re-photographed, meaning that the final 
piece is in fact a single image in which the tears and protrusions of the rips 
are themselves flat re-presentations.  
I made the decision to tear the photographs (rather than juxtapose the 
two layers digitally using clean, straight lines echoing the edges of each 
image) for a number of reasons. Firstly, because of my project’s engagement 
with the subjective in lens-based media I was interested in exploring ways of 
combining gestural, painterly techniques with the more passive, mechanical 
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process of photography. Secondly, the act of manually disrupting the surface 
of the image seemed to echo the real-life, manmade disruptions to the surface 
of the landscape that the images portrayed. Finally, the theoretical ideas that 
informed the development of the work seemed to rely on a language evoking 
such forms. In Camera Lucida for example, Barthes describes the subjective 
elements of the photograph, what he refers to as its ‘punctum’, with words 
such as ‘cut’ and ‘little hole’: something that ‘breaks’, ‘punctuates’ or ‘pierces’ 
(2000: 26-27). He describes the punctum as “this element which rises from 
the scene” and “this wound, this prick, this mark made by a pointed 
instrument” (2000: 26-27). Drawing on Barthes, Mulvey too speaks of how, 
through disrupting the illusion of reality in a filmic image, the “moment of 
registration suddenly bursts through its artificial, narrative surface” (Mulvey 
2007: 137-138). 
 
Figure 44 Matthew Smith, Hownsgill Rip 2, 2008. Digital print. 19 x 28 cm. See DVD 
insert ‘Disc Two’ (inside back cover) for higher resolution image. 
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Mottled Screen (2009) 
As discussed in Chapter Three (pp74-76), Barthes and Mulvey align fictional 
cinema with a potential for subjectivity – an engagement with what Derrida 
refers to as the “artistic act” (2003: 220) – that they feel is lacking in traditional 
still photography. It is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that my project’s 
examination of the potential of lens-based media to figure subjective 
experience led me to experiment with the moving image. My first such 
experiments attempted to transpose the formal ideas developed in the 
Hownsgill Rip series to video. This resulted in the piece Mottled Screen 
(2009) in which a voiceover, through reading a passage from Marcel Proust’s 
novel In Search of Lost Time (1913-1927), reflects upon issues of memory 
and subjective experience in relation to the natural landscape. The voiceover 
is accompanied by two identical video tracks that are temporally out of synch 
with each other, their disparity exposed by a hole or ‘rip’ in the 
representational surface of the moving image (see Figure 45). The intention is 
that the temporal interaction between the two out of synch images echoes the 
text’s philosophically inflected ruminations on past and present, real and 
representation. 
The ‘hole’ in Mottled Screen was created, using Apple’s Final Cut Pro 
video editing program, by layering only the dark portions of a third, two-tone 
image onto the topmost of the two identical images and then removing it along 
with those parts of the top image it covered. Because the two identical layers 
are out of synch with each other, this creates a ghost-like effect in which the 
third image is seen only as a negativity, a shifting gap created by the disparity 
between the two registers. The hole in the image is as dynamic as the actual 
 
images themselves, continually changing its shape. This rupturing of registers 
juxtaposes the differing time periods of the two layers in an attempt to visually 
figure the conceptual ideas suggested in the voiceover. This effect functions 
in much in the same way as the conflation of time periods in Der Sandmann – 
though where Douglas’s piece presents a static seam, Mottled Screen 
presents a continuously shifting rip.  
 
Figure 45 Matthew Smith, Mottled Screen, 2009. Video still. Super-8 transferred to 
digital video. 4:08 min (see DVD insert ‘Disk Two’, back cover, for full video). 
 
‘Juxtapossessions’ 
As both my studio work and theoretical research evolved, I became 
increasingly interested in what distinctive possibilities digital imaging 
processes might bring to my project. I began to feel that the binary model I 
was working to belonged, in some ways at least, to an analogue, pre-digital 
methodology – one of collage, or the limitations of multiple exposures on a 
single negative. More importantly, I felt that asserting the material, 
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representational nature of a photographic image as explicitly as I had in the 
binary experiments somewhat precluded the possibility of figuring the sense 
of uncertainty and confusion so associated with an evocation of the uncanny 
(a concept that was becoming increasingly central to my theoretical 
explorations).  
 
Figure 46 Fictionalized dictionary entry for ‘juxtapossession’, mimicking the fictionalized 
dictionary entry for ‘replicant’ seen in the documentary Dangerous Days: 
Making Blade Runner (2007). 
 
Though the binary model juxtaposes elements within the same frame 
simultaneously, those elements are nevertheless separated from one another 
by a ‘seam’ or second frame within that frame. Such an approach calls 
attention to the constructed nature of the piece, resulting in a very formal 
statement that can sometimes appear to be the central concern of the work, 
therefore detracting from its representational content. Digital imaging 
processes, however, allow the seamless and subtle integration of infinite, 
disparate – even conflicting – elements into the same representational space 
(see Chapter Four). Such an approach retains the illusion of spatial 
coherence and connection to reality so important to the power of the 
indexically-charged photographic image, while at the same time facilitating the 
doubling strategy explored in the binary pieces. As I experimented with these 
seamless integrations I began referring to them as ‘juxtapossessions’ (a 
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corruption of ‘juxtaposition’ in which, rather than simply existing side-by-side, 
conflicting elements occupy the same representational space).  
 
Shadowgram (2009) 
My first experiment with the concept of ‘juxtapossession’ drew inspiration from 
Alain Resnais’s enigmatic film about time and memory, Last Year at 
Marienbad (1961). The film’s most famous image depicts a group of standing 
figures casting bold shadows on the ground, while the ornamental trees 
surrounding them cast none. 
 
Figure 47 Last Year at Marienbad, 1961, dir. Alain Resnais. Film still. 
 
Shot in the grounds of Schloss Nymphenburg in Munich, the scene’s 
effect was achieved by painting the figures’ shadows onto the floor of the 
garden’s central promenade. Parts of Marienbad were also shot at Schloss 
Schleißheim just outside Munich, and it is a photograph I took in the grounds 
of that palace with which I developed my response to Resnais’s film.  
IMAGE REMOVED DUE TO COPYRIGHT RESTRICTIONS. PLEASE SEE HARD COPY 
FOR ORIGINAL IMAGE.
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The piece, which I named Shadowgram, originated as a proposal for a 
public sculpture; however, because its conceptual elements were all 
photographic in nature it seemed more appropriate that the final work should 
itself be a photograph.5 The proposal was never realized: what is presented 
here is a series of maquettes made in Photoshop, including a mock-up of the 
final piece (see Figures 48, 49 and 50, overleaf).  
The concept of Shadowgram is to combine ontologically different 
temporal moments into one image: the ‘shadows’ representing one, static 
timeframe and the various figures a variety of other, more fleeting moments. 
The first stage requires that the shadow of each of a group of standing figures 
be traced and then painted onto the ground in black paint or similar substance 
(see Fig. 48). This indexical tracing of each figure’s pose via their shadow has 
an effect akin to photography, in that it transposes a passing/past moment 
into a more permanent timeframe. Once the shadow-tracing is completed, the 
people from whom they were traced leave the site. Photographs are then 
taken, from a camera mounted in a static position above the scene, as new 
figures encounter the shadows and interact with them (see Fig. 49) – like the 
actors in the Resnais film pretending the shadows are their own.  

5
 The original intention was that this piece function as a public memorial (not specific to 
Schloss Schleißheim or related to Resnais’ film). I considered, for example, submitting the 
idea to iraqimemorial.org, “an online exhibition of and ongoing call for participation to artists 
…to propose concepts for the creation of memorials to the many thousands of Iraqi civilians 
killed in the War in Iraq” (DeLappe 2009: n. pag.). Like many proposals on that website, my 
idea would be submitted without necessarily hoping for its realization: “the intent is to facilitate 
a process that allows for the expression of concepts as a collective, networked, creative act of 
remembrance that takes place in the present tense” (DeLappe 2009: n. pag.). The piece – 
perhaps situated in Britain, perhaps Iraq, perhaps the US – would invite the public to align 
themselves (and thus perhaps identify) with the dead Iraqi civilian symbolized by each 
shadow marked on the ground. Taken to its logical conclusion, the piece would require many 
thousands of shadows. 
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Figure 48 Matthew Smith, Shadowgram Proposal, 2009. Painted shadows. 
 
 
 
Figure 49 Matthew Smith, Shadowgram Proposal, 2009. People interacting with the 
painted shadows.  
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Figure 50 Matthew Smith, Shadowgram Proposal, 2009. Mock-up of the final piece, showing layered figures. See DVD insert ‘Disc Two’ (inside back 
cover) for higher resolution image. Though the photographic execution of the work does not necessarily require a digital process (its layering 
effect could be achieved simply through long or multiple exposures), its shadow concept draws inspiration from my theoretical inquiries into 
digital photographic processes in that it seamlessly introduces multiple, distinct temporal elements into the same representational space.
 
The final piece consists of a digital layering of many photographs of 
numerous different people standing on the various shadows (see Figure 50). 
While the boldly painted shadows remain unchanged in each photograph, the 
difference between each standing figure’s pose is revealed through the 
layering.  
The end result is a photograph with an uncanny sense of time: the 
single moment suggested by the photograph-like fixity of each shadow’s pose 
is offset by the many other moments represented by the differing poses of the 
figures standing on them. The piece introduces the static time of a 
photograph, via the shadows, into a changing landscape represented by the 
changing figures. People attempt to enter the static time of the shadows by 
aligning themselves with the fixed poses captured on the ground: 
photographing these encounters and then digitally layering the resulting 
images reveals both the changing human figures (different body types, 
different poses) and the ‘deathlike’ stillness of the shadows. Thus a confusion 
or uncertainty in the temporality of the image is produced – an uncanny effect 
not unlike that generated by the originating image from Resnais’s film, though 
rendered in a still photograph while displaying a greater sense of temporal 
disjunction. 
 
RePlay (2009) 
My next attempt to explore the idea of seamless integration – what I was 
calling ‘juxtaposession’ – took the form of a short, looped video piece I named 
RePlay (2009). For this work I digitally altered a statically positioned video 
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shot of three children playing on a beach in order to double the two children 
who are holding hands to the right of the frame (see the three video stills in 
Figure 51, below).  
 
 
 
Figure 51 Matthew Smith, RePlay, 2009. Video stills. HD video, 1:29 min looped 
(see DVD insert ‘Disk Two’, back cover for full video). 
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This repetition of figures effectively makes it appear as though there 
are five children in the shot. However, the two pairs holding hands perform 
identical movements simultaneously. The uncanny effect this produces is 
amplified by the fact that the figures’ movements are also repeated temporally 
as they move backwards and forwards along the beach in a strange, almost 
mechanistic dance. When figures on film are transformed by such repetition, 
Mulvey suggests, “actions begin to resemble mechanical, compulsive 
gestures” and “precise, repeated gestures become those of automata, the 
cinema’s uncanny fusion between the living and dead merges with the 
uncanny fusion between the organic and the inorganic, the human body and 
the machine” (2006: 171). 
Mulvey proposes that because of this uncanny effect, figures subjected 
to such repetition “lose their protective fictional worlds…the repeated frames 
that elongate each movement and gesture assert the presence of [the] 
filmstrip” (Mulvey 2006: 171-172). Functioning in a similar way to the ‘rips’ in 
the Hownsgill series, therefore, RePlay’s repetition foregrounds the 
representational nature of its image. However, unlike the Hownsgill pieces, 
the illusion of a single, cohesive space remains intact, conferring upon the 
doubled figures, and indeed the whole piece, a sense of ontological 
uncertainty.  
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Do Grandads Dream of Celluloid Flamingos? 
Please note: the video piece ‘Re: Flamingo’ discussed in this section can be found on the 
DVD insert ‘Disc One’ on the inside back cover of this thesis (as a watermarked QuickTime 
file). 
 
While I felt that the Hownsgill Rip series was successful in its reconciliation of 
form and content, my other early experiments (for example Mottled Screen, 
Shadowgram and RePlay), though formally promising, seemed to offer little 
scope for development in terms of their subject matter. Having become 
intrigued by the potential of my digital video experiments, I began to consider 
once again the idea of developing a moving image work responding to the 
industrial/post-industrial landscape. The theoretical aspect of my research had 
by this point narrowed its focus on memory to a more specific interest in the 
related issues of trauma and the uncanny (in particular their association with 
the return/repetition of repressed memories). This led me to reconsider my 
early idea of developing a work which transposed Hoffmann’s Sandman story 
to industrial Teesside. The philosophical relationship I had by this point traced 
between the uncanny and the sublime in my theoretical research seemed to 
give weight to the concept of approaching the story via the landscape. What is 
more, the fact that I had deviated from an explicit focus on the binary model in 
my formal explorations gave me confidence that any resulting piece would 
contribute something original towards a retelling of the story, rather than 
simply become a derivative remake or ‘double’ of Douglas’s Der Sandmann. I 
therefore began to consider more seriously the idea of developing a video 
work that drew on both Hoffmann’s story and Ridley Scott’s film Blade 
Runner. 
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In the early stages of the development of this piece, I began 
exchanging emails with my father, telling him about my ideas for a film 
responding to the industrial landscape of Teesside. He sent me a collection of 
Super-8mm home movies that his father had shot in the area in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. I had seen this footage before, and one shot in particular 
had stayed with me: a flamingo wading in a lagoon near the ICI chemical 
works in Billingham, where my grandad used to work.6 I transferred this 
sequence to digital video and began experimenting with ideas similar to those 
I had explored in RePlay, cloning the image of the flamingo and seamlessly 
integrating the replicated birds into the same space as the original (see Figure 
52, below).  
   
Figure 52 Matthew Smith, Re: Flamingo, 2011. Video still. Cloned Flamingos: Identical 
‘doubles’ of the original flamingo appear one after another, apparently out of 
nowhere. The possibility of the multiple birds being mistaken for a flock is 
negated by the fact that they mimic each other’s movements identically and 
simultaneously. 
 
For some time I considered the possibility of this sequence remaining a 
stand-alone looped video piece like RePlay. However, as the emails with my 
father continued, the potential for a more substantial piece of work became 
apparent. One of the early emails I wrote to my father mentioned that I had 
read an interview with Ridley Scott, in which he explained how his childhood 
recollections of Teesside’s industrial landscape had influenced Blade 

6
 My father and I have always assumed this bird flew to Billingham from the Flamingo Land 
theme park, which lies about 40 miles south of Teesside, in North Yorkshire. 
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Runner’s visuals (see Chapter Six, p134). I noted how great an impression 
the landscape seemed to have made on the director, and asked my father if 
he had any comparably vivid memories of it.  
His reply was surprisingly revealing, detailing his boyhood memories of 
taking the bus to school through the ICI chemical plant, where he would also 
sometimes go to meet his father at work. Though the language he used 
revealed a certain amount of nostalgia for the landscape, in contrast to Scott’s 
rather positive account, my father’s email evoked an almost nightmarish 
panorama of “steaming pipes and leaking valves” (see Appendix Two for this 
email in full). He concluded by noting that he was able to see the North York 
Moors from his school and his still vivid recollection of telling himself “I’m 
getting out of here”. 
 
Figure 53 Matthew Smith, Re: Flamingo, 2011. Video still. “Steaming pipes and leaking 
valves.” 
 
As I considered how my father’s reply might further the development of 
my piece, I was reminded that Hoffmann used an exchange of 
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correspondence between his story’s protagonists to begin The Sandman’s 
narrative (and, of course, that Douglas had relied on this device for his own 
interpretation). This led to the development of a narrative structured around 
my email correspondence with my father, relaying a semi-fictionalized 
exchange between the two of us and ‘Clara’ – a fictional character borrowed 
from Hoffmann’s story (see Appendix One for full transcription of narrative).  
It seemed appropriate that if the Teesside piece were to continue my 
exploration of the impact of digitization on analogue processes, the letters of 
Hoffmann’s story should become emails. Furthermore, this made even more 
plausible Hoffmann’s plot device whereby Nathanael’s initial letter is 
accidentally addressed to the wrong recipient (an email can be easily sent to 
the wrong person by accidentally clicking on the wrong contact name). As 
Royle suggests, the dispatch mistake contributes a great deal to The 
Sandman’s feeling of uncanniness:  
Nathaniel’s is not only a letter about the uncanny…its very address and 
dispatch make it uncanny, as it comes to be read by someone other (familiar 
but strange) than the ‘intended’ recipient. The very sense of what is ‘intended’ 
– of so called authorial intention or narrational intention – becomes strange. 
(2003: 44-45) 
Echoing Schelling’s definition of the uncanny as “what one calls everything 
that was meant to remain secret and hidden and has come into the open” 
(quoted in Freud 2003a: 132), Royle notes that “[Nathanael’s] letter is 
supposed to be private, something that ought to have remained that way” 
(2003: 44-45). Transposing Hoffman’s plot device to my film, therefore, 
seemed to offer a way of couching those images of the Teesside landscape 
with which I would be working within an uncanny framework. The translation 
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of Hoffmann’s idea to email also opened up the possibility of structuring the 
work around a temporal confusion – again an effect often associated with the 
uncanny. The forwarding and reply functions of electronic mail allow each 
reader to follow the full history of a correspondence, because all preceding 
messages are included below the most recent. In terms of the structure of my 
video piece, this manifests itself as a confusion of voices: somewhat like the 
shared memories and dreams of the replicants in Blade Runner, the 
memories and dreams described in the emails are narrated simultaneously, in 
identical format, by each of the three recipients.  
I constructed the narrative of the Teesside film, like Hoffmann’s story, 
around three communications. Firstly, an initial email from myself, intended for 
Clara but mistakenly sent to my father, which recounts how images from 
Blade Runner have begun appearing in my dreams. This is followed by a 
reply from my father, partly based upon the real email he sent me describing 
his childhood memories of the Teesside landscape, but also integrating 
elements of the Sandman narrative. Finally a third email, again from me to 
Clara, considering how various camera-based representations of the 
Teesside landscape may have contributed to my strange dreams (beginning 
with Blade Runner, before moving on to my grandad’s home-movies, my own 
video recordings, and finally to my father’s photographs). 
The first drafts of the Teesside video piece (the working title of which 
was Do Grandads Dream of Celluloid Flamingos?)7 consisted of sequences 

7
 This early name for the piece is a play on the title of Philip K. Dick’s novel Do Androids 
Dream of Electric Sheep?, upon which the story of Blade Runner was based. 
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from my grandad’s Super-8 films – including the flamingo clip – alongside HD 
video footage I had shot around Teesside myself specifically for the film. I 
made a number of trips to the Teesside area to get this video footage, 
eventually settling on a hill east of Middlesbrough known as Eston Nab as the 
best location from which to shoot. The hill lies just south of the enormous 
Wilton Works chemical plant site, rising 250 metres almost directly above it, 
and affords an impressive vantage point from which to see the entirety of 
Teesside’s industrial landscape – from the Redcar Steelworks on the east 
coast, to the Billingham chemical plant (what used to be ICI when my 
granddad worked there) across the River Tees to the west, to Hartlepool 
Nuclear Power Station in the north (see Figure 54 below).  
 
Figure 54 Map detailing industrial sites mentioned in the text.                                         
© Crown Copyright/database right 2011. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service. 
 
IMAGE REMOVED DUE TO COPYRIGHT RESTRICTIONS. PLEASE SEE HARD COPY 
FOR ORIGINAL IMAGE.
 
It is perhaps interesting to recall here David Nye’s suggestion, 
discussed in Chapter One (pp40-42), that a factory district “viewed from a 
high place” may evoke “fear tinged with wonder”, thus provoking a feeling of 
the sublime (1994: 126). He observes that artists would often choose such a 
vantage point from which to develop their representations of such scenes, and 
furthermore, that these scenes would often be depicted at night (1994: 126-
127) – because, as Burke suggests, “darkness is more productive of sublime 
ideas than light” (1990: 73). My growing familiarity with these theoretical ideas 
led me to do most of my shooting from the top of Eston Nab at dusk, when the 
lights of the factories had been turned on and the various rising flames would 
contrast sharply with the dark industrial forms of the works (see Fig. 55).  
 
Figure 55 Matthew Smith, Re: Flamingo, 2011. Video still. “Darkness is more 
productive of sublime ideas than light.” 
 
Considering my film’s recontextualization of Hoffmann’s story, it is also 
perhaps interesting to remember at this point that Royle describes Freud’s 
essay on the uncanny as “an essay in the night, an investigation in the dark, 
 
into darkness” (2003: 108), and furthermore that Freud himself, as though 
alluding to darkness, suggests the uncanny may locate itself in “an area in 
which a person was unsure of his way around” (2003a: 125). 
Early drafts of my film piece combined HD video and Super-8 footage 
of Teesside with a voiceover in which I read the entire email narrative myself. 
Test screenings of these drafts – amongst supervisors, visiting lecturers and 
peers – helped to determine which elements were successful and which 
needed further development (see Appendix Three for list of test screenings; 
see also Figures 56 and 57, overleaf). It became obvious from the feedback 
generated at these screenings that many people found the single-person 
voiceover problematic. I was, however, somewhat resistant to the idea of 
having a different voice reading each letter. I felt that this might give the piece 
a ‘dramatic’ character too similar to that of traditional fictional cinema. While 
this in itself would not have been a problem, I was keen to extend my 
theoretical/formal ideas to all aspects of the film. I intuitively felt that there was 
room for experimentation with the soundtrack in a manner that echoed the 
ideas I had been experimenting with in my earlier practical research – in 
particular, the conflation of temporal registers seen in the Rip series and 
‘juxtapossession’ pieces.  
My ideas about the reply and forwarding function of email led me to 
consider a form for the soundtrack that, as mentioned earlier, would reveal the 
transference of identical information between all correspondents. This would 
also echo the film’s concern (explored in the narration in the third email) with 
the replication/cloning of memories in relation to both Blade Runner and 
 
       
Figure 56 (above left)  Re: Flamingo looped installation, RENDER10, Newcastle upon Tyne. September 2010. Installation shot.  
Figure 57 (above right)  Re: Flamingo, MK Gallery, Milton Keynes. February 2011. Installation shot. 
Figures 56 and 57 - Generating Feedback: Later edits of my video piece were tested in both an academic setting (departmental exhibitions, group crits, 
research seminars, faculty presentations etc.) and public galleries (MK Gallery, Milton Keynes; RENDER10/Globe Gallery, Newcastle – see Figs. 56 and 57 
above. See Appendix Three for a more detailed list of such screenings). These screenings tested a variety of installation configurations, and generated 
feedback from peers, artists, supervisors and the general public. In particular, this helped with determining a final exhibition format for the piece. Feedback 
suggested that it lent itself best to a cinema-style environment – i.e. a darkened room and large projection. The reasons given for this generally centered 
around two ideas: 1) that the Blade Runner references made the piece somewhat cinematic by default, and 2) that the subject matter of the images (‘sublime’ 
landscapes) demanded a large scale panorama/diorama-like presentation. Looped installations were tested, as were ‘single showing’ cinema-style 
screenings. The concept of the looped format seemed to lend itself to the subject matter of the piece (repetition in various forms) and to a potential ‘reverse 
temporality’ created by the ‘Re:’ and ‘Fw:’ function of the emails. Furthermore, looping the piece suggested possibilities relating to numerous ideas explored 
within the theoretical side of my project, in particular Laura Mulvey’s discussion of the effects of re-watching in Death 24x a Second (2006: 189, see also this 
thesis: Chapter Three, p81). However, the essentially linear narrative structure of the piece, adapted as it is from Hoffmann’s story, and the prominent 
allusions to conventional cinema (Blade Runner again) seemed to call for a straightforward, ‘cinematic’ presentation. 
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digital imaging. This resulted in the concept of the simultaneous voiceover 
used in the final version of the Teesside video piece, in which each 
correspondent reads each email.8 To achieve this effect, I recorded my father 
reading his part, and I my own, while the fictional character Clara was voiced 
by an actor. The results were then layered so that they played simultaneously 
with one another, creating an uncanny doubling effect brought about by the 
conflation of different temporalities (that is, the different moments attached to 
the writing and reading of each email). This confers upon the video piece 
something akin to what Barthes refers to in still photography as the medium’s 
“That-has-been” quality (2000: 77). 
The final version of my video piece, entitled Re: Flamingo, attempts to 
braid a sense of ‘that-has-been’ or ‘past-ness’ in the image with a sense of 
imminence, in order to provoke that feeling of uncertainty associated with the 
unpresentable. As has been discussed in previous chapters, evoking a feeling 
of ‘past-ness’ is often achieved through foregrounding the materiality of the 
medium: the seam that runs down the middle of Stan Douglas’s interpretation 
of the Sandman story, for instance, declares the piece’s representational 
status, as do the tears through the photographic paper in my Hownsgill Rip 
series. However, the feeling of uncertain boundaries between fact and fiction, 
real and imagined, past and present that I wished Re: Flamingo to elicit 
required a subtler approach – a sense of seamlessness similar to that 
explored in my ‘juxtapossession’ experiments. My film attempts to build a 
certain level of insistence on the veracity of the index – the ‘truth claim’ of the 
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 The one exception here being that the father does not read the third email, as it was never 
sent to him. 
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video image – giving it, to some degree, a documentary feel. Most 
constructed elements in the piece take minor roles, such as colouring and 
distortion. Those scenes that are more extensively constructed generally 
retain a sense of spatial and temporal coherence. When two temporally or 
spatially distinct images are conflated – for example, the reflections in the eye 
or the images on the computer screen – they do so with a level of 
representational seamlessness that exceeds even the ‘juxtaposession’ pieces 
(see, for example, Figures 58 and 59, below).  
 
 
Figures 58 and 59 Matthew Smith, Re: Flamingo, 2011. Video stills. Reflections: The 
‘reflections’ in the two images above, though obviously digitally 
composited, do not detract from each scene being read as one 
coherent – if not necessarily ‘truthful’ – physical space. 
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Rather than asserting their independent temporality through 
incongruity, as is the case with the layering effect of Shadowgram, or the 
doubling of figures in RePlay, the conflicting elements in Re: Flamingo are 
presented in such a way as to not undermine too explicitly the film’s feeling of 
an indexical connection to the real world. As Tom Gunning suggests, “the 
particular artistic and entertaining delight of digitally manipulated photographs 
depends on a continued investment in the photograph as potentially an 
accurate representation, causing a playful inversion of associations rather 
than simply canceling them out” (2008: 33). The one exception to this lack of 
explicit incongruity comes towards the end of the film, when the cloning of the 
image of the flamingo occurs. At this point, the voiceover narrative 
contemplates the digital image’s potential for identical duplication. Though 
boasting a sense of pre-digital indexical authenticity linked to its apparent 
materiality, the realization that the scratched and dirty film stock of the Super-
8 image is subject to digital manipulation calls into question any prior 
consideration of the film’s images as indexically ‘true’. 
The sense of uncertainty and confusion caused by the doubling of the 
birds in Re: Flamingo is intended to function somewhat like the famous scene 
in Chris Marker’s science-fiction film La Jetée (1962), in which, amid a 
narrative told otherwise entirely through still photographs, a sleeping woman 
suddenly opens her eyes and looks directly at the camera (see Figure 60, 
overleaf).  
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Figure 60 Stills from the ‘eye-opening’ scene in La Jetée, 1962, dir. Chris Marker. 
 
This brief moment in La Jetée provokes a feeling of uncertainty about 
the status of the film’s other, still images. In their inertness these stills possess 
something of Barthes’ “that-has-been” quality, but each photograph is 
nevertheless subject to cinema’s pans and zooms, its fades and transitions 
and flickering instability. As Janet Harbord describes the effect: 
Rushing towards and away at the same time, we are thrown in the opposite 
directions of recollection and anticipation. The still photograph evokes 
remembrance, the memory of this place on this day. But the movement 
across its still surface creates an anxiety about what we are moving towards. 
This is not a film composed of still images, where both cinema and 
photography remain distinct. This is a film that finds qualities of movement 
and stillness in each, that braids together remembering and forgetting, that 
points us in conflicting directions (Harbord 2009: 2)  
It is this sense of uncertainty and confusion described by Harbord that I 
wished to evoke in my own film. As Mulvey suggests, the moving image tends 
to be elusive, like “running water, fire or the movement of trees in the wind” 
(2006: 66). Barthes, she points out, felt that such qualities were “in direct 
contrast to the way the photograph’s stillness allows time for the presence of 
time to emerge within the image” (Mulvey 2006: 66). However, by braiding 
together in the video image a sense of ‘past-ness’ with a sense of elusiveness 
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and instability, an uncanny space between the dead and the living, the real 
and the representation appears to manifest itself. 
It is perhaps no coincidence that Marker chose the image of an 
opening eye with which to induce La Jetée’s most decisively confusing, 
vertiginous effect. His film is in many ways a homage to Alfred Hitchcock’s 
masterpiece of uncanny cinema, Vertigo (1958). La Jetée’s most direct 
reference to the earlier film occurs when Marker’s time-traveling protagonist 
admires, alongside the woman who is later the subject of the opening-eye 
scene, the cut-away trunk of a Sequoia tree. In Vertigo, Madeleine (Kim 
Novak) uses the growth rings of the tree to illustrate to Scottie (James 
Stewart) her imaginary existence in a distant past: the protagonist of La Jetée 
uses a similar cut-away tree to point, beyond its rings, to his existence in a 
distant future. Hitchcock’s film opens with the image of a woman’s eyes 
looking directly at the camera, gradually zooming in on her right eye until her 
iris becomes obscured by a swirling spiral representing, we assume, the 
dizzying experience of vertigo (see Figure 61 below).9  
   
Figure 61 Stills from the title sequence of Vertigo, 1958, dir. Alfred Hitchcock. 
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stairs of a high bell tower induce extreme vertigo in Stewart’s character. 
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When, in La Jetée, the woman in the photograph comes to life and looks 
directly into the camera, a sense of vertigo is created not only by the 
confusion of photographic stillness and cinematic movement, but through the 
dizzying sensation that she is looking out from the protagonist’s memory, 
across the gulf of time that he marked out on the Sequoia tree, and into his 
post-apocalyptic future. The image of the eye in my own film, perhaps, 
functions in a manner somewhat analogous to this eye-opening moment in La 
Jetée. It conflates two distinct temporalities: the ‘present’ time of the narrative, 
represented by the eye itself, with the ‘past’ time of the video/film image – the 
‘reflection’ nested in the iris. Beyond simply past and present, however, the 
eye/reflection image in Re: Flamingo appears to integrate other kinds of 
conflicting registers into the same image. At several moments, the voiceover 
narrative seems to imply an association between the nested reflection image 
and, variously: dreaming, memory and artificiality (in contrast to the perhaps 
wakeful, present ‘reality’ of the eye itself). These subjective registers, 
presented as they are through a constructed image, attempt to figure 
something uncanny in the video image.  
Interestingly, the image of the eye as bearer of subjective vision, as 
opposed to (indexical) reflector of objective reality, is also explored in The 
Sandman. In his story, Hoffmann compares Clara’s eyes with “a lake by 
Ruisdael…the pure azure of a cloudless sky, woodland and flowery meadow, 
the whole motley life of a rich landscape reflected in them” (1980: 102). 
However, Nathanael’s “dark-sighted eyes are described as flashing with inner 
light, with fire; they project rather than reflect, thrusting inner forces onto the 
outside world, working on it to change and distort it” (Vidler 1992: 33).  
 
 
 
Figure 62 Matthew Smith, Re: Flamingo, 2011. Video still. Eye image: “the pure azure 
of a cloudless sky, woodland … the whole motley life of a rich landscape 
reflected in them” (Hoffmann, 1980: 102). 
 
In Re: Flamingo, the manner in which the ‘nested’ image sits within the iris 
suggests a strange uncertainty as to whether, as in Clara’s eyes, it presents 
an indexical reflection, or, rather, an imaginary, artificial construction – like 
Nathanael’s eyes, projecting a subjective dream or vision out into the world. 
This confusion contributes to the film’s blurring of boundaries between 
imagination and reality – waking and dreaming, real and representation. 
The recurring use of the eye image throughout Re: Flamingo alludes in 
part to The Sandman’s preoccupation with eyes and sight, but it was the 
opening sequence of Blade Runner, with its close-up image of an eye 
reflecting the ‘Hades’ landscape, which provided the key reference (see 
Figure 22, Chapter Six). As has been outlined in the preceding chapter, eyes 
and allusions to sight function as important signifiers of authenticity and/or 
artificiality in Blade Runner. They seem to appear whenever a confusion 
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between real and representation arises. While the black pupil of a real human 
eye might reveal emotional depth, the reflecting flatness of a replicant’s retina 
seems to insinuate the replicated nature of their memories, and, therefore, the 
artificiality of their emotional responses (see Figures 24 and 30, Chapter 
Six).10 The iris in my film’s eye has been ‘flattened’ by a digitally introduced 
indexical representation grafted from a digital image, which may exist in 
identical form in a thousand other incarnations. Similarly, each replicant’s 
subjectivity – their memory and emotional response – derives from a copy, the 
imprint of one real human’s experience, implanted into the minds of a 
potentially infinite number of androids.  
In Blade Runner, photographs too function as signifiers of the fallibility 
of supposedly authentic experience. In one scene, not unlike that of the 
sleeping woman in La Jetée, the photograph that the replicant Rachael 
presents to Deckard in order to claim the truth of her memories (see Figure 
25, Chapter Six) momentarily comes to life. The movement in the image 
seems to symbolize the status of her memory as something closer to a dream 
than a recollection – an artificial construct rather than an infallible document. 
As Barthes argues, a photograph’s ‘intractable reality’ “deteriorates when this 
Photograph is animated and becomes cinema” (2000: 78): 
Why? Because the photograph, taken in flux, is impelled, ceaselessly drawn 
toward other views; in the cinema no doubt, there is always a photographic 
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 As the replicant’s creator Dr. Eldon Tyrell (Joe Turkell) explains to Deckard (Harrison Ford):  
“…they are emotionally inexperienced with only a few years in which to store up the 
experiences which you and I take for granted. If we gift them with a past, we create a cushion 
or a pillow for their emotions then consequently we can control them better.” (Blade Runner 
1982) 
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referent, but this referent shifts, it does not make a claim in favor of its reality, 
it does not protest its former existence (Barthes 2000: 89). 
The unreliability of Rachael’s photographic evidence is represented through 
animation: instead of a fixed record, the image becomes something shifting, 
subjective and fallible.11 This uncertain line between document and subjective 
construct is explored in Re: Flamingo: its integration of still and moving 
images leading to a confusion of the opposing qualities by which Barthes 
distinguished the two media. In Re: Flamingo, photographs become activated 
through zooms and pans – their fixity is integrated into the forward moving 
‘present-ness’ of the narrative, weakening their sense of ‘past-ness’. Video 
passages, on the other hand, slow to stillness, repeat themselves and show 
other signs of their re-presentational status, revealing the ‘intractable reality’ 
of their indexical base.  
The role of photographs in my own film draws not only upon the 
medium’s function in Blade Runner as evidence of a past, but also as 
instigator of a certain nostalgia for that past. The sunny suburban happiness 
of Rachael’s photograph is nowhere to be seen in the future-dystopia of Blade 
Runner’s industrial landscape, conferring upon her still image the feeling of a 
lost idyll. Having studied Rachael’s picture and sat down in front of his own 
set of nostalgia-tinged photographs (see Figure 27, Chapter Six), Deckard 
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 As Elissa Marder puts it, suggesting the ‘unpresentable-ness’ of this situation: “Rachel 
attempts to prove her humanity with a photo that would claim to successfully encase, frame 
and contain her mother in the square space of a snapshot. But…[s]he, or ‘it,’ refuses to lie 
motionless in the frame that has been constructed to contain her. The mother, in Blade 
Runner is no more Rachel’s mother than she is anyone else’s. Yet this image, this ‘it,’ 
disrupts and violates the boundaries of the photographic frame…This photograph, which 
Rachel offers as evidence of her ‘human’ origin, is a moving form which cannot be contained 
by a word, a proper name or a picture frame” (1991: 100-101). 
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slips into his artificially implanted reverie of a unicorn in green woodland – a 
dream of an apparently prelapsarian time before his dystopian world became, 
to use Benjamin Constant’s phrase,  “lost in isolation from nature” (quoted in 
Vidler 1992: 4). Amongst the vast urban/industrial sprawl of 2019 L.A., the 
only tangible signs of ‘nature’ are artificial, in the form of bioengineered birds 
and reptiles (Tyrell’s owl being the most prominent example).  
In my own film, my father’s black and white photographs perform, 
perhaps, a similar function to those in Blade Runner. As the final email 
explains: 
All his life [my father has] photographed only rural landscapes, as though 
documenting something that would one day be lost. Perhaps he imagined a 
future much like the film I saw, where people admire only synthetic birds, and 
green, sunlit woodlands are only seen through implanted memories. (see 
Appendix One for full email) 
The ‘that-has-been’ quality of these pre-digital, black and white still images –  
their sense of ‘past-ness’ – bestows a sense of nostalgia upon the natural 
scenes they portray.  
The use of still images of rural landscapes in Re: Flamingo (see Figure 
64, overleaf) also perhaps owes something to La Jetée’s sequence of black 
and white photographs presenting its protagonist’s recollections of/visits to a 
pre-nuclear war pastoral landscape. In a scene not dissimilar to that featuring 
Deckard’s unicorn daydream in Blade Runner (see p124 and Figure 28 in 
Chapter Six), the hero of Marker’s film reclines in a hammock, in his future-
dystopia, while, the voiceover tells us, “images begin to ooze like 
confessions”. The first of these images, we are told, as we are presented with 
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a photograph of a sunny field filled with animals and trees, is of “a peacetime 
morning” (see Figure 63, below). This is followed by a photograph of, we hear, 
“real birds” (perhaps implying that, as in Blade Runner, no such thing exists in 
La Jetée’s dystopian future). The images of trees, fields and birds in both 
Marker’s film and Re: Flamingo seem to evoke a sense of ‘past-ness’, and 
consequently a feeling of nostalgia for a pre-dystopian, rural landscape. 
 
Figure 63 “A peacetime morning.” La Jetée, 1962, dir. Chris Marker. 
  
 
Figure 64 Nostalgia for a pre-dystopian rural landscape? Matthew 
Smith, Re: Flamingo, 2011. Video still.  
IMAGE REMOVED DUE TO COPYRIGHT RESTRICTIONS. PLEASE SEE HARD 
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Figure 65 A “real” bird? Matthew Smith, Re: Flamingo, 2011. Video still.  
  
Like its still photographs, the Super-8 portions of my film, with their 
explicit materiality and pre-digital indexical ‘authenticity’, assert the ‘that-has-
been’ quality of their subject matter. However, where a sense of intractable 
reality conferred upon the flamingo image by the Super-8 stock once marked 
it as a ‘real’ bird (like those in La Jetée’s still photographs), digitization has 
transformed it into a clone: like Tyrell’s owl, it is a construction or 
representation, subject to infinite replication. This fluctuation of ontological 
registers – between real and virtual, ‘past-ness’ and imminence – is a feeling I 
have attempted to evoke throughout Re: Flamingo. While I have attempted to 
confer a sense of ‘present-ness’ onto those elements of my film that seem to 
“protest their former existence” (Barthes 2000: 89), I have also endeavored to 
assert the material, representational status of those passages that have a 
greater feeling of imminence or anticipation, conferring upon them a sense of 
‘past-ness’. 
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Barthes spoke of a sense of ‘past-ness’ in the photographic image in 
terms of trauma: to recall Mulvey’s explanation, “[t]rauma leaves a mark on 
the unconscious, a kind of index of the psyche that parallels the photograph’s 
trace of an original event” (2006: 65). Both La Jetée and Douglas’s Der 
Sandmann seem to feed off this analogy as a means by which to reconcile 
form with content. The still photographic images of Marker’s film tell the story 
of “a man marked by an image from his childhood”, while Douglas’s looped 
and doubled film figures the similar tale of a reawakened traumatic childhood 
memory. As outlined in Chapter Five, Douglas employed a number of 
techniques in order to foreground the materiality of his film – and thus its 
status as a ‘traumatic’ trace of the past. Repetition was one way in which he 
achieved this; another was to expose the fictional construct of the narrative. I 
applied similar ideas to my own piece’s story of resurgent childhood memory. 
For example, like the camera panning past the Schrebergärten set in Der 
Sandmann to reveal the film studio and camera equipment (see p109), the 
image of the computer screen and camera equipment in Re: Flamingo (see 
Figure 66, overleaf) foregrounds the video image’s representational status 
and its ‘materiality’ (if indeed the latter term may be applied to the digital 
image). 
While Douglas’s various methods of asserting the materiality of the 
filmstrip and the fiction of his narrative are achieved through disjunction and 
disruption, Re: Flamingo attempts to seamlessly integrate such devices into 
one coherent representational space. Where Douglas’s film utilizes the formal 
device of a ‘cut’ down the middle of the screen to present its two distinct
 
 
Figure 66 Matthew Smith, Re: Flamingo, 2011. Video still. Desk Image: While the computer/desk image is intended to smooth a ‘formal break’ so that, 
unlike my Hownsgill Rip pictures and Douglas’s Sandmann film, the ‘top level’ of the film’s representational illusion remains unpunctuated, the 
image also functions to alert the viewer to the material nature of the media of which the rest of the piece consists (showing as it does my 
father’s photographs pinned to the wall, unwound Super-8 reels, DV cassettes and of course the video image on the computer screen). 
 
temporalities, the computer screen in my own film incorporates two such time 
periods into one continuous, plausible space (therefore functioning in a similar 
way to the ‘reflections’ in the eye image). The frame of the laptop screen 
behaves, in a sense, in the same way as Douglas’s central seam, though 
without announcing the materiality of the whole image.12 Furthermore, while 
Der Sandmann’s methods of foregrounding its representational nature are 
formally independent (the central seam, the pan past the set to reveal the film 
studio), Re: Flamingo integrates its temporal ‘seam’ (the edge of the computer 
screen) and its equivalent of the studio image (the laptop/desk) into the same 
mechanism. What is more, while the studio pan past the Schrebergärten set 
presents a break from the fiction of Douglas’s Sandman narrative, the 
computer image of my own film remains within the fictional conceit of the 
story. Through amalgamating disparate and conflicting elements while at the 
same time retaining the illusion of coherent space and narrative, Re: 
Flamingo’s aesthetic of digital ‘seamlessness’ and, as Gunning puts it, 
“investment in the photograph as potentially an accurate representation” 
(2008: 33) remains intact.  
In addition to functioning as an amalgamator of registers, Re: 
Flamingo’s computer/desk image also helps to bridge the divide between the 
intimacy of the film’s voiceover and the rather detached feel of its vast 
industrial panoramas. Not only is the desk image on a more human scale than 
those landscapes, it provides a visual link between the emails read by the 
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 The image within the computer screen’s frame is, in fact, a separate, digitally composited 
video track – therefore the whole image is not in actuality a temporally coherent space, 
though it does appear to present one. 
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voiceover (which have of course been written and read on a computer) and 
the video images of Teesside’s factory district (which we see at times 
displayed on the laptop’s screen). 
In keeping with the piece’s formal aesthetic, Re: Flamingo’s ‘intimate’ 
voiceover is intended to confer a certain level of temporal confusion upon the 
film’s various images. As Mulvey points out, in certain films “varied levels of 
time are further complicated by the presence of voice…[a] voice-over or the 
dubbed voice adds a temporality that confuses the moment of recording” 
(2006: 188). This effect is perhaps amplified in my video piece due to the fact 
that its multitude of voices, each belonging to a different temporality, read 
emails discussing issues related to time and memory. While the voiceover 
bestows a sense of uncertainty upon the temporality of Re: Flamingo’s video 
image, it also seems to foreground the image’s status as an indexical imprint 
of a past moment. In contrast to fictional cinema, which endeavors to “mask 
the primary, the moment of cinematic registration, and [to] subordinate the 
fascination of movement as recorded time to narrative drama” (Mulvey 2006: 
183), the separation of image and voiceover seems somehow to function as 
an acknowledgement of the recorded nature of the video. Thus what Barthes 
refers to as the still photograph’s ‘that-has-been’ quality manifests itself, to 
some degree, in the moving image. 
The status of the moving image as document of a past moment of 
registration is asserted at various points throughout Re: Flamingo. This is 
approached in a variety of ways, but generally involves foregrounding the 
‘materiality’ or re-presentational foundation of the image. One such approach 
is to enlarge a small portion of an image, thus revealing the grain or pixilation 
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of which it is constituted. Unlike the photographs in Blade Runner, my images 
do not reveal infinite detail (see Chapter Six, p128) – rather, like Barthes, 
“however hard I look, I discover nothing: if I enlarge I see nothing but the 
grain”, I become aware “that this indeed has been” (2000: 99-100). In addition 
to foregrounding the ‘past-ness’ of an image, the feeling of absence this lack 
of information evokes seems to figure, as a scar might the trace of a traumatic 
wound, something akin to Kant’s concept of “negative presentation” (see 
Lyotard’s account of this idea: Chapter One, p29). In particular, perhaps, in its 
images of the industrial landscape, this seems to contribute something to Re: 
Flamingo’s attempts to present the sublime, the unpresentable. 
 
Figure 67 Negative presentation? Matthew Smith, Re: Flamingo, 2011. Video still.  
 
The materiality and re-presentational foundation of Re: Flamingo’s 
images is emphasized in other ways as well. During the various sequences of 
Super-8 footage, for example, the flickering of dirt and scratches on the film’s 
surface calls our attention not only to its physicality but, because the damage 
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Figure 68 (above)  Dirty movie? Matthew Smith, Re: Flamingo, 2011. Video still. 
Figure 69 (below right)  The Super-8 filmstrip ‘still’ used in Re: Flamingo. 
 
is different on each individual frame, also to the fact that the 
moving image is a series of animated stills (see Figure 68, 
above). This fact is also revealed in a very direct way, when, in 
one of the film’s sequences, we pan down a ‘still’ close-up of 
the filmstrip itself. Speaking of a similar moment in Dziga 
Vertov’s 1929 film Man with a Movie Camera, Mulvey suggests 
that such an image “seems to touch the point between the 
aesthetic of photography and the cinema. In their stillness, the 
repeated images…represent the individual moments of 
registration, the underpinning of film’s indexicality (2006: 15). It 
is this revelation of stillness within movement that leads Mulvey 
to her definition of cinema as “death 24 times a second”, and 
consequently her correlation of cinema with Freud’s 
understanding of the uncanny as that which exists somewhere 

 
between the dead and the living (2006: 15). Re: Flamingo attempts to figure a 
sense of the uncanny in the landscape of industrial Teesside through 
representing that landscape in images lying somewhere between the inert and 
the animated. 
The materiality of the Super-8 film used in Re: Flamingo is figured most 
overtly, perhaps, when we see the final frame of the ‘still’ filmstrip described 
above. Where preceding frames have shown a blurry image of the River Tees 
below steam-spewing cooling towers, the final frame reveals a large hole 
where the projector lamp has burned through the film (see Figure 70 below).  
 
Figure 60 Negative presentation. Matthew Smith, Re: Flamingo, 2011. Video still.  
 
This perforation asserts the physicality of the image surface as explicitly as 
the torn paper does in the Hownsgill Rip photographs. What is more, the 
violence of the puncture seems to somewhat deflate Barthes’ conception of 
the photographic image as traumatic (see Chapter Three, p68). Lacking the 
iconicity of a photograph, the burn hole is the simplest of indices, the scar of a 
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direct encounter with the traumatizing real. It is the unpresentable figured as a 
pure absence, an absolute negativity.  
While the burn-hole’s invocation of the projector lamp signifies nothing 
more remarkable than the physicality of the mechanical apparatus through 
which my grandfather’s filmic representations of the Teesside landscape were 
brought to life, it nevertheless has echoes of holes burned in film stock by 
more authentically traumatic events. The documentary film The Day After 
Trinity (1981), for example, contains footage of the first nuclear detonation at 
Trinity site, New Mexico in 1945: as the film’s director Jon Else explains, the 
heat from that atomic bomb was “focused so intensely on the film in the 
camera gate” that it burned a small hole through the negative (quoted in 
Renov 2004: 120). Watching the footage of the explosion the viewer can 
actually see, Else points out, “this extraordinary physical imprint of the first 
atomic bomb” (quoted in Renov: 120-121). He suggests that “[i]n many ways, 
it’s the ultimate movie. It’s not just an image on the emulsion; it’s actually a 
hole in the film” (quoted in Renov: 120-121). This hole, like the lesion in my 
own film, exposes the representational limits of the medium: its inadequacy to 
fully figure the trauma of the real. Barthes searched his photograph for greater 
reality but found only the limits of its representation – the grain of the paper 
marking the point at which the medium could no longer accommodate the 
real. Similarly, because the heat from both the atomic bomb and my 
grandad’s projector lamp each confront the film stock with more ‘reality’ than 
can be integrated into its representational system, the hole created exposes 
the inadequacies of the filmic medium to fully figure the real.  
Reflecting upon the sequence from The Day After Trinity described 
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above• the documentary theorist Michael Renov parallels the trauma to the 
physical surface of the film with the “absolute unrepresentability” of the 
nuclear explosion: 
This massive release of energy is figurable only as a sheer negativity, 
commensurable not to the black leader found on every answer print of the 
documentary but to the void, a hole in the emulsion of the original camera 
stock, a null set in the domain of indexicality and of signification. (2004: 120-
121) 
As Renov suggests, the hole – a negatively presented, material-dependent 
realization of the ‘unpresentable-ness’ of the nuclear blast – cannot be 
transferred to copies of the film. It remains a trace of the event unique to the 
original stock, because the gap in the representational surface of the film 
would be lost through photographic reproduction. The absence that the lesion 
presents is of course re-presented in copies, but it becomes as flat as the 
photographic image itself – the hole filled by the material base of whatever 
medium it is copied to. Within the video image of • , the hole in the 
Super-8 footage seems to assert both the materiality of the filmstrip and yet, 
simultaneously, the loss of that very materiality through digital transfer. 
Barthes aligned the traditional photochemical image with loss – what 
he referred to as the medium’s “that-has-been” quality. The advent of 
digitization, however, has led some theorists to mourn the loss of this feeling 
of loss: the digital photograph “severs the link between representation and 
referent” (Doane 2007a: 132) and this absence of a physical, material 
connection to the subject diminishes the medium’s ‘truth claim’ (see Chapter 
Four). With this loss, the boundary between imagination and reality becomes 
uncannily blurred: the photographic image acquires an aptitude for subjectivity 
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and invention more traditionally assigned to painting (see Chapter Four). The 
introduction of such malleability leads the contemporary camera-image into an 
acutely uncertain space between art and index. It is within this uncanny space 
– between photography and painting, art and index, imagination and reality, 
death and movement, material and immaterial, past and present, waking and 
dreaming – that my film attempts to figure an experience of the indeterminate, 
to present the ‘unpresentable’. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The central aim of this practice-led research project has been to determine an 
aesthetic approach by means of which a sense of the ‘unpresentable’ may be 
exposed within camera-based representations of the industrial landscape. 
Although theoretical approaches have informed and given context to this 
undertaking, the research findings are predominantly aesthetic and studio-
based. This project’s thesis or ‘argument’ is therefore presented in the form of 
an artwork, the video piece Re: Flamingo. 
The preceding chapter has attempted to clarify the way in which ideas 
discussed throughout the written thesis – both creative and theoretical – have 
fed into Re: Flamingo’s development. It has mapped the genesis of the piece 
and detailed the ideas behind a number of its constituent parts. Ultimately 
however, this account has not endeavoured to translate the video piece’s 
‘findings’ into a textual argument. Those findings, as I have said, are 
aesthetic, and it is important that they remain so. As Timothy Emlyn Jones 
suggests (paraphrasing Andrew Harrison), for practice-led research in art and 
design “the medium of communication (of knowledge) must ultimately be 
works themselves, not descriptions of them or assertions about them” (2009: 
44).  
Given the above, a concluding textual summary of this project’s 
findings is perhaps somewhat problematic. There are, however, a number of 
recurring ideas and motifs that have provided a contextual ‘spine’ for the 
project’s argument, all of which have been clearly articulated throughout the 
written thesis. Of these, perhaps the most important has been the hypothesis 
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that lens-based media in its contemporary form(s) offers intriguing possibilities 
for figuring registers of the unpresentable. In the wake of digitization, the 
camera-image’s retention of a sense of indexical veracity, allied with its 
increasingly limitless capacity for manipulation and construction, has 
facilitated a uniquely promiscuous approach to the opposing ideas of 
subjective and objective. It is the uncertain space between these two 
ontological categories, I believe, that has constituted this project’s most 
compelling area of enquiry.  
My creative response to the industrial landscape of Teesside has 
drawn on photographic and film theory, in particular that of Barthes and 
Mulvey, in order to establish its approach to representing the unpresentable. 
Barthes’ partiality toward the photographic image’s passive, documentary 
qualities and his resistance to its ‘artistic’ potential is pertinently revealed in 
his question, “[w]hat did I care about the rules of composition of the 
photographic landscape? I saw only the referent…looking at certain 
photographs, I wanted to be primitive, without culture” (2000: 7).  
Such an uncompromisingly objective, documentary attitude toward the 
photographic image, exemplified perhaps in Bernd and Hilla Becher’s 
compositionally invariant renderings of industrial architecture (see Figure 71, 
overleaf), is somewhat elided in my own camera-based excavations of the 
industrial landscape (see, for example, Figure 72 overleaf). My attempt to 
reveal something of the unpresentable in such images walks an uncertain line 
between the subjective and the objective. The inert, objective, indexical  
 
 

 
Figure 71 Bernd and Hilla Becher, Cooling Towers, 1970s, Gelatin silver prints. 


 
Figure 72 Matthew Smith, Re: Flamingo, 2011. Video still. 
IMAGE REMOVED DUE TO COPYRIGHT RESTRICTIONS. PLEASE SEE HARD COPY 
FOR ORIGINAL IMAGE.
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passivity of the photographic image lends itself to a figuration of the traumatic 
real (see Chapter Three, p68). What is more, the medium’s perceptual 
richness and ability to graft from objective reality marks it as particularly 
adequate to a representation of the sublime. However, the sublime and its 
‘subcategory’ the uncanny may be, ultimately, subjective experiences. My 
attempts to figure a sense of the unpresentable, therefore, trace the concept’s 
complex, often paradoxical relationship to the ontological registers of 
subjective and objective. 
Re: Flamingo represents its industrial landscapes, to some degree, by 
means of a documentary aesthetic: it trades in a certain sense of passive 
registration and objective, indexical veracity. However, that sense of 
truthfulness is somewhat tempered by various creative incursions throughout 
the work – distortions that make the viewer question the agenda of the piece. 
It is the transgressing of such boundaries that contributes, I believe, to this 
project’s distinctive approach to exposing a sense of the unpresentable in 
camera-based representations of the industrial landscape. 
Non-digital works such as Stan Douglas’s installation Der Sandmann 
and Ridley Scott’s film Blade Runner have been shown to expose a sense of 
the unpresentable in the landscape through their reliance on the materiality of 
the film stock. Re: Flamingo, though maintaining that indexical aesthetic as 
the most appropriate with which to approach such subject matter, does so 
through a prism of digital immateriality. This brings a new level of uncertainty 
to a set of forms already functioning as activators of uncanniness, in a 
medium that has always been intimately bound to a sense of the uncanny. 
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In 1982, the year of Blade Runner’s theatrical release, the film theorist 
Peter Wollen asked: 
To what extent does film communicate by reproducing an imprint, in Bazin's 
term, of reality and of natural expressivity of the world...? Or, to what extent 
does it mediate and deform (or transform) reality and natural expressivity by 
displacing it into a more or less arbitrary and non-analoguous system and 
thence reconstituting it, not only imaginatively, but in some sense 
symbolically? (1982: 2) 
This uncertain space in film described by Wollen, somewhere between reality 
and imagination, is the same space within which a sense of the unpresentable 
may be glimpsed. In the 21st century, increasingly uncertain boundaries 
between media, alongside the omnipresence of digital imaging processes, 
have given new significance to Wollen’s question. This project has explored 
the spaces revealed by such shifting borders, and in so doing has suggested 
new forms through which a sense of the unpresentable may be exposed 
within camera-based representations of the industrial landscape. 
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POSTSCRIPT 
There are certain ideas raised by this project that suggest interesting 
possibilities for further research. Of these, for me the most engaging relate to 
those ideas of alienation, estrangement and a homesickness or “nostalgia for 
the premodern” (Vidler: 8) discussed towards the end of Chapter Two. The 
concept of the “sprawling, artificial terrains” of modernity being “divorced from 
nature” (Luckhurst 2008: 20) was a central, if perhaps implicit theme of Re: 
Flamingo. Considered from this perspective, my video piece explored the 
alienating effects of the industrial landscape by (to some extent at least) 
dialectically opposing it to a natural/rural landscape. It seems to me that an 
interesting evolution of the practical research presented here might be to 
develop a video piece that reverses this opposition, considering the above 
ideas from the perspective of a natural/rural landscape. 
Some of my most successful experiments with video prior to the 
commencement of this PhD programme have been developed from footage 
shot in the northwest Highlands of Scotland (see Figures 73 and 74, overleaf). 
The ideas behind these pieces have been informed, to a large degree, by my 
experiences of living for short periods of time over that last twenty years in a 
small communal setting there.  
Leaving that situation to return to modern urban life has always been 
difficult for me, and I believe the particular feeling that seems to accompany 
such a departure contains the seeds of an intriguing practical investigation. 
Building upon the notion that modernity brought with it “the alienation of the 
individual” – as “community bonds were brutally severed” (Vidler 1994: 4) and 
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people became “lost in isolation from nature” (Constant quoted in Vidler 1994: 
4) – such a project would explore the potential of the ‘industrial’ media of 
photography and film to map the traumatic departure from an almost edenic 
natural landscape of ‘connectedness’ to an alienating urban one. As David 
Campany suggests, “[t]he camera [can be] understood as nature’s industrial 
other but also as an apparatus with a particular affinity with organic form. It 
[can] produce ‘natural signs’, images as apparently unmediated and 
spontaneous as nature itself" (2003: 39). 
 
Figure 73 Matthew Smith, Paper Lanterns, 2003. Digital video, 10 min. 
 
 
Figure 74 Matthew Smith, Sound of Sleat, 2003. Digital video, 7:41 min.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[A]mid the Ridley Scott images of world cities, the writing about 
skyscraper fortresses, the Baudrillard visions of hyperspace … 
most people actually still live in places like Harlesden or West 
Brom. Much of life for many people, even in the heart of the First 
World, still consists of waiting in a bus shelter with your shopping 
for a bus that never comes.  
 
(Massey 1994: 163, quoted in Keiller 1997) 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix One:  
Re: Flamingo – Transcript of Narration 
Email 1: Matthew to Clara (mistakenly sent to “Dad”) 
Clara,  
Sorry I’ve not been in touch for a while. I think about you but my work is keeping me 
busy.  
Recently I’ve become preoccupied with thoughts of a film I saw late one night. Some 
of its images seemed oddly familiar and made such an impression on me they’ve 
even begun appearing in my dreams. Watching it seems to have brought back a 
long-forgotten moment from my past. After the film ended I read an interview with its 
director, who like my dad grew up on Teesside in the 1950s. He said: “There's a walk 
from Redcar into Hartlepool ... I'd cross a bridge at night, and walk above the steel 
works. That's probably where the opening of the film comes from. It always seemed 
to be rather gloomy and raining, and I'd just think ‘God, this is beautiful’.” 
Though what he said didn’t quite identify what part of my past watching the film has 
brought back to me, I think it is somehow related. Set in a heavily industrialized 
future, the opening scene he talks about shows immense chimneys spitting flames 
into the sky. As you can imagine it did remind me of the Teesside skyline. 
In the film, industry has integrated itself into society to such a degree, that in some 
cases it’s difficult to tell the living from the mechanical. In fact, the main character 
even falls in love with a kind of machine. It’s this part of the story, I think, that made 
me feel like I’d seen it before - though I’m sure I have not. I can’t place the reason for 
this, but I think the answer lies somewhere in my childhood. That’s why I’m writing to 
you, hoping you might remember something from those days that I can’t? 
With love, 
Matthew 
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Email 2: Dad to Matthew 
Dear Matthew,  
I’ve not heard from you in a while so I was pleased when an email arrived from you. 
When I read Clara’s name I saw your mistake in sending it to me and I should have 
read no further. I hope you’ll forgive me though, as I’m clearly in your thoughts, and I 
think I may be able to answer some of your questions. Growing up amongst all that 
industry did affect me – but in stranger ways than you‘d imagine.  
My bus journey to school went through the centre of the massive chemical-works 
complex where your Granddad worked. There were two huge lagoons of chemicals 
that regularly changed colour through fluorescent greens and blues. We went 
through tunnels of steaming pipes and leaking valves, less than fifty feet from the 
road. I remember holding my breath through the more colourful ones – scared they 
were poisonous. Occasionally, I'd go in to meet my Dad. He worked at the Nitrogen 
Fertilizer Plant where he manually loaded “one hundredweight” sacks on to lorries. 
He did this all day every day for over twenty years. But from the second floor of my 
school, beyond all that industry, you could clearly see the North York Moors less than 
ten miles away. I can vividly remember sitting on the upper deck of that bus, thinking, 
“I'm getting out of here”. Perhaps I’ll never really understand what effect that place 
had on me, but sometimes, it seems as though the shapes of those chimneys and 
cooling towers, are fixed permanently in my mind, looming like ghosts on the horizon 
of whatever landscape I see.  
The film you described in your email to Clara reminded me of another ghost that’s 
haunted me since my childhood, and I wonder if it might be this same ghost, that’s 
causing your strange dreams? Once, when you were very young, I read you a story 
called The Sandman. Like the film you saw, the protagonist of this story – who is 
haunted by the Sandman – falls in love with a robot of sorts. As a child I was read 
this story too – by my dad. I remember one passage in particular gave me terrible 
nightmares. It read: “The Sandman is a wicked man who comes after children when 
they won’t go to bed, and throws handfuls of sand in their eyes, so that they jump out 
of their heads. Then he throws them into his sack and carries them to the crescent 
moon as food for his little children”. 
I used to dream, that unknown to him the sacks my dad heaved all day in the 
chemical works belonged to the Sandman – filled not with nitrogen fertilizer, but 
children’s eyes! Many years later, just after your granddad died, I found the Sandman 
story amongst his things and soon after I read it to you. I can remember that as I 
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read it my nightmares about the chemical works came back to me. I think that even 
then part of me still believed in the Sandman – that my dad had died being forced to 
take part in his wicked chemical experiments, as this is what happens to the boy’s 
father in the story.  
Maybe the film also reminded you of the Sandman story and that sad night years ago 
when I read it to you? If the industrial landscapes of the film also brought to mind the 
landscape we would see when we used to visit your granddad, maybe somehow, 
some part of my childhood nightmare found its way to you? 
Again, apologies for reading an email not intended for me. I hope some of what I’ve 
said might be helpful … 
With love, 
Dad 
P.S. With the Sandman book I found some of your granddad’s old home movies. I’ll 
post them to you. I think there could be some shots of Teesside, which I thought 
might help with your work. 
 
 
Email 3: Matthew to Clara 
Clara, 
It was my own mistake but I regret that my dad read the email I intended to send to 
you. You’ll find it (with his reply) below this one …  
Though I’m sure he has identified the cause of my peculiar dreams, for some reason 
it hasn’t helped – and unfortunately the Super-8 reels of my granddad’s he posted to 
me contain very few shots of industrial Teesside. In what shots of the area there are 
the factories are out of focus or half cropped out of the frame – the camera zooming 
in on some piece of wildlife. In one shot a flamingo that had escaped from a nearby 
theme park is seen wading in a lagoon beneath the chemical works. As I watched 
this I thought about my granddad, who was a keen birdwatcher. I wondered what 
he’d think of the novel I’m reading – another vision of a dystopian future inspired by 
the Teesside landscape. One of its characters announces “a love of nature keeps no 
factories busy.”  
When I realised dad’s email hadn’t helped me shake the strange images from my 
mind I decided to drive to Teesside. I thought it might help to see it with my own 
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eyes. But I took my video camera with me that day and when I returned home I 
watched what I’d recorded. What had comforted me while I was there returned, on 
the video, as the same peculiar landscape that’s been troubling my dreams! Maybe 
there was something about my recordings that reminded me of my granddad’s old 
Super 8 films – or perhaps seeing the landscape framed by a screen gave it 
something of that film I saw? Whatever the answer is I see now that filming a thing 
can change it. This makes me think again about my dad. In his email, he 
remembered as a child looking at the chemical works and saying to himself “I’m 
getting out of here”. When he was eighteen, a photography diploma in another city 
allowed him to leave. But I think it offered another kind of escape as well. All his life 
he's photographed only rural landscapes, as though documenting something that 
would one day be lost. Perhaps he imagined a future much like the film I saw, where 
people admire only synthetic birds and green, sunlit woodlands are only seen 
through implanted memories. 
But industry and technological simulation have, in a way, caught up with my dad. The 
photochemical processes that intrigued him as a boy have been electronically 
replicated and replaced. I’m not sure if this matters much to me, but for some reason 
it makes me think about my granddad’s home movies. The dust and scratches on the 
film surface always remind me I’m watching an animated sequence of frozen 
moments, but they also seem to give these “memories” their own life independent of 
the permanence of the images. The sense of lost time this decay evokes is 
something that digital images don’t seem to have. They are memories without their 
own history. Like the androids in the film I saw who were gifted with other people’s 
memories to convince them of their individuality, like clones one recollection is 
indistinguishable from another.  
Maybe it’s this that’s been haunting me since I saw that film. A strange image of 
technology moving in, not only on reality, but on time and on the life of my memories. 
Perhaps, like the character in the film I saw, and in the book my dad read me as a 
child, I’m under the spell of a machine – possessed by nothing more than the 
mechanical representation of a landscape I used to see as a child, and haunted by 
the strange dream that my memories of that landscape are somehow not my own. 
I hope you are well and that I hear back from you soon … 
With love, 
Matthew 
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Appendix Two:  
Email from Michael Smith to Matthew Smith  
sent 28.12.2008 
 
Dear Matt,  
A thought that's occurred to me - one of your questions has more significance than 
you'd imagine - the Blade Runner one. I've told you some of this before but maybe 
not with enough emphasis.  
From age 11 to 13+ my journey to school by bus went through the centre of that 
huge complex. A snapshot: Sitting upstairs on an unheated double-decker, dark 
winter mornings and evenings. Men smoking, 'No Spitting' signs. Driving through 
took 10 to 15 mins. There were two huge lagoons of chemicals that regularly 
changed colour - fluorescent greens and blues. The main Billingham outlet to the 
Tees was usually a primary colour. We went through tunnels of steaming pipes and 
leaking valves maybe 50 feet away. I remember holding my breath through the more 
colourful ones - scared they were poisonous. Occasionally I'd go and meet my Dad 
(pre-security days you could almost wander in). He worked at the Nitrogen Fertilizer 
Plant where he manually loaded one hundredweight (50 kg) sacks on to lorries - all 
day every day for over 20 years. At one time the route to find him was through the 
'drum plant', where they made large steel drums for the chemicals. It was literally 
deafening - a different dimension to the nightmare. The point of telling you this is that 
I can vividly remember sitting on that upper deck age 11 or 12 thinking - I'm getting 
out of here. Which is obviously relevant to how you came about, eventually. 
Love Dad 
P.S. Counterpoint: from the second floor of my school you could clearly see the 
North Yorks Moors less than 10 miles away. 
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Appendix Three: Test screenings of Re: Flamingo (group screenings only) 
 
• Newcastle University Fine Art Lecture Theatre, Newcastle upon Tyne. 21st 
October 2009. Screening of first draft of Re: Flamingo for selected audience. 
• RENDER10, Globe City Gallery, Newcastle upon Tyne. 23rd – 27th September 
2010. Looped installation of late draft of Re: Flamingo within public group 
show (see Figure 56, p166).  
• Newcastle University Fine Art Seminar Room, Newcastle upon Tyne. 28th – 
29th September and 6th October 2010. Three screenings of late draft of Re: 
Flamingo for invited audiences (see Figure 75 below). 
• MK Gallery, Milton Keynes. 3rd February 2011. Late draft of Re: Flamingo 
shown as part of ‘Matt Smith: Selected Films, 2002-2010’ (see Figure 57, 
p166). 
 
 
Figure 75 E-invite/poster for screenings of a draft version of Re: Flamingo (then 
known as Do Grandads Dream of Celluloid Flamingos?) within 
Newcastle University. 
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